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PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA SETTING IN FOREIGN POLICY

A Dissertation

by

JEFFREY SCOTT PEAKE

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1999

Major Subject: Political Science

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May 1999

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ABSTRACT

Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy. (May 1999)

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Agenda setting is the critical first stage of the policy process that determines which issues government will address. Given its importance, agenda setting is fundamental to presidential leadership in American politics. Few scholars have empirically examined the president's role in the process or the president's ability to influence other agendas. A conventional wisdom persists claiming that presidents are effective agenda setters.

I challenge the conventional wisdom of presidential predominance in agenda setting, instead claiming that presidents are responsive to competing agendas and their policy environments. I examine presidential agenda setting in the most presidential of policies, foreign policy. My analysis clearly shows that presidents are constrained substantially by international events and competing institutions, particularly the media, when defining their own agenda and when trying to influence other agendas. The results indicate only marginal influence of presidents on the foreign policy agenda. I examine ten different foreign policy issues, from 1984 to 1995, using sophisticated time series methods, including Vector Autoregression analysis and impact assessment analysis.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Years of effort go into writing a dissertation, and there are several people I want to thank. Without them, this work would not have been possible. I want to thank George Edwards, whose mentoring helped guide me through the rough waters of graduate school. Many young scholars become lost and work without focus. Professor Edwards helped me keep focused on the question at hand, making what seemed a daunting task more attainable. I must thank Dan Wood, whose friendship and collegial advice helped bolster my confidence. Dan is a master methodologist, and it was his teaching ability that made me realize the utility of econometrics and time series. Countless discussions with Dan helped formulate ideas into empirical questions. I want to thank James Anderson and Bill Brands, whose helpful commentary on my work made it much clearer. Thanks must go to Bryan Jones for his agenda setting course, where ideas were born, and Nehemia Geva for his willingness to talk issues out candidly. Thanks to my cohorts at A&M for never taking things too seriously.

One cannot make it through the process without support from family. First and foremost I want to thank Lori Peake, a more wonderful wife I could not imagine. Her support and thoughtfulness through these years in College Station have made it all worthwhile. Her parents, Gary and Phyllis Kimmel, helped make Texas home, and for that I am ever grateful. Thanks must go to my parents, John Peake and Beverly Vermillion, for allowing a kid to dream and make that dream a reality.

Finally, thanks are in order for the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University, a place where young scholars receive plenty of support. Dozens of individuals at A&M made my stay here both enjoyable and thought provoking. To them, I say thank you. Thank you Donna Dunlap for making the administrative side of graduate school a breeze, and Pat Hurley for developing such a fine graduate program. Thanks to the Center for the Study of the Presidency, for a dissertation grant that made the daunting task of data collection and analysis manageable, and thanks to Doug Bond of Harvard University for graciously providing the PANDA data set that was very useful in my analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the publication of Neustadt's (1960) seminal *Presidential Power*, studies on the presidency have focused on leadership. Crucial to presidential leadership is the ability of presidents to influence the political agendas of other actors. Through effective agenda setting, presidents can establish the priorities of government and the American people.

Agenda setting consists of the activities that influence what issues government attends too, how the issues are defined, and which policy proposals are used to address the issues. John Kingdon defines the policy agenda as "the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying serious attention to at any given time" (1984, 3). In order for an issue or policy proposal to receive attention by government, it first must be placed on the policy agenda.

Agenda setting is critical to the public policy process. By definition, agenda setting is the first stage of the process. E. E. Schattscheider (1960) succinctly stated the importance of agenda setting when he wrote, "The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power" (68). Agenda setters are powerful actors in American

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This dissertation follows the style and format of the *American Journal of Political Science*.

politics. They define which problems the government tackles and which issues the government ignores. Some subjects emerge, attracting governmental attention, whereas others are never seriously considered by government. The pre-decision process of agenda setting is certainly as important as other stages in the policy process, for those latter stages do not occur until the agenda is set.

The agenda setting process is critical to presidential leadership. In order to be a successful policy maker, presidents must have some influence on the policy agenda. Presidential success and power in the policy process is increased if the president can influence the agendas of Congress, the media, and the American people. According to Neustadt (1960), the key to presidential power is persuasion. In order to persuade other actors, the president must first have some influence on their agendas.

Previous Research

Despite the importance of agenda setting to presidential leadership, we know little concerning the president's role in the process. Most studies that address the president's role in agenda setting suggest a great deal of presidential influence. Distinguished scholars, including Kingdon (1984), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Neustadt (1960), and Samual Huntington (1973) have written on the president's role in setting both the national and the congressional agendas in American politics. Kingdon argues that the president can single-handedly set the national agenda, influencing both Congress and the media. Kingdon states "there is little doubt that the president remains

a powerful force in agenda setting, particularly when compared to other actors" (1984, 25).

Baumgartner and Jones describe the president as having a unique ability to thrust an issue into national prominence, both in the media and Congress. In describing the president's role in the process, Baumgartner and Jones argue: "No single actor can focus attention as clearly, or change the motivations of such a great number of other actors, as the president" (1993, 241). The president can be the dominant agenda setter in American politics if he effectively establishes a focused set of priorities.

The idea that the president proposes and Congress disposes legislation is strongly founded in the traditional presidential-congressional literature. According to Neustadt, "Congressmen need an agenda from outside, something with high status to respond to or react against. What provides it better than the program of the president" (1960, 7)? Samual Huntington writes, "Congressmen expect the president to present them with bills. The President now determines the legislative agenda of Congress" (1973, 23).

Analysis by Example

Both pundits and scholars use examples to show presidential influence on the policy agenda. Examination of presidential agenda setting by example is far from systematic, however, typically providing great success stories. A common example of successful presidential agenda setting is President Clinton's effort to push Congress to address the issue of health care in 1993. Once it was clear the president was serious about health care, the media and Congress attended to the issue. Of course, setting the

agenda does not mean policy success. In the end, Clinton's plan was unsuccessful. However, presidential involvement did place the health care issue on the policy agenda.

Another instance of presidential success in setting the agenda is George Bush's war on drugs. Prior to his nationally televised speech of September 5, 1989, when President Bush announced the war on drugs, roughly 28 percent of the American people felt that drugs were the most important problem facing the United States. Following the president's speech, nearly two-thirds of American voters considered drugs the most important problem, an increase of nearly 40 percentage points. Furthermore, presidential attention to the problem increased media attention to drugs eight fold, resulting in substantially increased public concerns (B. Jones 1994).

Examples suggest that presidents can indeed be powerful agenda setters. However, analysis by example fails to systematically explain presidential success or failure in agenda setting. Rarely do examples of failed presidential agenda setting become part of our political folklore on presidential power. Although President Reagan was very successful in economic policy early in his administration, his inability to direct Congress and the American people to take on issues such as Nicaragua, prayer in schools, and abortion frustrated his presidency. President Ford proposed a $100 billion Government Energy Corporation, which Congress ignored. Other examples of presidential failure and success in agenda setting exist. However, sorting through them in an unsystematic manner will not answer the central question of whether or not presidents are effective agenda setters.

Moving Beyond Examples

Despite the evidence suggesting presidential influence on the policy agenda, no study has examined presidential agenda setting systematically over several issues. The case studies and examples in the literature do not provide stringent tests of presidential influence. Also, most of the research fails to address confounding factors that may influence the policy agenda, such as competing institutional agendas and events. We cannot be sure that presidents are influential without taking into account other factors that may influence the policy agenda.

It is quite possible that the president's agenda is influenced by external factors, including attention to issues by Congress and the media, or important political events. The most prominent study focusing on the president's agenda is Light's *The President's Agenda* (1991). Light finds that the president's list of priorities usually originates from outside the White House. Congressional initiatives have a way of finding their way on to the president's agenda. Light's findings imply that the president may not be as consequential in setting policy agendas as other authors suggest. If the president's own priorities are shaped by media and congressional attention to issues, can he in turn influence the agendas of the media and Congress?

Recent systematic research questions the conventional wisdom of presidential advantage in agenda setting. Wood and Peake (1998) examine the president's and media's agendas in foreign policy over time and find that the president does not systematically influence media attention to three foreign policy issues. The president

responds to increased media attention, instead of leading the media. Anecdotes suggest that the president can be sporadically influential. However, sporadic influence is not the same as a systematic relationship between presidential efforts to influence the agenda and what makes up the policy agenda.

Systematic study focusing on the president's agenda raises questions concerning the relative inability of presidents to influence other institutional agendas. Citing examples of success and failure will get us no closer to solving the puzzle of presidential influence in agenda setting. In order to explain the president's role in the agenda setting process it is necessary to move beyond analysis by example and focus on systematic analysis of several issues over time. Also, we cannot determine the role of the president in agenda setting without exploring both presidential influence on the policy agenda and the makeup of the president's own agenda.

Research Focus

I focus my research on the president's influence on the foreign policy agenda for several reasons. First, most of the work on agenda setting has focused on domestic policy. "We know practically nothing about why it is that some situations abroad never become the subject of public discussion, whereas others take hold and soon acquire the status of national issues" (Rosenau 1961, 4-5). Research over the past 35 years has not explained much concerning the perplexing problem of why some issues rise to the attention of policymakers in foreign affairs while others do not.

Second, foreign policy is a large part of a president's job. Presidents spend a great deal of time working on foreign policy because of the subject's political importance. Presidents are often evaluated on how well they handle foreign affairs (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995) and presidential legacies are often defined by presidential success or failure in foreign affairs. Foreign policy decisions are profoundly important to the survival of the nation. In the words of President Kennedy, "Domestic policy... can only defeat us, foreign policy can kill us" (Wildavsky 1966, 24).

Presidents play an important role in foreign policy. Presidents are the chief diplomats of the United States and have clear constitutional responsibilities in foreign policy. When foreign policy decisions are made, they are typically referred to as the president's policy. Foreign policy is more presidential than other policy areas including economic and welfare policy. If presidents influence the policy agenda, we are likely to see that influence in foreign policy. Analysis of foreign policy provides a best case for presidential influence in agenda setting. Foreign policy is defined for the purposes of this study as the interaction between the United States and other nations, and the policies that come under that domain. Also included are the relationships between other nations or within other nations that may effect the foreign policy of the United States.

Research Questions

The central research question of this dissertation is: Can the president significantly influence the foreign policy agendas of the media and Congress? If so, when is presidential influence the greatest, and which methods available to the president

have the greatest influence on the policy agenda? Also, do the agendas of the media and Congress influence the president's priorities in foreign policy? Essentially, I want to determine whether the president is leading the foreign policy agendas of the Congress and the media, or responding to shifts in attention by Congress or the media.

Understanding the president's role in the agenda setting process should enlighten our understanding of presidential leadership in American politics. It is likely that presidents are more effective using some agenda setting strategies as opposed to others. Also, if presidents are more successful on some issues, we can begin to predict when presidents are likely to be successful in the future. Finally, determining what influences the president's own foreign policy agenda provides a more complete picture of the agenda setting process.

Research Approach

I address the research questions by identifying two theoretical models that suggest varying levels of presidential success in agenda setting and testing the two models using time series methods. One model, the hegemonic presidency, suggests presidents dominate the foreign policy agenda, with Congress and the media exercising little influence. When the president attends to an issue in foreign policy, the media and Congress follow the president's lead. The pluralist presidency rejects the notion of presidential dominance. Instead of dominating the agenda process, the president competes with members of Congress and the media for influence in setting the foreign

policy agenda. Presidents become frustrated in their attempts to influence the policy agenda, often finding themselves following the institutions they are trying to lead.

In order to test both models of presidential agenda setting, we must test for presidential influence, while simultaneously determining if presidents react by adjusting their own agenda in response to Congress and the media. The time series methods I adopt allow for the reciprocal relationships predicted by the pluralist model, while at the same time testing the hegemonic model.

Presidents influence the foreign policy agenda using three methods: continuous public attention to a specific issue, presidential drama, and legislative initiatives. Presidents focus attention by publicly addressing an issue consistently over time. The White House sends signals to other institutions on what they consider the important issues of the day. Presidents also focus attention on a foreign policy issue through presidential drama. Dramatic events created by the president include taking trips abroad, attending summit meetings, or using military force (Brace and Hinckley 1992). Systematic examination of both methods are necessary in order to test the level of presidential influence in foreign policy agenda setting. Finally, presidents initiate legislation in order to influence the agenda. Since legislation rarely is of consequence in most of the foreign policy issues examined in the dissertation (Hinckley 1994), I exclude examination of the initiative strategy.

Organization of the Study

I organize the study as follows. First, I review the relevant agenda setting literature, focusing on the president's role in the process. Then I present two theoretical frameworks and expectations that flow from the two theories. Many contextual factors influence the policy agenda. Also, presidents use different methods in order to exert influence, with varying degrees of success. I test the expectations of the theories using time series methods, examining the different strategies over a set of ten foreign policy issues.

In Chapter II, I review the literature regarding the role of the president in agenda setting. In reviewing the literature, I find substantial scholarly support for presidential influence in agenda setting. However, most of the conclusions supporting presidential prominence rely on only a few cases, anecdotal evidence, or evidence not directly related to presidential attempts to influence agendas. The systematic study of agenda setting requires a dynamic approach, one that examines the process over a lengthy period of time. No previous study which focuses on the president and finds presidential influence has examined the question dynamically. The agenda setting literature indicates the importance of the media, Congress, and especially focusing events in setting the policy agenda.

In Chapter III, I develop the hegemonic and pluralist presidency models. The hegemonic presidency model is based on research that supports the conventional wisdom of presidential influence on the policy agenda. The pluralist presidency model is based on work that doubts the ability of presidents to significantly influence agendas. The two

models provide a set of testable hypotheses related to the president's influence and role in agenda setting. I discuss the importance of international events in foreign policy agenda setting. Events provide the foreign policy context. Policy context matters in agenda setting and must be taken into account when modeling the agenda process. Also in Chapter III, I explore the methods presidents use to influence the policy agenda. For instance, are presidents making speeches, ordering military attacks, or practicing summitry? We can expect varying levels of presidential influence depending on the strategy employed. I explore the effectiveness of the different strategies available to presidents.

In Chapter IV, I discuss the design of the research, including the data, measurement techniques, and a basic introduction to Vector Auto Regression and Impact Assessment analysis, the primary statistical methods used in the study. The data include weekly observations of the presidential, the media, and congressional agendas and international events on ten different foreign policy issues over the period January 1984 to April 1995. Chapter IV also addresses why a longitudinal time series approach allowing reciprocal relationships between the president and other institutions is more appropriate than other possible approaches.

Chapters V through VII are the analytical chapters of the dissertation. In each of the chapters, I analyze questions concerning the president's influence on the foreign policy agenda. In Chapter V, I examine presidential influence on the media and congressional agendas for eight different regional issues using the continuous attention measure of the president's agenda. I test the level of influence presidents have on the

agenda and find minimal presidential success for most issues. The findings suggest that presidents shift their agendas in reaction to changes in media coverage of most foreign policy issues. Presidents also respond to changes in congressional attention on a few of the issues. International events influence all three institutional agendas.

Chapter VI deals with presidential drama designed to influence the foreign policy agenda. How do dramatic presidential events, such as summit meetings, televised national addresses, military attacks, and presidential trips abroad impact media and congressional attention to the different foreign policy issues? I assess the impact of 31 different presidential events on media and congressional attention in six of the foreign policy issues. The analysis indicates that presidential drama usually increases media and congressional attention for at least a week. Significant impacts beyond the initial week are less common, however, with less than a third of the presidential events examined having a long term impact on media and congressional attention to the issues. Only the most dramatic presidential events have a significant impact on the foreign policy agenda.

In Chapter VII, I examine the president's ability to set the foreign policy agenda for broad policy issues, including foreign aid and foreign trade, using the continuous attention measure. Foreign aid and trade are important, contentious issues that are fundamentally different than the regional issues examined in Chapters V and VI. Events are less important in setting the agenda in broad policy issues, like aid and trade. Also, Congress has specific constitutional powers governing foreign aid and trade so it is likely that Congress plays a critical role in influencing the agenda for these issues. Finally,

without events defining the foreign policy agenda for foreign aid and trade, the president has more influence than on the regional issues where events prove vital.

I discuss implications of the findings for presidential leadership and democracy, and how the results relate to agenda setting more broadly in Chapter VIII. I also discuss the empirical and normative implications of the findings. How do the findings in the dissertation relate to the study of the presidency? Is the media driving the foreign policy agenda by design or does media coverage just reflect public concerns about prominent international events? How does the prominence of the media in foreign policy agenda setting affect the president's leadership abilities in foreign policy? The results presented in the dissertation point to further questions regarding the relationship between the president, the media, and Congress in foreign policy.

One of the most comprehensive studies on agenda setting is Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. The authors focus on how issues become important enough for policymakers to address and how policy subsystems are dissolved through the processes of agenda setting. Despite their broad study, which makes some very important conclusions concerning the importance of agenda setting in public policy, Baumgartner and Jones fail to systematically examine the president's role in the process. Instead, they focus on the media and Congress. Their exclusion of the president does not preclude them from reaching conclusions concerning the president's role, however.

> No single actor can focus attention as clearly, or change the motivations of such a great number of other actors, as the president . We saw in several cases... how the involvement of the president pushed those issues high onto the agenda... We conclude that the president is not a necessary actor in all cases, but when he decides to become involved, his influence can be decisive indeed (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 241).

According to Baumgartner and Jones, presidents have the ability to thrust issues onto the national agenda by focusing on one issue to the exclusion of other issues. Surely presidential involvement may legitimize a problem for congressional discussion and media concern; however, the authors make sweeping conclusions concerning presidential influence without measuring the independent impact of the president's agenda or presidential activities on the policy agenda. Baumgartner and Jones address the difficulties of systematically measuring the president's agenda; however, they abandon the task in favor of focusing on Congress and the media.

Kingdon's (1984) *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* is another study of agenda setting that concludes that presidents are influential in setting the policy agenda. Kingdon (1984) argues that the participants involved in a policy and the process by which items come into prominence define the agenda setting process. Participants include the president, Congress, bureaucrats, the media, congressional staff, and interest groups. Kingdon seeks to explain why some problems capture the attention of policymakers, while others are ignored.

Policy proposals, generated by the relevant actors in a policy area, turn into alternatives when they are actively considered by policymakers. The political environment determines when the time is right for an alternative to make it to active consideration. Elements in the political environment include (but are not limited to) problem perception, the party situation in Congress, election results, critical events that focus attention on a problem, and the number of viable alternatives available to policymakers. The opportunity for a problem to rise to the agenda exists when the environmental elements are favorable for the problem and its relevant proposals. Despite the importance of other political actors in this process, Kingdon concludes "there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in agenda setting, particularly when compared to other actors" (1984, 25).

To test his model, Kingdon relies on interviews with participants, including bureaucrats, congressional staff, and media experts to determine who were the critical actors in health and transportation policy over a period of four years in the 1970s. He examines the agenda setting process in health care and transportation policy and finds

that members of Congress and the president play the most important role in raising a problem to the agenda. Reliance on interview data may overestimate the role of the president. Interviews rely heavily on the respondents' recall of past actions and events, which may tend to focus on dramatic actions by presidents or members of Congress. Respondents are more likely to remember dramatic actions by policy entrepreneurs that culminated in a problem reaching the agenda and are less likely to recall more mundane influences. Also, asking respondents which issues are "hot" and why does not provide a systematic measure of actual influence or issue prominence, relying on individual perceptions of influence and the important issues. Reliance upon perceptions may overestimate the actual influence of the president and other important political actors. Actual measures of presidential activity with analysis of how agenda setting activities affect media or congressional attention is a much more systematic and valid way to estimate presidential influence.

Another problem with Kingdon's study is that it only provides a cross-sectional glimpse at the agenda-setting process by examining a particular policy at a given time (transportation and health policy during four years in the 1970s). Although the data exist over a time period, Kingdon's method of analysis does not take advantage of the dynamic nature of his data. The process that Kingdon describes is inherently dynamic, however his analysis is not. Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) work shows the dynamic nature of agenda setting. To understand and accurately estimate how presidents influence the agendas of the media and Congress requires examining the agenda process over time, across the span of many years.

Shifts in institutional attention are important indicators of changes in the policy agenda (B. Jones 1994). In his discussion of attention shifts and their affects on public policy, Bryan Jones provides a case study of presidential agenda setting that clearly shows the capacity of presidents to affect the public's agenda. Jones shows how President Bush's "War on Drugs" speech significantly increased both media attention and public concern for the drug problem. "A peak in awareness of the drug problem was caused primarily by presidential attention to it" (B. Jones 1994, 107). Jones shows how shifts in presidential attention influences public opinion and the case he chose demonstrates the malleability of public perceptions. However, it is the use of such case studies that tend to overestimate presidential influence in agenda setting. By focusing on presidential successes, case studies avoid instances of failure and authors tend to over-generalize from the cases' findings.

Presidents Influencing Congress

Scholars of presidential-congressional relations generally agree that the president has a systematic impact on the congressional agenda. However, they differ on the degree to which presidents exert influence over the legislative agenda. Huntington (1973), for example, used a quote from Senator Abraham Ribicoff to argue his point that the president controlled the legislative agenda:

> Congress has surrendered its rightful place in the leadership in the lawmaking process to the White House. No longer is Congress the source of major legislation. It now merely filters legislative proposals from the President, straining out some and reluctantly letting others pass through. These days no one expects Congress to devise the important bills (28).

Studies of presidential success in Congress have generally focused on roll-call voting (Bond and Fleischer 1990; Edwards 1989). Roll-call studies find very limited presidential influence on the outcomes of legislative voting. Instead, voting in Congress is explained through congressionally centered variables, such as party (Edwards 1989) and ideological cross-pressures (Bond and Fleischer 1990).

Despite their findings of marginal presidential influence, neither Edwards (1989) nor Bond and Fleischer (1990) discount presidential influence in the legislative process entirely. Both studies point to agenda setting as the major presidential function in the legislative process. Bond and Fleischer (1990) state that "the president's greatest influence over policy comes from the agenda he pursues and the way it is packaged" (230). Edwards (1989) argues that the president's role in leading Congress is one of facilitator, rather than director. Part of facilitating the passage of legislation in Congress is persuading Congress to take on the issues that make up the president's own policy agenda.

Edwards (1989) suggests that presidents can increase their chance of success in Congress by maintaining a clear, focused legislative agenda, much like President Reagan did in 1981. The perception of electoral mandate surrounding Reagan's 1980 election victory offers a partial explanation for his initial success in setting the policy agenda. Electoral mandates are rare, however, and only Presidents Johnson and Reagan have experienced a mandate in the postwar period (Dahl 1990; Edwards 1989; C. Jones 1994). Elections clearly play a role in influencing policy agendas in the United States,

linking public desires to the important issues that are discussed extensively every fourth year. The appearance of a mandate helps presidents carry electoral success into the legislative arena by defining the national policy agenda in relation to the president's winning campaign.

Charles Jones (1994) carries the discussion of mandates and presidential agenda setting further in his study, *The Presidency in a Separated System.* Jones suggests that it is the illusion of electoral mandates that provide the impetus for presidential agenda setting in Congress. The president's major legislative role is not shepherding his legislation through Congress. Instead, presidents provide an orientation for new policy proposals based on whether they represent the status quo or change. The orientations provided by the president's agenda sets the tone for policy making during the president's tenure and defines which issues will receive serious consideration.

According to Jones, the president's legislative role is primarily agenda setting. The president establishes legislative priorities and Congress is hard pressed to ignore the president's agenda entirely.

> The president becomes part of a continuous though changing government. He has significant influence in setting priorities, certifying certain issues, proposing policy solutions, and reacting to policy initiatives of others... These are vital functions of a busy government. Under most circumstances, the agenda is full to overflowing. Since it is not possible to treat all issues at once, members of Congress and others anxiously await the designation of priorities. These presidential choices are typically from a list that is familiar to other political actors. Nonetheless, a designator is important, even if he is a Republican having to work with a Democratic Congress. As in any organization with too much to do, there is a need for someone in authority to say: "Let's start here" (C. Jones 1994, 181).

Charles Jones' ideas concerning the agenda role and impact of presidents are certainly plausible and well thought through. However, Jones fails to test systematically the agenda orientation role of the president. Instead, Jones takes us through an historical account of the different presidents since 1960, assigning agenda orientations to each president and then determining how that orientation fared given the circumstances of history.

Jones identifies a role for presidents in agenda setting, and he expresses some doubt about the level of influence presidents have in the process. Presidential influence is often limited by circumstances beyond the president's control, such as the partisan makeup of Congress, important international and domestic events, and the existence of agenda items prior to the president taking office.

Based on the work of these prominent scholars, it is reasonable to assert that a large number of political scientists agree that presidents significantly influence the legislative agenda. Recent empirical work generally agrees that presidents are effective agenda setters in the legislative process. Taylor (1998) examined the domestic legislative agenda in the post war period and found that presidential proposals make up a significant portion of the legislative agenda. However, congressional proposals from party leaders and committee chairs are more common. Edwards and Barrett (1999) find that presidential initiatives make up roughly 40 percent of the potentially significant legislation on the congressional agenda, a substantial subset of what Congress works on each session. Neither of these studies conclude that the president dominates the legislative agenda, only that the president plays an important role.

Presidents Influencing the Media and the Public

An important agenda setting relationship for the president is his relationship with the media. Research has established that the media have a significant impact on what the American public considers important and how they evaluate their president (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Heightened media coverage of an issue increases public concerns for problems associated with that issue, as well as priming which issues the public bases their political evaluations. Thus, influence on the media is of primary political importance to presidents. The media provide an important tool for presidential leadership of the public. If presidents can influence the level of media coverage of different issues, they can impact public concern, in effect setting the public's agenda through the media.

How successful are presidents at influencing media coverage? Many scholars agree that presidents are quite successful at influencing media coverage. The White House provides the major source of information on politics for the news media (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993). Media and public relations are institutionalized within the White House (Grossman and Kumar 1981). Many of the day's events in the White House are designed to make the network nightly news programs, to the point that the nightly news is often orchestrated by the president's handlers (Smoller 1990). The White House manipulates media coverage in an effort to put the proper spin on issues and crises that arise.

Of course, presidents may influence the media in more subtle ways by focusing presidential attention on specific issues and ignoring others. Experimental research suggests that a presidential address increases media coverage of related issues, in turn increasing public concern (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Behr and Iyengar (1985) demonstrate that a high profile, single issue speech by the president heightens media attention to the related issue. Subsequent research by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) shows that television news coverage of an issue may heighten public concern. The authors manipulated actual television news programs for experimental audiences and found that members of the audience were more likely to consider a public policy problem most important if the problem was addressed prominently in the news.

There really is no question that presidential activity and speechmaking attracts media attention. However what is not clear is whether presidential efforts at setting the media's agenda have a substantial long term influence on the media's coverage of the issues. If presidential public statements systematically increase media coverage to related issues, then presidents are quite powerful agenda setters.

A more comprehensive approach is required to address the question of presidential influence on the media's agenda. A recent study by Wood and Peake (1998) examines presidential and media attention to three foreign policy issues to estimate the amount of influence presidents have in setting the foreign policy agenda. Their findings indicate that the president has *no systematic long term impact* on media attention to the three issues, when international events are taken into account. Instead, the president

responds by changing his agenda in relation to shifts in media attention and the changing foreign policy environment represented by events.

Some scholars argue that presidents have a direct influence on what the American people consider to be the important issues. Each year presidents are required to give the State of the Union address, and through this speech, presidents try to establish the policy agenda for the coming year. Cohen (1995) found that when the president focused heavily on foreign affairs in his address, the percentage of the American public that considered a foreign policy problem the "most important problem facing America" increased. Presidents had the same effect on civil rights and economic issues. It is unclear whether or not the resulting increase in public concern for an issue was influenced by increased media coverage since Cohen did not include a measure of media salience in his study.

The President and Foreign Policy

Studies focusing on foreign policy identify the president as dominant in the policy process. The president is the central actor in American foreign policy and has abilities and powers unavailable to competing institutions. The level of information available to the president, along with increases in executive powers given by the Court, have led many scholars and participants to conclude that presidents act as directors of foreign policy change (Fenno 1973; Hinckley 1994; Peterson 1994; Rieselbach 1994; Weissman 1995). The view of presidents dominating foreign policy is consistent with the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance in agenda setting discussed above.

Work on the president in foreign policy overlooks the president's role as agenda setter, however, focusing instead on the passage of legislation in Congress. There is a wealth of empirical literature comparing presidential success in Congress in foreign policy to success in domestic policy. Most of the work on presidents in foreign policy focuses on the "two presidencies" hypothesis, comparing the legislative success of presidents in foreign and domestic policy. Other literature (eg. Hinckley 1994) has focused on the legislative agenda in Congress, examining which bills Congress acts on every year and making inferences concerning the presidential-congressional relationship from this set of cases. Empirical examinations of presidential agenda setting often exclude foreign policy, citing the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance (eg. Taylor 1998).

The Two Presidencies

The two presidencies hypothesis, originally posited by Wildavsky (1966), suggests that presidents are more successful in Congress on foreign and defense legislation than on domestic legislation. The hypothesis is based on the diplomatic, military, and informational powers of the president, which are greater than any other American political institution. Wildavsky examined data from the bipartisan era of the 1950s and 1960s, when foreign policy was consistently considered one of the most important problems by the American public. Using data from the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, he found that presidents had greater levels of success in foreign and defense policy than domestic policy.

Recent scholarship examining the two presidencies hypothesis questions Wildavsky's original findings of presidential advantage in foreign policy. Scholars have analyzed the roll-call data dealing with foreign and domestic policy and have concluded that the two presidencies do not exist after Vietnam (Edwards 1989, Chapter 4), or only exist for Republican presidents (Bond and Fleischer 1990, Chapter 6). Even with the various findings, study of the two presidencies tells us little concerning presidential leadership of Congress in foreign policy agenda setting. The research focuses on roll-call votes, the end of the legislative process, thus limiting their usefulness in extrapolating the findings to presidential agenda setting in foreign policy.

Wildavsky's (1966) original work on the two presidencies provides some interesting observations on agenda setting. Wildavsky argues that the president's time is inordinately taken up by foreign policy problems, due to the complexity and importance of international problems concerning the survival of the United States and its national interest. In the words of President Kennedy, "Domestic policy . . . can only defeat us, foreign policy can kill us" (1966, 24). Presidents spend a greater percentage of their time, than do other policymakers, on foreign policy.

Wildavsky identifies several competitors for control of foreign policy, including the public, Congress, interest groups, the military, and the bureaucracy. Despite the various competitors, presidents still dominate the process. The competitors appear weak when compared with presidential power in foreign policy, according to Wildavsky. However, Wildavsky maintains that certain competitors can make policy leadership in the White House difficult by keeping issues the president would rather ignore on the

public agenda. The major competitors include "situations", public concerns, and members of Congress.

> The fact that there are numerous foreign and domestic policy situations competing for a president's attention means that it is worthwhile to organize political activity in order to affect his agenda. For if a president pays more attention to certain problems he may develop different preferences; he may seek and receive different advice; his new calculations may lead him to devote greater resources to seeking a solution. Interested congressmen may exert influence not by directly determining a presidential decision, but indirectly by making it costly for a president to avoid reconsidering the basis for his action. For example, citizen groups, such as those concerned with a change in China policy, may have an impact simply by keeping their proposals on the public agenda (Wildavsky 1966, 25).

Despite suggesting that presidents tend to dominate the foreign policy agenda, Wildavsky clearly is stating that what makes up the president's agenda is not necessarily what the president wants to pay attention to, rather it is what the president must pay attention to. The president's agenda is subject to pressure from other competitors in foreign policy, including members of Congress and the public.

The Legislative Agenda in Foreign Policy

Some scholars examine legislative agenda setting in foreign policy by studying the bills that pass every session. Barbara Hinkley (1994) studied foreign policy legislation in Congress over a period of several decades. Hinckley concludes that most foreign policy legislation is non-binding, ceremonial, or consists of minor changes in current policy. She asserts that Congress does not have a whole lot to do with the real foreign policy decisions made within the White House, as the legislative agenda rarely

includes legislation of significance in foreign policy, other than the yearly foreign aid bill.

The literature's focus on the legislative process ignores much of the foreign policy made within Congress. Congress pressures the executive branch and makes decisions on policy without passing legislation. The president also tries to influence events within Congress beyond legislation, particularly in foreign policy. For example, in 1984 Congress passed only one significant piece of legislation dealing with the superpower relationship, an increase in SDI spending. Minimal floor action does not mean that Congress was uninterested or inactive in the progression of the Cold War in 1984. Congressional committees held 40 days of hearings concerning the Soviet Union, independent of defense legislation.

Clearly, congressional interest and activity in the Cold War was wider in 1984 than an examination of enacted legislation shows. Also, President Reagan was probably interested in pressuring members of Congress on issues related to the Soviet Union beyond that single piece of legislation in 1984. Were the congressional hearings, independent of legislation, a result of presidential pressure or activities? Or, was congressional interest in the U.S.-Soviet relationship an attempt to influence the president's foreign policy agenda?

Presidential Dominance and the Constitution

Literature on foreign policy also examines the constitutional questions of presidential dominance in the policy process (Fisher 1991, 1995). The central claim is

that the Founding Fathers meant for power to declare or initiate war to lie with Congress, not an individual president. However, during the twentieth century, presidential power in foreign policy has grown in relation to the increased complexity and leadership role of the United States in the world system. Because "foreign policy can kill us," members of Congress defer their constitutional authority in foreign policy to the president. Only in rare cases where bipartisan leadership and broad based political constituencies challenge presidential positions in foreign policy, such as South African sanctions, does Congress play a fundamental role (Weissman 1995).

Many argue that Congress has not stood by while the presidency grows in power in foreign policy. Some point to the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and increased congressional activism since the Vietnam war, and claim a "resurgent" Congress (Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Sundquist 1981). Other authors decry a "fettered presidency", claiming the resurgent Congress is detrimental to presidential leadership in foreign policy, and thus hampers the president as world leader (Crowitz and Rabkin 1989; Mann 1990; Abshire and Numberger 1981). None of the studies claiming a resurgent Congress offer systematic evidence of congressional reemergence in foreign policy other than isolated examples.

Clearly, there is a wealth of scholarship that examines the presidential-congressional relationship in foreign policy. Most of the literature asserts presidential predominance in the foreign policy realm. However, reviewing the literature has shown a dearth of knowledge on the agenda setting relationship between the president and Congress in foreign policy.

Reasons to Doubt the Conventional Wisdom

The American political system is one of separated institutions sharing power (C. Jones 1994; Neustadt 1960). All legislative powers do not reside with Congress; the Constitution provides the president with a limited veto and the ability to recommend legislation. Presidents do not declare war, they ask Congress for declarations of war. Presidents submit an annual budget to Congress, and Congress submits its own version to the president to sign into law or veto. The president does not speak directly to the American people; he speaks through the media. Political scientists agree that presidents are not able to say "do this and do that" and expect things to get done. Presidential agenda setting is likely much more complicated than the conventional wisdom suggests.

What other institutions in American politics have an influence on policy agendas in the United States? Kingdon (1984) identifies several other actors important in agenda setting including the bureaucracy, Congress, interest groups, and the media. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) suggest Congress, the media, and interest groups are important actors in agenda setting. We are primarily interested in the president's relationship with the media and Congress. Do the institutional agendas of the media and Congress impact the president's agenda? If so, presidents are less likely to dominate the foreign policy agenda. Rather, presidents may share the agenda setting role with other political actors.

Charles Jones (1994) argues that much of what makes up the president's agenda comes from external sources. Elections tend to provide the initial agenda for the president in domestic policy. Every four years, new issues rise to prominence due to the electoral schedule. Presidents come into office with a large portion of their initial agenda set for them by the election. As the winner of the election, presidents have a hand in determining the prominent issues.

Beyond the election, the context in which the president operates directs the president's agenda. The political context is beyond the president's own control. Jones identifies a continuing agenda, problems that exist prior to the president taking office.

> Although the government cannot do without a president, most of what the government does requires little or no involvement by the White House. There is a momentum to a working government that cannot be stopped or easily redirected.... One obvious conclusion is that the president's agenda—his list of priorities—is influenced by, and has to be fitted into, a larger set of ongoing issues... the president's role in the agenda is not at all of his own making. In fact, one measure of leadership is the capacity of a president to comprehend the policy environment accurately (C. Jones 1994, 165-6).

Jones argues that the president's primary role in agenda setting is designating priorities, legitimizing problems, and choosing existing proposals from the continuing agenda. When and which priorities presidents choose to designate indicate their primary contribution to agenda setting. Jones also stresses the continual nature of problems in his study. He cites President Eisenhower's final State of the Union address: "progress implies both new and continuing problems and, unlike presidential administrations, problems rarely have terminal dates" (C. Jones 1994, 171). Presidents leave their

successors with a continuing set of problems which define the context "within which the new president would set his priorities." (C. Jones 1994, 171).

The nature of problems may influence how an issue rises to the agenda. Some problems are persistent, while others are mere fads. According to Downs (1972), most issues tend to attract public and governmental attention for short periods of time, causing a flurry of governmental activity. Then the problem fades into obscurity a short time after reaching the agenda. Later down the road, the problem may reappear on the agenda, causing activity once again. Problems tend to persist, whether or not government actually solves the problem.

The persistence of difficult policy problems can limit the influence of presidents and other governmental participants in agenda setting. A persistent problem may attract the attention of the media and then the public, forcing politicians to attend to the problem even when they would rather ignore it. The persistence of problems and the likelihood of their reappearing on the agenda limits the subset of choices political actors have when deciding which issues to address and place on the their agendas.

An important part of the external foreign policy context are events. Wood and Peake (1998) argue that the president's foreign policy agenda is primarily dependent upon a set of foreign policy issues set in the context of an ongoing process of international events. They examine the impact of events exogenous to the American political system on the dynamics of presidential and media attention to three foreign policy issues. Their findings indicate that exogenous events primarily determine presidential and media attention to the foreign policy issues.

Events unrelated to an issue are important in the process, as well, according to Wood and Peake (1998). The authors identify what they call the "economy of attention," their explanation of how agenda setting relationships in foreign policy operate. Essentially, the laws of scarcity in presidential and media attention govern which issues the institutions focus. Each institution has limited agenda space to give to foreign policy, and only so much of that space can be devoted to each issue. World events determine how that agenda space is governed in foreign policy for both institutions. Wood and Peake found that when events occur in one foreign policy issue area, other issues are driven off of the agenda. For example, when the end of the Soviet Union was announced in December, 1991, both presidential and media attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict declined substantially for a long period of time. Presidents take cues from their environment when deciding which foreign policy issues to focus upon. A large part of that environment consists of international events.

Research suggests that presidents have a difficult time determining their own agendas, let alone the agendas of other institutions in American politics. Instead of internal forces determining the president's agenda, external forces beyond the control of the White House play a dominant role. Light (1991) identifies Congress, the media, interest groups, and focusing events as important factors external to the presidency. Charles Jones (1994) shows how the continuing agenda, independent of an individual president, is important, along with focusing events beyond the president's control. Wood and Peake (1998) point to international events as the primary determinant of the president's foreign policy agenda, along with media coverage of the various international

issues. The factors most important to the president's agenda appear to be the other institutional agendas, such as those of the media and Congress, the policy context, and events critical to a particular policy.

The Media's Impact on the Agenda

Scholars studying agenda setting have identified the mass media as an important part of the process. The role of the media goes beyond interpreting and reporting government activity and newsworthy events. It is believed by some scholars that the media have an independent agenda and can influence what problems and issues political participants (beyond the public) feel are important. By going beyond simple reporting of facts and aggressively investigating stories or looking for new scoops to boost ratings, national media outlets can have a profound effect on what is considered important in Washington.

Research has clearly shown that the media influence public opinion in various areas important to presidents and agenda setting. The media, at times, influence how the public votes in presidential elections (Heatherington 1996), which issues the public uses to judge presidential performance (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995; Iyengar and Kinder 1987), and which issues the public feels are most important (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page and Shapiro 1992). The media provide a necessary link for the president and other political actors to the mass public. However, many media scholars argue that the media are not mere tools of political actors seeking to influence the public; rather, the media have profound influence on the agendas of the political actors themselves.

The media may not decide for the mass public and political actors what issue positions to take; rather, the effects of the media are more subtle. Cohen (1963) argues that the media "may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (13). In other words, the media influence political agendas. The power of the press has led some observers to label the media as "the fourth branch of government" (Cater 1959).

> The reporter is the recorder of government but he is also a participant. He operates in a system in which power is divided. He as much as anyone . . . helps to shape the course of government. He is the indispensable middleman among the subgovernments of Washington. *He can choose from among the myriad of events . . . which to describe, which to ignore.* (Cater 1959, 7, emphasis added)

The issues the media ignore tend to fade from the policy agenda; whereas, the issues the media focus attention on tend to remain on the policy agenda. More recent empirical analyses suggest that the media influence the government's agenda. Linsky (1986) surveyed dozens of political officials and journalists, and concludes the media have a large, identifiable impact in setting the policy agenda.

> Policymakers generally share the view that among the most significant impacts of the press occur early on in the policymaking process, when it is not yet clear which issues will be addressed and what questions will be decided. Officials believe that the media do a lot to set the policy agenda and to influence how an issue is understood by policymakers, interest groups, and the public (Linsky 1986, 87).

Furthermore, Linsky (1986) finds that officials often try to influence what the press covers, but "there was an overall sense that in general the press, or perhaps the

When American networks picked up the BBC story, the public began to consider the African famine an important issue (Rogers and Dearing 1994). Members of Congress and the president then began to address the issue of famine relief. Television news chose to focus on the famine, making an endemic problem in Africa a new foreign policy problem in the United States. "In this case, the mass media helped 'create' the news event, set the public agenda, and facilitate amelioration of suffering in Ethiopia..." (Rogers and Dearing 1994, 89).

The mass media clearly have a role to play in setting the policy agenda. Whether or not that role is through influencing policymakers through the public or more directly is unclear. It is quite probable that heightened media attention to an issue or foreign policy problem could draw the attention of policymakers, irrespective of whether the public is concerned about the problem. Presidents have constituencies other than the public they need to satisfy, including partisans that might become interested in an issue, policy entrepreneurs in Congress, and international leaders that look to the American president for guidance (Neustadt 1960).

The consistent findings of media influence on governmental agendas coincide with the "bottom-up" model of agenda setting suggested by Cobb and Elder (1983). The media represent the concerns of the mass public and policymakers take cues from the media as to what is important to the public. The agenda-setting process is "bottom-up" because it is driven by public concern rather than the concerns of policymakers and politicians.

Congress and the Agenda

How might Congress influence the policy agenda, in particular the president's agenda? Light (1991) indicates the president's agenda often includes items adopted from the congressional agenda. The Congress and the presidency certainly compete with one another to lead in American politics. James Thurber (1996) labels them "rivals for power" in a system of separated institutions sharing power (Neusdadt 1960). In the legislative realm, presidents are far from dominating, their success heavily dependent on the characteristics of Congress (Bond and Fleischer 1990; Edwards 1989). The marginal powers of the presidency in relation to Congress, coupled with a rivalry between the institutions, suggests that Congress probably influences the president's policy agenda. Given the lack of study concerning congressional influence in setting agendas, we are not sure how the congressional agenda may influence other policy agendas. Typically, the legislative agenda serves as the dependent variable in studies focusing on presidential agenda setting. Rarely is the congressional agenda examined for independent influences on the policy agendas of other institutions.

Charles Jones (1994) argues that presidents adopt proposals and ideas from the ongoing legislative agenda. Most presidential proposals and agenda items are not new to Congress. Rather, presidential proposals are usually old ideas that have been stymied in Congress prior to the president taking interest. Charles Jones (1994) examined the legislative timeline of twenty-six of the important legislative acts identified by Mayhew (1991). He found that most of the bills dated to previous Congresses or previous acts

that had failed. Even most of the "presidentially preponderant" bills dated to previous congressional initiatives.

Some scholars suggest that Congress has a direct influence on the foreign policy agenda. A "resurgence" literature has emerged since the end of the Vietnam War, claiming that Congress has reasserted its influence in relation to the presidency in foreign policy. Members of Congress are less likely to defer to presidential leadership in foreign policy today than they were in pre-Vietnam days. Foreign policy entrepreneurs are more common in Congress today, than prior to Vietnam. Issues, such as South African sanctions and religious persecution in China, are kept alive by entrepreneurs in Congress despite the best efforts of presidents.

The congressional "resurgence" could have an influence on what the president does in foreign policy, according to Lindsay (1994). Lindsay argues that congressional action can shape presidential foreign policy by influencing the president to attend to problems he would rather ignore. Congressional activity, such as floor debate, procedural legislation, hearings, action on unsuccessful legislation, member attempts at personal diplomacy, and membership appearances on television and in other media can lead to presidential responses through adjustment of the president's agenda. Members of Congress independently try to influence American foreign policy through their own diplomatic efforts and media statements. These attempts may keep difficult problems on the foreign policy agenda when the president would rather ignore them. Lindsay (1994) suggests that presidents cannot just ignore these congressional concerns; to do so, would be to jeopardize their tenuous relationship with Congress.

The congressional role in agenda setting, and more specifically foreign policy agenda setting, is unclear given the current state of the literature. However, the notion of presidents proposing legislation and Congress disposing is highly questionable even in foreign policy. Even so, presidents do appear to have the upper hand when compared to Congress in foreign policy. Most foreign policy is made without the need for legislation, relegating Congress to more of a sideline role where members of Congress try to affect presidential decision making by influencing the agenda through less direct methods (Lindsay 1994).

Conclusion

Pundits and scholars, alike, typically exaggerate presidential leadership. Research suggesting presidential dominance in agenda setting is incomplete, despite the claim by prominent agenda researchers and students of the presidency that presidents are effective agenda setters and tend to dominate the foreign policy arena. Research indicates that presidents are often frustrated when trying to set the policy agenda. Careful examination of current knowledge related to agenda setting and the president's relationship with the media and Congress indicates problems with the conventional wisdom.

Both quantitative and qualitative evidence indicate a strong, independent effect by the media on policy agendas, including the president's. Critical events also play a decisive role in bringing to the forefront important issues. Events and media coverage of

events are especially important in foreign policy, where it is unlikely that the mass public would even be aware of a problem without information from the media.

It is likely that the Congress has an influence on the president's agenda as well. Most of the legislative alternatives that presidents claim as their own existed previously as congressional measures. Beyond legislative proposals, congressional activity can create interest in an issue, thus bringing it onto the policy agenda. Members of Congress act as policy entrepreneurs, trying to increase media, congressional, and presidential attention to issues they feel are important.

Proponents of the conventional wisdom make a critical error when they fail to examine the independent effects of competing institutional agendas on the president's own agenda. Studies claiming media or congressional influence make the same error. By only examining one direction of the relationship, presidential effects on media coverage and the congressional agenda (or vice versa), the studies reveal only half of the agenda setting puzzle.

In order to gain a more complete understanding of agenda setting and the president's role, it is important to examine both influences by the president and influences on the president. By recognizing that reciprocal relationships are likely, we can begin to develop theoretical frameworks focusing on presidential influence in foreign policy agenda setting and strategies presidents might adopt in order to affect the agenda. I develop two theoretical frameworks and discuss agenda setting strategies in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

AGENDA SETTING DYNAMICS

Given the wide disparity within the agenda-setting literature, several different relationships between the agendas of the president, Congress, and the media are plausible. The challenge is to identify the possible relationships and establish a theoretical framework to derive hypotheses. Further, the theoretical framework must take into account contextual influences on the policy agenda, such as the importance of international events. Finally, there are different strategies president's can use to influence the policy agenda. We should expect different results depending on the strategy.

In this chapter I discuss two theoretical frameworks that represent different levels of presidential influence on the policy agenda. Each model is based on observations from existing literature and provides a set of expectations. The first model, the hegemonic presidency, is drawn from the conventional wisdom of presidential influence on the policy agenda and suggests that presidents are the primary agenda setters in foreign policy. The second model, the pluralist presidency, suggests a different set of relationships. Presidents are politically responsive to shifts in media and congressional attention to foreign policy issues, adjusting their own agendas in response to the media and Congress.

The international context greatly influences the foreign policy agenda in both frameworks. International events provide primary cues for the president, Congress, and the media, driving the foreign policy agenda. Other contextual factors beyond the control of the president influence the agenda as well. Important contextual factors include problem persistence, the scarcity of resources, and political factors, including public approval, party control of Congress, and recent electoral fortunes.

Thinking about Presidential Agenda Setting

In order to understand presidential agenda setting, we must answer several important questions. First, who is the president trying to lead? Second, what contextual factors decrease the president's ability to lead? Which contextual variables influence the president's agenda and the agendas the president is trying to influence? Thirdly, how might the institutions the president is trying to lead impact the president's own agenda? Finally, we must take into account the different strategies presidents use in order to influence policy agendas.

Presidents operate within a large, complex political system in which presidents strive to influence a variety of constituencies that look to the president for leadership. According to Neustadt (1960), these constituencies include the American public, the president's partisans, Congress, the bureaucracy, and leaders of other nations. Neustadt's major claim is that presidential influence is persuasion and persuasion requires bargaining. Bargaining involves a give and take process whereby presidents negotiate to gain influence rather than give orders.

Neustadt's (1960) definition of presidential power suggests that presidents are likely influenced by the very constituencies they are trying to lead. For example, when presidents consider which policies to press for in Congress, they scan the existing legislative agenda to designate priorities (C. Jones 1994; Light 1991). Therefore, the current legislative agenda is likely to influence the president's own agenda. Presidents use the media as a tool to influence the public; however, research has shown that the presidency, as a representative institution, responds to public concerns as well (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).

It is also likely that the degree of presidential influence on the policy agenda is affected by the political and policy context. Contextual factors include the president's recent electoral fortunes, the president's standing in the public, the partisan make-up of Congress, and real world events and conditions that draw attention to specific policy issues. Context influences the agenda and is unlikely to be influenced by the president or any other political institutions. We know that presidents have little control over their public approval (Edwards and Gallup 1990), cannot really affect which party gains control of Congress (Edwards 1989), and certainly have little impact on unforeseen events and real world conditions, such as economic downturns and peace in the Middle East. We also know that presidents who can legitimately claim an electoral mandate are advantaged in setting the policy agenda (Edwards 1989; C. Jones 1994).

Limited resources, particularly time, provide another constraint in agenda setting. One way to represent an institution's agenda is by stating that the agenda is nothing more than how Congress, the media, or the president choose to spend their scarce resource of

time. This is how they define their agendas. Time is scarce, therefore space on the agenda is scarce. New issues are likely to crowd old issues off of the agenda. The amount of attention an institution can devote to foreign policy is finite, so issues compete in a zero sum environment for presidential, congressional, and media attention.

Two Theoretical Frameworks

In order to explore foreign policy agenda setting, I develop two competing frameworks that predict different sets of institutional relationships. The frameworks take into account the important factors discussed in the previous section: who the president is trying to influence, what contextual factors influence the agenda, when does the president respond to the other agendas, and how presidents try to influence the policy agenda. The first framework, the hegemonic presidency, is based on the conventional wisdom of presidential influence on the policy agenda that I laid out in the Chapter II. The competing framework, the pluralist presidency, is based on the theory that presidents are responsive political actors and findings that the media and Congress play a critical role in defining policy agendas.

The Hegemonic Presidency

Without restating what I covered in Chapter II, I will review the basis for the conventional wisdom of presidential prominence that is the foundation for the hegemonic presidency in agenda setting. First, the word *hegemonic* indicates presidential dominance. Presidents are the single most important actor influencing the

Constitution. Presidents also head a large foreign policy bureaucracy which provides information and perspectives unavailable to the media or Congress.

As the hegemon, the president influences other institutional agendas by focusing publicly or taking direct action on foreign policy problems he thinks are important. Presidents seize the initiative by addressing problems first, forcing Congress and the media to react to their foreign policies. Congress typically acquiesces in foreign policy, particularly when serious national security questions are at issue (Patterson 1994). When Congress and the president are of the same party, the president is usually given the opportunity to set the policy agenda at the beginning of his term. Even in times of divided government, congressional deference to executive leadership exists in foreign policy (Bond and Fleischer 1990).

Research suggests that presidential attention, through public speeches on a specific issue, increases media coverage and in turn public concern for the issue (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). According to the conventional wisdom, the agenda causal chain proceeds from the president to the media to the public. Prime time speeches and presidential activities demand media attention, and the content of speeches and activities influence public opinion (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Cohen 1995).

Presidential hegemony exists within the foreign policy context provided by international events and political factors that affect presidential influence. International events influence the agendas of all three institutions (the president, the media, and Congress), and represent the international context that U.S. foreign policy is meant to

Figure 3.1: The Hegemonic Presidency Model



address. Not all presidents are similarly advantaged in setting the agenda. Popular presidents are likely to have greater influence on the agenda (Neustadt 1960), as are presidents that faired well in the last election (C. Jones 1994). Also, presidents facing a majority of the other party in Congress are less advantaged in setting the agenda than presidents lucky enough to preside over unified governments (Edwards and Barrett 1999).

The hegemonic presidency framework is shown in Figure 3.1. Each of the boxes represents the foreign policy agenda of the institutions and international events. Given the hegemony of the president in foreign policy agenda setting, the framework suggests the following expectations:

1. Presidential attention and activities directly and positively increase media attention to foreign policy issues for significant lengths of time.
2. Presidential attention and activities directly and positively increase congressional attention to foreign policy issues for significant lengths of time.
3. Media attention, which responds to presidential attention and activities, influences congressional attention and activity in foreign policy; however, media attention has no systematic influence on presidential attention.
4. Congress has little influence on the foreign policy agendas of the president and the media.
5. International events have direct, positive influences on the agendas of the president, the media, and Congress. Presidential attention to an event should prolong media and congressional attention to issues related to the event.

An example of what is likely to occur according to the hegemonic model illustrates the expected relationships. In 1988, George Bush campaigned heavily on a platform that included refocusing the "War on Drugs" internationally, with particular focus on Latin America, the primary supplier of illicit drugs in the United States. President Bush attended heavily to drugs in his public statements and went public with a speech in September of 1989. Media attention (and public concern) to the drug problem increased substantially as a result of presidential campaigning, statements, and finally the speech. President Bush's "war" culminated in the invasion of Panama and the arrest of General Manuel Noriega, a notorious international drug dealer and dictator of Panama, in December 1989. Through presidential statements President Bush focused American attention on the drug problem and used public concern as a primary justification for invading Panama. There was little congressional opponents could do to refocus the policy agenda away from the drug problem and the invasion.

The Pluralist Presidency

In Chapter II, I reviewed the agenda setting literature and found that the media and Congress have a clear and definable role in setting the policy agenda. The conventional wisdom erred in that scholars have only looked at one side of the relationship, whether the president had an influence on the policy agenda, without examining the president's own agenda as a dependent variable.

The pluralist presidency model suggests multiple access points affecting the foreign policy agenda. Robert Dahl's (1956) pluralist theory of democracy contends that

many different actors vie for power in American politics. The different actors are facilitated by the multiplicity of access points, including the many different committees in Congress, the presidency, or the expansion of conflict by drawing media attention to an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Schattschneider 1960). Because of the pluralist nature of American democracy, institutional agendas are likely to influence one another rather than one central actor dominating the system. Pluralist presidents respond to the concerns of the public, which are often expressed by media attention and attention by Congress.

Dahl's pluralism also fits with Neustadt's (1960) definition of presidential power as persuasion and bargaining. Pluralist theory suggests that bargaining and compromise are essential in policy making in a democracy. The central agenda setting goal of the president is persuading other actors to take on the issues he or she feels are important. In order to be successful, presidents must be ready to bargain. Bargaining may include shifting one's own agenda to reflect the agendas of those you are trying to influence. Presidential leadership is facilitated (Edwards 1989) through agenda setting. Successful presidents find issues that resonate with the public and Congress and then focus attention on those issues in order to lead.

Pluralist theory suggests competition among political actors; no one actor dominates the policy agenda. Observations of foreign policy making in the United States buttress the pluralist ideal of agenda competition. Many argue that foreign policy has moved into the same partisan realm as domestic politics, with as much conflict and competition between policy advocates (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990).

Presidents often lose the initiative in foreign policy to pluralist factors including increased media attention to issues or congressional and public concern over an issue the president would rather ignore. Presidents must compete with partisans in Congress and competing events televised on the nightly news when attempting to lead in foreign policy. To maintain the initiative in foreign policy, modern presidents try to anticipate political competition by being inclusive in their foreign policy leadership. Presidents understand that the American people look to the president for leadership in foreign policy and try to respond to public desires. The public believes that presidents control foreign policy, so any changes that are responsive to public opinion and popular are directly credited to presidential leadership. For example, President Reagan softened his stance on the Soviet Union during the campaign of 1984, possibly in response to growing public impatience with his previous hard-line policies (Nincic 1990).

A primary cue for presidents in foreign policy is media coverage of the various foreign policy issues. In an early work, Cohen (1963) identified the media as the primary form of communication in the foreign policy community. According to Cohen, the media influence what people, particularly political elites, consider important in foreign policy. As shown in Chapter II, media scholars examining the agenda-setting role of the media conclude that the media play an important, definable role in setting the agenda of political actors (Linsky 1986; Rogers and Dearing 1994; Smoller 1990). The definable role of the media includes increasing public concerns for issues they cover. Public concern then leads to responses by policymakers.

Figure 3.2: The Pluralist Presidency Model



relationship between the president and Congress varying according to the type of foreign policy issue and the type of pressure that Congress can put on the president.

The relationships identified by the pluralist model are influenced by the political and international context much like in the hegemonic model. International events provide the primary cue for all three international agendas. Also, the amount of presidential influence increases when presidents are popular, preside over unified governments, and enjoy the perception of an electoral mandate. The primary agenda setting relationships suggested by the pluralist presidency model are shown in Figure 3.2.

The pluralist model derives the following hypotheses regarding foreign policy agenda setting:

1. Presidential attention and activities related to foreign policy issues rarely have a long term impact on media attention to the issues. Responses by the media to the president are short-lived.
2. Increased presidential attention influences the congressional agenda on some issues. The president will also respond to increased congressional attention to some of the foreign policy issues.
3. The media's agenda, independent of presidential attention, has a strong, positive influence on the congressional agenda.
4. The president's foreign policy agenda responds positively to increased media attention to different issues.
5. International events have direct, positive influences on the agendas of the president, the media, and Congress. Media attention to an event should

and the media increase their attention to terrorism. Examples abound of focusing events thrusting issues on to the policy agenda.

Despite the importance of events in focusing attention, we must separate events from issues when examining agenda setting. Shaw (1977) defined events as discrete happenings that are limited in space and time, and issues as cumulative attention to a series of related events that fit into a broad category. Given this definition, a discrete event focuses attention and policymakers and the media fit the event into an issue, thus increasing the chances that issue is elevated to the policy agenda (Rogers and Dearing 1994).

How do international events relate to foreign policy agenda setting? According to Wood and Peake (1998), international events drive institutional attention to foreign policy issues. In the Wood and Peake (1998) analysis, a focusing event, like the announcement of the death of the Soviet Union, caused sharp and long lasting increases in media and presidential attention to Soviet-U.S. relations. The authors also find that a continuous stream of related events drive media and presidential attention to the foreign policy issues they examine.

If the hegemonic presidency is an accurate representation of agenda-setting, it is likely that an event related to a foreign policy issue will cause an increase in presidential and media concern for that issue for at least a short period of time. If the president then continues to attend to the issue, media attention will follow the president's lead. The pluralist presidency suggests just the opposite. An event occurs, the president and media react. If the president continues to attend to the issue, the media may or may not

continue to focus on the issue. However, if the media continue to attend to the issue, the president continues to focus on the issue.

The Economy of Agenda Space

Rogers and Dearing (1994) complain that agenda setting research fails to recognize agenda items are related in the amount of attention they each receive. "Today's top news story crowds out yesterday's" (84). Further, the salience of an agenda item is "not just an absolute but to some extent a relative matter" (Lang and Lang 1981, 453). In other words, issues compete for attention. There is a limited amount of agenda space on each institutional agenda. Attention to one issue necessitates drawing attention away from a competing issue.

Wood and Peake (1998) contend that issues compete for presidential attention. According to the authors, "The president is governed by an economy of attention in which competition exists for scarce resources" (174). Because presidential time and agenda space are severely limited, presidents must choose between issues. They cannot focus on all of the issues all of the time. "As a result, presidents purposely restrict the set of issues at any one time to a few. They tend to process these few issues in a serial rather than a parallel fashion, attending to one before moving on to the next" (Wood and Peake 1998, 174).

Because of scarce time, presidents try to maximize their political benefits when deciding where, when, and how to focus attention. By focusing attention on a specific foreign policy issue, the president can increase the salience of the issue, increasing its

relative importance in public approval polls (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995). Benefits extend beyond influencing the agendas of the media and Congress. Presidential activities in foreign policy can create public opinion rallies (Brace and Hinckley 1992) while attracting large amounts of positive media coverage.

Although presidents try to maximize their benefits, multiple forces beyond media and congressional attention shift presidential attention to foreign policy issues. Foreign policy problems often prove intractable and presidents have no choice but to attend to the difficult problems. Persistent problems, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, are bound to reappear on the agenda when events draw attention to them (Downs 1972).

Furthermore, presidents inherit difficult foreign policy problems that can dominate their attention over time. President Clinton inherited many of the foreign policy problems that have dominated his tenure, including Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Iraq. Presidents from Truman to Bush inherited problems associated with the Cold War and were forced to devote considerable attention to Soviet-U.S. relations and related issues. Ever since the creation of Israel as a free nation, American presidents have continually been forced deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The point is that presidents may not want to attend to these important issues, but the trappings of the office give them little choice. Most of a new president's foreign policy agenda is defined for him before he even takes the oath of office.

The economy of attention exists for the media and congressional agenda as well. The coverage the media devote to political issues and events is limited. There is finite space on the front page of any newspaper and the time devoted to news on the networks

is confined to 22 minutes per half hour show. Given the limited time news organizations can spend on reporting foreign policy issues, events related to one issue will crowd other issues off of the media's agenda. Congress cannot attend to all of the issues all of the time and must make choices on what issues to address. Congress is organized to handle a variety of policy issues at the same time. However, only a couple of committees are devoted to foreign policy and they must divide their time between the spectrum of issues.

It is conceivable that some foreign policy issues are not linked to international events like regional, nation-specific, or crisis-oriented issues are. For instance, foreign aid and trade do not relate to an ongoing set of international events, but attention to aid and trade issues are affected by attention to other foreign policy issues. Institutional attention to aid and trade are still driven by an economy of attention; however, events do not provide the primary influence on attention shifts by the president, the media, or Congress. The agendas interact and influence one another when events are not the primary determinant.

Non-event issues, like aid and trade, may increase the leadership opportunities available to the president because he may have greater discretion. Although such issues are very important, they are less likely to be forced onto the president's agenda by events. The hegemonic presidency predicts that presidents will dominate the agenda in non-event related issues, such as foreign aid and trade. The pluralist presidency predicts a reciprocal relationship between the president and Congress and the president and the media, with each institution affecting the other's agenda.

address the public on national television or focus on a single issue when they practice summitry, travel abroad, or order military interventions. Finally, legislative initiatives prove costly to presidents, as well. Presidents can only initiate so many bills in Congress each session without saturating the legislature with proposals. Initiating too many bills decreases the chances that Congress will pass any of the major initiatives of the president (Rivers and Rose 1985).

The Continuous Attention Strategy

Presidents are visible public speakers. Their public statements draw media and congressional attention. When presidents speak publicly they address certain issues at the expense of others due to the realities of the economy of attention. Presidents, by speaking publicly about issues they feel are important, try to focus the attention of the media and Congress on the president's agenda.

Speaking publicly includes television and radio addresses, public addresses to various groups, proclamations, campaign speeches and debates, news conferences, both formal and informal, and interviews. The range of public statements by presidents is wide and represents the president's continuous attention to public policy problems. By making public statements, presidents focus their own attention on some issues to the exclusion of others in an effort to shift the focus of the media, the public, and Congress.

The costs of continuous attention to an issue are slight when compared to the other strategies. Presidential public statements are commonplace. All it takes for a president to use the strategy is to focus his or her public statements on an issue.

However, a focus on one issue means another issue may not receive presidential attention.

Due to the limited costs of the continuous attention strategy, it makes sense to expect only modest results in terms of agenda setting, even if the president dominates the policy agenda. Media and congressional attention should still shift in response to shifts in public attention by the president. However, the shifts may not be as great as with the more straightforward agenda setting strategies. The pluralist presidency framework suggests that the continuous attention strategy is ineffective in influencing the media and congressional agenda. The president is responding to media, congressional attention, and international events in his public statements rather than actively trying to influence the agenda.

Presidential Drama

The second broad strategy presidents employ to influence the foreign policy agenda is presidential drama. Presidents are such newsworthy actors in foreign policy that media events are created through presidential activity, and the events in turn influence attention by the media and Congress. When presidents meet with their Soviet or Chinese counterparts, the media and Congress are watching. When the president orders an attack on a small Latin American nation, shifts in attention by Congress and the media can be dramatic. Presidential drama provides a useful tool for presidents to influence the policy agenda.

Presidents travel abroad, attend summit meetings, order military attacks, and address the nation on television, creating drama and spectacle (Miroff 1990) that may directly influence the policy agendas of the media and Congress. In such events, the presidency is the central focus. Brace and Hinckley (1992, 109) show how certain types of presidential travel abroad and other foreign policy drama serve to boost public approval of the president for short periods of time. Ragsdale (1984) found that presidential speeches increase public approval.

Presidential drama is probably more effective than the continuous attention strategy; however, the costs are much greater. In order to hold summit meetings, presidents must take several days out of their busy schedule to focus on one aspect of foreign policy. The cost is even greater if the summit involves travel abroad. Through travel abroad presidents focus attention on a particular foreign policy which comes at the cost of attention to domestic policy and other foreign policies. Also, the president may come under fire for focusing too much attention on foreign policy, as President Bush did during his tenure.

Even seemingly less costly drama, such as a single-issue televised national speech, incur significant costs on the president's time and divert his focus from other issues. Going above the heads of Congress, directly to the American people, makes bargaining more difficult with Congress (Kernell 1993). Also, the president can only give so many speeches each year because speeches lose their effectiveness when they become commonplace.

The president's power in foreign policy, as commander in chief, has grown so significantly that presidents can order attacks upon other nations without consulting Congress. Nothing is more dramatic and attention grabbing than seeing American forces heading into combat in a foreign land. Such events clearly cause media attention to shift to the foreign policy issue. Despite the agenda setting and leadership benefits gained from such action, using military force is not without substantial costs to the president. The American reputation abroad often suffers from gunboat diplomacy. Also, many American policymakers consider using force as a failure in diplomatic leadership, rather than a resounding presidential success. Finally, a "Vietnam Syndrome" exists that discourages major uses of force because of the danger of a protracted military involvement.

Often, presidents combine televised speeches with other presidential drama, such as summits, trips, and uses of force. President Reagan spoke on successful negotiations with his Soviet counterpart after the Iceland summit in October, 1986. President Bush did the same after the highly dramatic Malta summit in November, 1989. After invading Panama, President Bush spoke to the American people explaining his actions. President Clinton addressed Americans on national television twice during the Haiti invasion; once prior to the invasion, drumming up support and educating the public, and once after the successful bloodless invasion. Combining speeches with dramatic events increases the costs of presidential drama by extending presidential focus on the issue. Since space is limited on the president's agenda, this extension may force the president to avoid other important matters.

The more dramatic and protracted a presidential event, the more media attention it is likely to draw. Military invasions are the most dramatic, placing the president at the center of attention in the nightly news for lengthy periods of time. Soviet-U.S. summits, though commonplace in recent decades, are critically important presidential events and are likely to draw protracted media attention to issues related to the Soviet Union.

Given the high costs of presidential drama and the fact that presidential drama is usually considered newsworthy, both models of agenda setting suggest that presidential events should increase media and congressional attention at the time of the event. However, to have an agenda setting impact, presidential drama must cause a shift in attention by Congress or the media to an issue. A shift in attention denotes a long term change; for example, media attention continues to focus on issues related to the Soviet Union after a summit is completed. Without a long term change, all that is occurring is the media covering presidential activities, not shifting their attentiveness to an issue for any length of time.

If the president dominates the agenda setting process, we would expect long term shifts in media and congressional attention following dramatic presidential events. Presidents draw attention to an issue through diplomatic activity, and the media and Congress adjust their agendas in response. If, however, presidents compete with other institutions and are responsive in developing their own foreign policy agendas, we would expect long term shifts in media and congressional attention following a presidential event to be rare.

Legislative Initiation

There is a third strategy presidents use to influence the policy agenda. Presidents initiate bills in Congress directly influencing the legislative agenda. There is dispute in the literature on whether the legislative proposal strategy is effective for presidents. Some recent work has shown that presidents are indeed active and often successful agenda setters in Congress (Edwards and Barrett 1999; Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney 1995; Taylor 1998). However, other work suggests that environmental influences and the ongoing cycle of issues in Congress often overpower attempts by presidents to set the legislative agenda (C. Jones 1994).

Indeed, the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance pertains to presidents dominating the legislative agenda; presidents proposing legislation and Congress disposing. Despite the notion of presidential dominance, the work that suggests presidents are active and successful agenda setters also shows that congressional initiatives make up a larger percentage of the working agenda of Congress (Edwards and Barrett 1999; Taylor 1998). The president does not dominate the legislative process. Presidents may lead the legislative agenda on some issues and adjust their own agendas to reflect the congressional agenda on others. This is consistent with the pluralist presidency framework.

Legislative initiatives are more common in domestic policy than in foreign policy. Most foreign policy legislation is pro forma, inconsequential, or symbolic and has little influence on actual foreign policy decisions (Hinckley 1994). In fact, one study

that examines presidential agenda setting in Congress abandons foreign policy for similar reasons (Taylor 1998). Even so, in policy areas such as foreign aid and trade where legislation is relatively important, presidents often have no choice but to use the initiation strategy. President Reagan used the initiation strategy to try and exert influence on the congressional agenda in relation to aid to Nicaragua. At times, the initiation strategy may be the best route for presidents, particularly in areas that rely on congressional legislation such as foreign aid and trade. In this study, I do not examine empirically the president's efforts to influence the agenda using the initiation strategy. I instead focus on continuous presidential attention and presidential drama, strategies that are more commonplace in foreign policy. I leave examination of the initiation strategy to future research.

Conclusion

Presidents are not agenda setters acting within a vacuum. Rather, presidents lead within a political and policy context defined for them and must adjust their agenda strategies in order to take advantage of the context. The most important elements of the policy context in foreign policy are international events. Events often determine the important issues that American policymakers address in foreign policy.

With these important realities in mind, I presented two theoretical frameworks of presidential agenda setting in foreign policy based on the literature and theories of American democracy. The models differ in their expectations of presidential influence in the agenda setting process. The hegemonic presidency suggests presidential

dominance, with presidents leading both the media and congressional agendas. The pluralist presidency suggests presidential responsiveness to the media and congressional agendas with marginal presidential impact on the policy agenda.

Given the two theoretical frameworks and hypotheses flowing from the models, I explored other impacts on the policy agenda in foreign policy. Focusing events are critical in drawing attention to foreign policy issues. Also, attention to one issue is related to attention to other issues due to limits on institutional agenda space. The economy of attention necessitates institutions (especially the president) focus on only a few issues at the expense of others. Furthermore, presidents inherit difficult foreign policy issues and their agendas are often defined for them by predecessors and the existence of several important foreign policy problems that never seem to get solved.

Finally, I discussed three broad presidential strategies in foreign policy agenda setting, including continuous presidential attention to an issue, presidential drama, and legislative initiation. The theoretical frameworks suggest that the costlier presidential strategy of presidential drama is likely to have a greater agenda setting impact than continuous presidential attention.

In the next chapter I discuss how I test the relationships and expectations suggested by the two models and the strategies of presidential agenda setting. I focus my discussion on data conceptualization issues, measurement of the institutional agendas, the issues I chose to examine, and the time series methods employed.

CHAPTER IV

EVALUATING AGENDA SETTING DYNAMICS

In order to determine presidential influence in setting the policy agenda we must, ask two central questions. First, what influence do presidents have on the policy agendas of other institutions in American politics? Second, what makes up the president's own agenda? The two questions are inescapably linked. We cannot understand presidential influence in agenda setting without understanding what influences the president's agenda. The two theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapter III distinguish between the determinants and influences of the president's foreign policy agenda. Any method we use to test the frameworks must model both processes.

In this chapter I discuss the data and methods used to assess the two models and the strategies developed in Chapter III. I explain the main concepts of institutional attention and agendas and how I measured each of the agendas. I also address case selection questions: why I chose the issues I chose. To test the continuous attention strategy, I use Vector Auto-regression Analysis (VAR), which tests for both the influences and determinants of the president's agenda described in the two agenda setting models. To test the presidential drama strategy, I use Box-Jenkens Impact Assessment Analysis (or intervention analysis), which assesses the impact of discrete events on a dependent time series.

What Is an Agenda?

The standard definition of the policy agenda is "the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying serious attention at any given time" (Kingdon 1984, 3). In essence, the foreign policy agenda is the set of issues, which are "subjects and problems," that the president, Congress, and the media are paying attention to over time. When the president discusses aid to the Contras, Central America is on the president's agenda. When Congress holds hearings on the Israeli occupied territories, the Arab-Israeli conflict is on the congressional agenda. Finally, when the media broadcast stories showing student demonstrations in China, the China issue is on the media's agenda.

The key difficulty in designing research in foreign policy agenda setting is defining valid measures of the theoretical concept of foreign policy agenda. For measurement reasons we are required to make assumptions in our definition of institutional foreign policy agendas. I define institutional foreign policy agendas in terms of issue attention. The issues each institution is attending to are the issues on the agenda at a particular time. This is the typical operational definition used in previous studies on domestic agenda setting (ie. Baumgartner and Jones 1993), and follows closely Kingdon's (1984) definition. Essentially, the president's public agenda is what he says, initiates, and does publicly; the media's agenda is what they broadcast and print: the congressional agenda includes what Congress is working on in hearings and what members are discussing in public and on the floor.

The Data

Testing the theoretical frameworks developed in Chapter III requires the development of time series measurements of the presidential, media, and congressional agendas over a lengthy period of time. Also, an event measure is required in order to control for the impact of international events. Finally, it is important to examine the relationships over a variety of foreign policy issues.

I examine weekly measures of the presidential, congressional, and media attention to ten different foreign policy issues from 1984 to 1995. The time frame provides an N for the study of well over 500 weeks extending over three presidential administrations for each of the ten issues. The presidents I examine are Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton.

The President's Agenda

Previous research measures the president's agenda using public statements by the president. Cohen (1995) and Hill (1998) measure the president's policy agenda through his attention to the economy, foreign affairs, and civil rights in the annual State of the Union address. Annual addresses give an incomplete image of presidential attention to issues as attention changes due to shifting circumstances and events. Others have measured presidential attention through content coding of presidential statements (Andrade and Young 1996). A weekly measure over the entire year, such as Wood and Peake (1998) employ, gives a more complete representation of the president's agenda.

Of course, the president's public face may not be a true reflection of what is actually going on behind closed doors in foreign policy. For security reasons, it is impossible to accurately assess what exactly the president is doing privately in foreign policy. Therefore, I assume that what presidents say and do publicly from week to week reflect what is on their agenda.

Many of the president's public statements represent attempts to lead publicly through agenda setting. By speaking publicly, the president provides signals to other institutions on what he feels are the important issues, and which issues he is working on at a given time. The president can attempt to influence other institutional agendas by increasing his attention to issues he feels are important, or ignoring issues he feels are unimportant or politically threatening. The president's time to focus on foreign policy is limited, so attention to one issue necessitates inattention to another. The decisions concerning which issues to publicly address determines the president's public agenda. Presidential attention includes his public statements, White House press releases, presidential activities such as trips abroad and meetings with foreign dignitaries, and correspondence between the White House and Congress. If the president is going to affect change in other institutional agendas, he can do so through such public activities.

Presidents make their priorities known through a variety of methods including speeches (both national and to smaller groups), proclamations, legislative proposals, press conferences, White House news releases, letters, interviews, and presidential activities, such as travel abroad and meeting with foreign heads of state. A complete record of presidential statements are available from the *Public Papers of the President,*

organizations are likely to have an affect on presidential or congressional attention or be influenced by presidential attention in foreign policy. These organizations include the national newspapers and national news networks that focus much of their attention on national politics and foreign events. Newspapers and television networks define their institutional agendas by making choices on what stories to print or broadcast.

I measure attention to foreign policy by the national news media using the *Vanderbilt Television News Abstracts*, available on-line at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu. I measure media attention as the weekly TV broadcast time devoted to the various issues on the three nightly network news programs (ABC, CBS, and NBC). Rather than counting the number of stories, as has been done in past research (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Iyengar and Kinder 1987), I count the number of minutes devoted to each issue on the three nightly television news programs. Specifically, I search the *Abstracts* using keywords relevant to the different issues to capture stories related to the issues. I examine each "hit" of the keywords for validity concerning whether or not it dealt with some facet of the foreign policy issue. Keywords are provided in the Appendix.

Although nightly news programs are not the only television news sources that may be influenced or influence the president, they do provide a consistent sample of coverage and are also continuous for the period of study. Each network spends about 22 minutes each day delivering news in half hour programs. This leads to a typical weekly news hole roughly 150 minutes, or 450 minutes total for the three networks. Also, national broadcasts reach a much broader audience than print media and have been found

to influence what issues the American people consider important and how they evaluate their leaders (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

There are a variety of methods available to measure the media's agenda. Some scholars have counted the number of stories related to the issue in the *Readers Guide to Periodical Literature* (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), the *New York Times Index* (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), and on the nightly television news programs (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Coverage of the president and national politics is different depending on the medium. Periodicals tend to provide in-depth coverage while television news tend to provide superficial coverage of important political events. Despite the differences in type of coverage, the mediums are highly related in the amount of coverage they give each issue (Grossman and Kumar 1981). Wood and Peake (1998) and Edwards and Wood (1999) use the amount of TV news devoted to an issue to measure the media's agenda.

Much like presidential attention, media attention to the different issues varied quite substantially. The media attended to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet Union most heavily over the time period, averaging just under 17 minutes per week. There was at least one story on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet Union for 510 of the 520 weeks of the study. The amount of media attention to the two most salient issues varied over time. Coverage of the Soviet Union varied from zero to 178 minutes per week. Coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict varied from zero to 171 minutes.

The media did not pay nearly as much attention to the other issues. Media attention to Central America averaged eight minutes of news coverage per week. In over

half the weeks examined, there was no news coverage of Central America. Media coverage of Central America is very volatile, however, ranging from zero to 181 minutes per week of coverage. The other issues attracted even less media attention over the time period.

How the media covers the various issues is certainly a concern. The most important areas are more likely to have foreign correspondents issuing in-depth and lengthy reports more often than less critical regions. Generally, Moscow, Jerusalem, London, Tokyo, and Beijing have the most news correspondents from the American media. Other locales, such as Latin America, have fewer American correspondents, so consistent coverage is less likely (Graber 1997, 344-345). As news agencies cut the number of foreign correspondents in order to save operating expenses, these differences are likely to increase. It is important to remember that the media's agenda is often determined by business decisions and practical concerns like the location of news correspondents.

The Congressional Agenda

Congressional attention is a much more difficult concept to define. There are 535 individuals in Congress, along with dozens of committees and subcommittees, each with their own agenda. However, legislative activity gives an indication of what the legislature as a group feels is important. Congress holds thousands of hearings annually, on almost every topic. Members introduce thousands of bills each Congress, with only a few hundred receiving any sort of attention. Beyond formal activity, there are individual

press conferences and television appearances by members, particularly the leadership, that give an indication of what Congress considers important in national politics. Instances of attention to foreign policy by Congress provide indicators of the congressional foreign policy agenda.

The *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* provides the database used to measure congressional attention to the foreign policy issues. *CQ Weekly* is the major periodical that focuses on Congress. Each issue is essentially a recap of what occurred on Capitol Hill the previous week, along with ongoing issue discussions in Congress and the administration. As with the previous databases, I used keywords related to the issues in the subject indexes for each yearly volume of the *CQ Weekly Reports*. The keywords are provided in the Appendix. I read each story indicated in the indexes and counted the number of columns (typically 3 per page) that were relevant to the issue being examined. I did not count articles that made sole references to the administration. I counted only columns mentioning activity or attention by Congress or by members of the legislature.

Past research has measured the congressional agenda by examining formal legislative activity, specifically the number of hearings on an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) or the amount of legislation before Congress (Edwards and Barrett 1999; Hinckley 1994; Taylor 1998). Although measurements using formal activity are valid measures of the congressional agenda, they do not provide indicators of the informal activities that Lindsay (1994) found to be so important in congressional influence in foreign policy, such as members talking to the press or traveling abroad. If formal legislative activity in foreign policy is often symbolic and rarely substantive, as many

authors argue (Hinckley 1994; Lindsay 1994; Weissman 1995), then looking only at measures of formal activity to assess the congressional agenda in foreign policy is incomplete. Content examination of the *CQ Weekly* provides indicators of both the formal and informal activities of Congress because the *Weekly* reports on both types of activity.

Much like presidential and media attention, congressional attention varied substantially across the different issues. Congress paid more attention to the Soviet Union than any of the other issues. The *Weekly Report* averaged 4.7 columns per week of coverage congressional activity related to the Soviet Union, whereas coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Central America averaged 2.5 columns per week. Congressional attention to foreign aid averaged 4.7 columns per week and trade averaged about 3 columns per week. Congressional attention to the Soviet Union ranged from zero to 28 columns per week, while the highs for other issues are usually not as great.

International Events

Theoretically, events provide the primary cue in defining institutional agendas in foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to have some measure of events related to the various issues. Most research that examines the influence of discrete international events on American political institutions use the dummy variable method to account for the presence of an event. This is especially the case in studies of the effects of "rally events" on public approval of the president (Edwards and Gallup 1990; Mueller 1973; Ostrom and Simon 1985). Hill (1998) replicates Cohen's (1995) study on the president's

agenda, but controls for "real world cues" (Behr and Iyengar 1985). Hill uses controls for international cues on the foreign policy agenda, including dummy variables on the existence of war and the size of the U.S. armed services. "Real world cues" in international politics include dramatic events like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Tianamen Massacre, events that are not included in Hill's control measure.

Measurement of an event using dummy variables is inadequate for the present study because it does not account for differences in the severity of each event and does not allow for the development of an event-related issue over time. Dummy variables and measures like military spending and size are blunt instruments. What is required is a finer measure of the "real world cues" that shape political responses and policy agendas in foreign policy.

With these limitations in mind, I develop a weekly time series measure of events that assesses the severity of an event over time. To develop a time series measure of exogenous foreign events related to each of the issues, I rely on the PANDA data set developed by Doug Bond at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. PANDA uses an artificial intelligence program (KEDS) to code discrete events from Reuters news leads. PANDA events are reports of discrete actions by a source country (or nationality) toward a target country or discrete actions completely within a single country, such as a civil war or rights violation (Bond and Bond 1995).

KEDS (Kansas Events Data System) is a program developed by Phillip Schrodt of the University of Kansas that machine codes Reuters' news leads based on the subjects, objects, and transitive verbs in sentences in the leads which provide the source of the event, the target of the event, and the action of the event. Schrodt and Gerner (1994) describe the program in detail and also report validity tests of the machine-coded events. It is important to recognize that one singular event in a foreign nation is likely to receive several reports on the Reuters news wire as the event unfolds and develops. Therefore, the severity of the event is represented by the actual number of reports.

Using keywords related to the issues, relevant events were separated from the entire data set. I also excluded from this set events where the United States is listed as the source country. I excluded U.S. events to ensure the events measure was exogenous from the U.S. institutional system. I then counted the events by week to create a consistent measure of exogenous events to match the other three series. The source and target keywords for each of the issues are provided in the Appendix.

Measuring Presidential Drama

I measure presidential drama as discrete events that are created by the president through presidential activity in foreign policy. Using the *Public Papers of the President,* I determine when each of the presidents held a summit meeting (with the Soviet leader), took a trip abroad, delivered a nationally televised speech, or some other major diplomatic event related to the issues examined. I then classified each of the events and determined the week the event occurred.

Jones (1993). the most extensive agenda setting study to date, examined seven different domestic policy issues. Wood and Peake (1998) examined only three foreign policy issues, all of which were crisis-oriented and highly salient. Edwards and Wood (1999) only examine two foreign policy issues among the five total issues they analyze.

It is likely that the agenda-setting process is different for issues depending on such factors as national security relevance, salience, and crisis orientation. To cover the variety of different issues, I examine ten foreign policy issues and issue areas. The issues include the Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Central America, the Caribbean, China, Japan, Korea, the Bosnian conflict, foreign aid, and foreign trade. The operational definition of each issue is provided in the Appendix.

The issues were not chosen at random; rather, I chose the issues to represent the spectrum of salience, crisis orientation, and national security concerns. Looking only at salient issues may distort our view of foreign policy agenda setting by overestimating the impact of the president or the media. Also many foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and trade, are unrelated to a continuous stream of international events. Institutional behavior is likely to be different on such issues. Finally, many scholars argue that presidents have greater freedom on crisis-oriented issues and issues that are directly related to national security concerns (Patterson 1994; Weissman 1995). Therefore, it is important that we examine a broad set of issues in foreign policy.

One way to measure issue salience over time is by the amount of media coverage associated with the issue. The average weekly television news coverage varies with each of the issues. The issues that are highly salient include the Soviet Union (16.7

minutes/week), the Arab-Israeli conflict (17.4 minutes/week), and the Bosnian conflict (14.1 minutes/week). The less salient issues include foreign trade (5 minutes/week), foreign aid (5.9 minutes/week), Central America (8.5 minutes/week), the Caribbean (4.8 minutes/week), Japan (7.3 minutes/week), China (7.3 minutes/week), and Korea (5.4 minutes/week).

The issues also vary in their level of event or crisis orientation. The issues that focus on regions or relations with specific nations relate to events in those defined regions and nations much more than the broader issues of foreign aid and trade. The issues also vary in terms of relevance to national security. Clearly, presidents have maintained that the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict directly impact the national security concerns of the United States. National security concerns are less clear for the other issues; however, China, Japan, Korea, Central America, and the Caribbean are all important issues in U.S. foreign policy. Foreign aid and trade are issues that are not closely associated with national security. Many scholars claim aid and trade are more in the realm of Congress (Ripley and Franklin 1991; Rosner 1995). Also, aid and trade do not relate to exogenous events as well as the other issues.

Methods

Assessing presidential influence in agenda setting requires a dynamic approach that tests for both presidential influence and influences by other institutions and events on the president's agenda. Vector Auto-regression (VAR) analysis allows us to assess the independent effects of presidential attention upon the other institutional agendas, as

variables in the system. I determined lag lengths using methods based on Simms (1980). More details on lags are provided in the Appendix. Relationships are evaluated by conducting joint hypothesis tests for the blocks of lags associated with each variable. A significant block of coefficients on the dependent variable in each equation implies that issue persistence is strong.

VAR models typically exhibit high collinearity due to the multiple lags entered into the system. For this reason, coefficient estimates are useless in determining the relationships presented in the results. Instead, VAR conducts Granger F-tests in order to determine if significant causal relationships exist among the variables in the system. We also can use simulations to track out system dynamics. Moving average response rates track out simulations of the system. Moving average response involves introducing a shock to a variable in the system and tracking out movements in the other variables using the VAR estimates for computing a forecast. Shocking a variable means increasing the independent series by one standard deviation and estimating the impact the increase has on the other series in the system (Wood and Peake 1998). To facilitate interpretation of the moving average responses, and because the variables had no natural metric, I standardized all variables prior to analysis ((x-mean)/standard deviation). All initial shocks are one standard deviation in magnitude. Because innovations are correlated between variables we plotted Choleski orthoganalized responses to one standard deviation simulated shocks.

To control for related international events, I enter the events variable into each VAR system as a single exogenous variable with no lags. This approach is sometimes

termed ARX modeling (Judge, *et, al.* 1988). I use no additional lags on the events variable, because events are discrete occurrences that should affect the media, Congress, and president immediately, but once the events have occurred the stimulus is no longer present. The system should be free to work itself out as the different institutions interact and interpret the relative significance of the events. The introduction of the exogenous events variable provides a theoretical test for the manner and extent to which events instantaneously shock attention by the U.S. institutions to foreign policy issues. Including events also controls for spuriousness. We can exclude the possibility that it is only events that definitively shape institutional attention, rather than the models discussed in Chapter III. Controlling for events allows us to determine the independent effects of presidential attention on media and congressional attention, and vice versa.

To simplify the discussion, VAR can be represented as a series of regression equations where each dependent series is set equal to all of the other series in the model, lagged values of the other series, and lagged measures of the dependent series. Algebraically, the VAR model appears as:

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \upsilon + \Theta_1 \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \ldots + \Theta_P \mathbf{y}_{t-p} + \epsilon_t + \mathbf{v}_t \quad ,$$

where **y** is a vector of the endogenous variables, Θ is a vector of regression parameters associated with the lags of each variable in the VAR system, p is the number of lags in each variable, υ is a vector of constants for each equation, ϵ_t represents exogenous events, and $\mathbf{v}_t$ vector of disturbances for each equation (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999; Judge, *et. al.* 1988). Adding ϵ_t to the equation makes the system an ARX model.

The VAR system consists of three equations in this case, with each equation representing one of the endogenous variables: presidential attention, congressional attention, or media attention.

Impact Assessment Analysis

The primary method of analyzing the presidential drama strategy is Box-Jenkins impact assessment. To test the presidential drama strategy, we need to gauge the impact of each of the discrete presidential events on media and congressional attention to the related issue. Because our primary interests are the independent impact of each of the dramatic presidential events, impact assessment is the proper time series tool. Conceivably, we could place interventions into the VAR analysis to control for the impact of dramatic presidential events. However, we would lose important information on the amount of impact each individual event has on media or congressional attention.

Theoretically, impact assessment is similar to OLS regression except that the error term is modeled prior to assessing the impact of the independent variable. The dependent series is first analyzed for its noise model, which represents the error. I determine whether or not the dependent series is auto-regressive, has moving average properties, is non-stationary, and other factors that would violate the assumptions of OLS regression. The process is typically termed ARIMA modeling and is fully explained in McLeary and Hay (1980). Once an acceptable noise model of the dependent series is developed, we can assess the impact of the interventions, in this case presidential drama, using the transfer function method explained in McLeary and Hay (1980, Chapter 3).

issue involved and then turn away soon after because of pressing events related to other issues.

Impact assessment provides two parameters of significant importance concerning agenda setting. First, does the intervention have an immediate, positive impact on the dependent variable? We look at the impact parameter, which indicates the amount of initial change in the dependent series due to the intervention. Second, does the intervention's impact remain after the initial week? Is there a significant change in media coverage after the initial stimulus of presidential drama is completed? To assess the long term impact, we look at the decay parameter. The decay parameter ranges between -1 and 1. As the parameter approaches zero, the rate of decay is increased to the point where a zero indicates a true pulse function, without lingering effect. So, decay parameters further from zero decay more slowly, thus having a greater long term effect (McLeary and Hay 1980).

We can determine the estimated impact of the event by using the mathematical formulation: $Y_t = f(I_t) + \mu$, where Y_t represents the dependent series at time t, $f(I_t)$ is the differenced transfer function input, and μ represents the ARIMA noise model. Since all of the data are logged, the parameters provide percentage changes in the pre-intervention and post-intervention equilibria. Simple exponential mathematical calculations can then give us the estimated impact on the dependent variable in terms of minutes for media coverage and columns for congressional attention. We can gauge the percent change due to the event for the weeks following the event as well.

Since the unit of analysis is weekly media and congressional attention, finding a significant spike in the dependent series during a presidential event does not indicate an agenda setting impact. The media reports on what presidents are doing, so spikes in coverage to an issue are unsurprising, and do not tell us much. However, if the increase in media and congressional attention is sustained past the stimulus of the event (there is a significant decay parameter), then the agenda impact of the event is much clearer. Also, in order to attribute a shift in equilibrium of the dependent variable to the event via a significant decay parameter, it is necessary for the event to have caused a spike in the dependent series as well; both parameters must be significant.

Conclusion

To properly test the relationships and hypotheses outlined in Chapter III requires a well designed, systematic examination of the foreign policy agendas of the president, the media, and Congress. I make the assumption that these agendas are represented by institutional attention to a variety of issues in foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to collect data representing the agendas over many issues. I use a variety of archival sources and content coding schemes to gather the measures of the relevant agendas and international events. I also employ time series techniques to assess the hypotheses developed in Chapter III, including Vector Auto-regression and Box-Jenkins Impact Assessment analysis.

In the next few chapters I employ these data and techniques to test the various expectations of the hegemonic and pluralist models of presidential agenda setting. In

Chapter V, I employ VAR on the eight event oriented issues. In Chapter VI, I employ impact assessment analysis in order to test the influence of presidential drama. In Chapter VII, I use VAR to assess presidential influence and influences on the president's agenda in the non-event issues of foreign aid and trade.

CHAPTER V

SETTING THE AGENDA IN FOREIGN POLICY

I begin my analysis of presidential agenda setting in foreign policy with a broad examination. I seek to empirically determine the agenda setting relationships between the president, the media, and Congress by systematically examining institutional attention to a wide variety of foreign policy issues. In this chapter, I employ Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques in order to test the two agenda setting models discussed in Chapter III, the hegemonic presidency and the pluralist presidency. More specifically, I test the ability of presidents to influence the media and congressional agendas in foreign policy using the continuous attention strategy.

The analysis suggests that presidents are unable to influence the media or congressional agenda in most issues using the continuous attention strategy. Instead, the president appears responsive to shifts in media attention to most of the issues, and congressional attention to a few of the issues. The evidence presented here supports the pluralist model and seriously questions the plausibility of the hegemonic model.

Data and Methods

Chapter IV provides a thorough discussion of the data used in this chapter, as well as a discussion of VAR analysis. I will briefly outline the data and methods used for the analysis. I examine weekly institutional attention to eight foreign policy issues from 1984 to 1995. The variables for the analysis include: presidential attention, measured using paragraph counts from the *Public Papers of the President*; media attention, the number of minutes of network television news devoted to each issue measured using the *Vanderbilt Television News Abstracts*; congressional attention, the number of columns devoted to each issue in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*; and exogenous events, the number of discrete events related to an issue drawn from the PANDA events data set.

The eight issues include the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bosnian conflict (1991-1995), Central America, the Caribbean, China, Korea, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The issues vary in terms of salience over time as well as their relative importance to American national security. The eight issues are also linked to exogenous international events. Since they are regional or country specific issues, an identifiable set of related international events is available. I expect events to be a primary indicator of institutional attention to this set of foreign policy issues. Therefore, I include exogenous events as a control variable in the VAR system.

Expectations

The expected relationships, discussed in Chapter III, are displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The hegemonic presidency model suggests that the president is the primary agenda setter in foreign policy. For the hegemonic presidency to accurately reflect foreign policy agenda setting, presidential attention to the foreign policy issues should have significant influence on the attention of the media and Congress. Also, the president is not significantly responsive to the Congress or the media. The analysis should result in insignificant responses by the president to other institutional agendas.

The pluralist model suggests only a weak positive relationship flowing from the president's agenda to the media's agenda, in contrast to the strong relationship outlined in the hegemonic model. The pluralist model suggests that the media have an important role in setting the foreign policy agenda and that the president will adjust his attention to foreign policy issues in response to changes in media attention. The media's agenda has a strong, positive influence on the president's agenda, according to the pluralist model. Also, congressional attention may at times influence the president to pay attention to an issue.

The main difference between the two models is the role of the president as the primary agenda setter in the hegemonic model and the president as primarily responsive in the pluralist model, with the media taking the lead in influencing the agenda. Examining the agenda relationships over a variety of issues should tell us which model best represents reality.

Testing the Hegemonic Presidency

The hegemonic presidency model holds that presidential attention is independent of media and congressional attention in foreign policy. In other words, presidents do not adjust their agendas significantly in response to changes in media and congressional attention to foreign policy issues. Statistical independence is not the only requirement necessary to accept the hegemonic model. When the president attends to a foreign policy issue, the media and Congress must follow the president's lead and alter their own attention. The first question I examine is whether the president is able to systematically influence the media and congressional agendas.

Presidential Influence on the Media

Do presidents significantly influence the media's agenda using the continuous attention strategy? Table 5.1 shows the results of Granger F-tests from the VAR analyses where media attention is the dependent variable. The independent variables are

listed on the left-hand column, with the significance tests listed in the columns for each issue. Whether or not presidential attention causes subsequent media attention is not clear. In six of the issues (Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bosnian conflict, China, Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union), presidential attention has no significant effect on media attention when controlling for events. The F-tests for the president fails to reach standard levels of significance for six of the issues. In two of the eight issues the president significantly influences media attention. According to the F-tests reported in Table 5.1, presidential attention has a substantial influence on media attention to the Caribbean and Central America. For both issues, the Granger tests exceed standard statistical significance levels.

Does the president systematically influence the media's agenda in foreign policy? No. The president appears influential in only two of the eight issues (the Caribbean and Central America). In most cases, shifts in presidential attention have no influence whatsoever on media attention. For only a quarter of the issues, can we conclude that presidents are able to systematically influence how much the media pays attention to the issue. One explanation for finding presidential influence in Latin American issues is that they are relatively low salience issues in comparison to other, more important issues, like the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Table 5.1. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Media Attention to Foreign Policy

Independent Variable	Arab-Israeli Conflict	Bosnian Conflict	Caribbean	Central America
Presidential Attention	1.276 (0.28)	1.67 (0.14)	6.701 (**0.00**)	2.014 (**0.04**)
Previous Media Attention	18.875 (**0.00**)	14.811 (**0.00**)	26.459 (**0.00**)	7.113 (**0.00**)
Congressional Attention	1.164 (0.32)	0.257 (0.94)	1.454 (0.20)	1.454 (0.17)
International Events	134.81 (**0.00**)	64.64 (**0.00**)	157.25 (**0.00**)	179.56 (**0.00**)

Independent Variable	China	Japan	Korea	Soviet Union
Presidential Attention	1.164 (0.33)	0.600 (0.66)	1.021 (0.39)	1.752 (0.155)
Previous Media Attention	51.207 (**0.00**)	1.515 (0.19)	37.575 (**0.00**)	9.180 (**0.00**)
Congressional Attention	2.194 (**0.05**)	0.337 (0.853)	1.443 (0.22)	0.103 (0.96)
International Events	67.89 (**0.00**)	75.86 (**0.00**)	136.41 (**0.00**)	366.72 (**0.00**)

Note: The numbers in the tables are F statistics; p values are in parentheses. Significant values are in bold. The lag values are reported in the Appendix. Events at lag 0 are included as an exogenous variable to control for the contemporaneous effects of events. The N is 514 in the Arab-Israeli and Soviet Union series. The N is 219 in the Bosnian series. The N is 591 in the Caribbean, Central America, China, Japan, and Korea series.

The F-tests reported in Table 5.1 suggest that Congress plays a minimal role in determining media attention. In all but the China series, the Granger F-tests for Congress prove insignificant. The results suggest that Congress plays no role in influencing media attention in seven of the eight issues. Media attention proves highly inertial. Reading the table horizontally, we see that previous media attention is determinative of current media attention in seven of the eight issues. The Granger F-tests are highly significant in most cases. Essentially, media attention to an issue systematically influences media attention to the issue the following week. Exogenous events clearly play a role in determining media attention as well, with events proving significant in all eight of the issues. These findings are consistent with expectations of both the hegemonic and pluralist models of agenda setting.

The Granger F-tests only tell part of the story, whether or not significant relationships exist. In order to gauge the explanatory power of each of the independent variables we can examine the Decompositions of Forecast Error Variance. The Decompositions of Error Variance, reported in Tables 5.2 through 5.9 give us an idea of how much variance of the media attention series is explained by shifts in the various independent variables. The ordering of the variables in the VAR system may determine the results for both the Decomposition of Error Variance and the Moving Average Response Rates discussed below. For the analysis, the variable ordering was media attention, presidential attention, congressional attention. The reasoning behind this ordering follows standard procedures that media attention is the most exogenous of the

variables according to the F-tests, followed by presidential attention, then congressional attention. Different orderings were tried without any real degree of change in the results.

The evidence suggests the exogenous nature of media attention to presidential attention. The forecasts presented in the Tables 5.2 through 5.9 show the percentages of error variance explained in the dependent variable when the independent variables are shocked (increased by one standard deviation). Only for two of the issues does a shock in presidential attention explain a significant portion of the forecast error variance for media attention. For example, in Table 5.2 presidential attention only explains .67 of a percent of the error variance for media attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similar low levels are evident in Tables 5.2 through 5.9, in the other issues where the media is unresponsive to presidential attention according to the F-tests in Table 5.1.

The Granger F-tests in Table 5.1 indicate that presidential attention significantly influences media attention to the Caribbean and Central America. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 support this finding, albeit marginally. After six weeks, a shock in presidential attention explains nearly seven percent of the forecast error variance for media attention to Caribbean issues and three percent for Central America. For the Bosnian conflict (Table 5.3), presidential attention explains four percent of the forecast error variance for media attention after six weeks.

Table 5.2. Decomposition of Error Variance for Arab-Israeli Conflict VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.29	0.52	0.18
	3	99.03	0.67	0.30
	4	98.54	0.67	0.79
	5	98.44	0.67	0.89
	6	98.41	0.67	0.92
	7	98.40	0.67	0.93
	8	98.40	0.67	0.93
	9	98.39	0.67	0.93
	10	98.39	0.67	0.93
Presidential Attention	1	13.86	86.14	0.00
	2	15.96	83.85	0.19
	3	16.11	83.68	0.20
	4	16.02	83.75	0.24
	5	16.01	83.73	0.26
	6	16.01	83.73	0.26
	7	16.01	83.73	0.27
	8	16.01	83.73	0.27
	9	16.01	83.73	0.27
	10	16.01	83.73	0.27
Congressional Attention	1	1.31	2.49	96.21
	2	1.38	3.56	95.06
	3	2.73	3.50	93.78
	4	2.92	3.61	93.47
	5	3.00	3.64	93.36
	6	3.02	3.64	93.34
	7	3.02	3.65	93.33
	8	3.03	3.65	93.33
	9	3.03	3.65	93.33
	10	3.03	3.65	93.33

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.3. Decomposition of Error Variance for Bosnian Conflict VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.95	0.00	0.05
	3	99.33	0.62	0.05
	4	99.21	0.62	.018
	5	97.16	2.66	0.18
	6	95.70	3.89	0.41
	7	95.38	4.01	0.61
	8	95.33	4.01	0.66
	9	95.30	4.02	0.68
	10	95.17	4.13	0.70
Presidential Attention	1	6.82	93.18	0.00
	2	9.24	90.54	0.21
	3	10.03	88.32	1.64
	4	10.07	88.27	1.66
	5	10.30	87.77	1.93
	6	9.23	88.95	1.83
	7	9.18	88.96	1.86
	8	9.17	88.76	2.07
	9	9.16	88.76	2.08
	10	9.16	88.72	2.12
Congressional Attention	1	4.01	0.05	95.94
	2	3.67	13.62	82.71
	3	3.70	13.78	82.52
	4	3.71	17.52	78.77
	5	3.62	17.27	79.11
	6	3.65	17.33	79.02
	7	3.60	18.78	77.62
	8	3.63	19.05	77.33
	9	3.63	19.28	77.09
	10	3.63	19.28	77.09

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.4. Decomposition of Error Variance for the Caribbean VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.47	0.52	0.01
	3	96.81	2.58	0.61
	4	93.73	4.84	1.43
	5	92.33	5.80	1.87
	6	91.17	6.82	2.01
	7	90.21	7.47	2.32
	8	90.07	7.50	2.42
	9	90.06	7.50	2.44
	10	90.05	7.50	2.45
Presidential Attention	1	18.79	81.21	0.00
	2	19.16	79.61	1.23
	3	18.87	79.07	2.06
	4	23.39	74.61	2.00
	5	27.00	70.60	2.40
	6	26.29	70.75	2.96
	7	25.94	70.73	3.33
	8	26.12	70.41	3.47
	9	26.12	70.41	3.47
	10	26.24	70.28	3.49
Congressional Attention	1	1.34	0.94	97.72
	2	2.31	1.65	96.03
	3	2.30	1.76	95.94
	4	5.62	1.72	92.66
	5	5.56	4.17	90.28
	6	5.46	5.07	89.46
	7	5.60	5.27	89.14
	8	5.73	5.26	89.01
	9	5.78	5.31	88.91
	10	5.80	5.31	88.90

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.5. Decomposition of Error Variance for the Central America VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.47	0.51	0.02
	3	98.77	1.21	0.02
	4	98.31	1.46	0.23
	5	96.80	2.59	0.62
	6	96.50	2.59	0.90
	7	96.08	2.99	0.93
	8	95.61	3.36	1.03
	9	95.51	3.45	1.04
	10	95.29	3.49	1.21
Presidential Attention	1	22.46	77.54	0.00
	2	21.36	77.91	0.73
	3	20.37	78.90	0.73
	4	20.44	78.08	1.48
	5	20.31	77.23	2.45
	6	21.07	76.36	2.56
	7	21.47	75.93	2.60
	8	21.52	75.77	2.71
	9	21.53	75.64	2.83
	10	21.55	75.51	2.94
Congressional Attention	1	7.10	3.82	89.08
	2	7.43	5.26	87.31
	3	7.29	7.17	85.54
	4	7.71	9.51	85.78
	5	7.60	10.59	81.81
	6	7.42	10.67	81.91
	7	7.40	10.54	82.05
	8	7.82	10.34	81.84
	9	7.88	10.24	81.88
	10	7.85	10.31	81.84

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.6. Decomposition of Error Variance for the China VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.94	0.02	0.04
	3	99.64	0.33	0.04
	4	97.86	0.93	1.21
	5	96.89	1.43	1.69
	6	96.81	1.44	1.75
	7	96.80	1.45	1.75
	8	96.78	1.45	1.76
	9	96.78	1.45	1.77
	10	96.75	1.46	1.78
Presidential Attention	1	13.03	86.97	0.00
	2	12.12	87.69	0.19
	3	12.16	87.66	0.18
	4	11.54	77.89	10.56
	5	12.09	74.88	13.03
	6	12.72	74.35	12.93
	7	12.72	74.23	13.05
	8	12.69	74.06	13.24
	9	12.71	74.05	13.25
	10	12.71	74.03	13.26
Congressional Attention	1	0.03	0.01	99.95
	2	0.23	0.03	99.74
	3	0.22	0.32	99.46
	4	1.32	0.70	97.98
	5	1.38	0.77	97.82
	6	1.66	0.79	97.55
	7	1.77	0.79	97.44
	8	1.95	0.83	97.22
	9	1.97	0.84	97.20
	10	2.03	0.84	97.13

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.8. Decomposition of Error Variance for the Korea VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.28	0.19	0.53
	3	98.49	0.48	1.03
	4	97.91	1.05	1.04
	5	97.76	1.17	1.07
	6	97.75	1.18	1.07
	7	97.75	1.18	1.07
	8	97.75	1.18	1.07
	9	97.75	1.18	1.07
	10	97.75	1.18	1.07
Presidential Attention	1	3.30	96.70	0.00
	2	3.41	96.50	0.09
	3	3.43	96.36	0.21
	4	3.46	96.32	0.21
	5	3.47	96.17	0.36
	6	3.47	96.17	0.36
	7	3.47	96.16	0.37
	8	3.47	96.16	0.37
	9	3.47	96.16	0.37
	10	3.47	96.16	0.37
Congressional Attention	1	0.29	0.03	99.68
	2	0.66	0.16	99.18
	3	1.34	0.21	98.45
	4	1.81	0.22	97.96
	5	2.05	0.25	97.69
	6	2.13	0.25	97.62
	7	2.16	0.25	97.58
	8	2.16	0.26	97.58
	9	2.17	0.26	97.58
	10	2.17	0.26	97.58

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

Table 5.9. Decomposition of Error Variance for Soviet Union VAR: Percentage of Forecast Error Resulting from Innovations

		Innovations in:		
Forecast Error	k	Media Attention	Presidential Attention	Congressional Attention
Media Attention	1	100.00	0.00	0.00
	2	99.46	0.51	0.03
	3	99.38	0.59	0.03
	4	98.91	1.04	0.05
	5	98.84	1.10	0.06
	6	98.82	1.10	0.07
	7	98.82	1.11	0.07
	8	98.82	1.11	0.07
	9	98.82	1.11	0.07
	10	98.82	1.11	0.07
Presidential Attention	1	29.21	70.79	0.00
	2	28.94	70.44	0.62
	3	28.45	70.52	1.03
	4	28.37	70.48	1.15
	5	28.34	70.46	1.19
	6	28.35	70.45	1.20
	7	28.35	70.45	1.20
	8	28.35	70.45	1.20
	9	28.35	70.45	1.20
	10	28.35	70.45	1.20
Congressional Attention	1	0.57	6.21	93.21
	2	0.75	6.31	92.94
	3	1.00	7.20	91.80
	4	1.09	7.34	91.56
	5	1.11	7.39	91.50
	6	1.12	7.39	91.49
	7	1.12	7.39	91.48
	8	1.12	7.39	91.48
	9	1.12	7.39	91.48
	10	1.12	7.39	91.48

Note: Each entry represents the percentage of forecast error (k quarters ahead) in the row variable that is due to innovations in that column variable.

So far, the discussion of the results suggest that the president often fails to influence media attention to foreign policy issues. Rather, the president influences the media in only two issues. To complete the test of the hegemonic presidency model, we need to examine whether or not the president influences congressional attention to the foreign policy issues.

Presidential Influence on Congress

Do presidents influence the congressional agenda using the continuous attention strategy? Table 5.10 shows the determinants of congressional attention to the eight foreign policy issues. Of the eight issues, the president has a clear, significant influence on congressional attention for three of the issues. For the Bosnian conflict, the Caribbean, and Central America, shifts in presidential attention cause significant responses in congressional attention. The Granger F-tests for the three issues are highly significant. Presidential influence is absent for the other five issues. Presidential attention has no significant influence on congressional attention for many important foreign policy issues including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet Union.

The Decomposition of Error Variance (Tables 5.2-5.9) results show that presidential attention explains a significant portion of the forecast error variance for congressional attention on the same issues indicated by the Granger F-tests. Innovations in presidential attention to the Bosnian conflict explain about 17 percent of the forecast

error for congressional attention. The president explains roughly five percent of the forecast error for congressional attention to the Caribbean and 10 percent for Central America (Tables 5.4 and 5.5). The only other issue where presidential attention approaches these levels is in the case of the Soviet Union (7 percent). However, the relationship is statistically insignificant. Levels of explanation are below four percent for the other four issues.

According to Granger F-tests reported in Table 5.10, the media play a clear role in determining congressional attention. Media attention significantly influences congressional attention in six of the eight issues, excluding Bosnia and Japan. Clearly, Congress responds to shifts in media attention to the various foreign policy issues. This relationship is expected by both models of agenda setting.

Examining the Decomposition of Error Variance results in Tables 5.2 through 5.9 do not paint as clear a picture of the media influencing Congress as the Granger F- tests indicate. Innovations in media attention explain more than three percent of the forecast error variance of congressional attention in only four of the issues (Arab-Israeli conflict, Bosnia, the Caribbean, and Central America).

Congressional attention to the foreign policy issues tend to follow the same general rules as media attention. Congressional attention is inertial, and determined by events for the most part. In all but one of the issues, lagged values of congressional

attention cause current congressional attention. In five of the eight issues, the Congress is clearly reacting to events as indicated by the significant F-tests.

With regard to the congressional agenda, presidents lead Congress on only a few of the foreign policy issues. Presidents seem unable to influence the congressional agenda on most of the issues including important issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet Union. The congressional agenda responds to shifts in media attention and events, in effect ignoring shifts in presidential attention in many cases. This finding is the opposite of what the hegemonic model would predict.

The evidence shows the inadequacies of the hegemonic model. For the eight issues examined, presidents rarely influence the congressional or the media's agenda. Previous media and congressional attention appear much more important, with international events being the primary indicator of when the media and Congress alter their own agendas.

The analysis of presidential influence using the continuous attention strategy is incomplete, however. The Granger F-tests and Decomposition of Error Variance tell only part of the story in terms of presidential impact on the agendas of Congress and the media. We know that presidential attention rarely has a systematic causal influence on other agendas. We do not know the direction of the relationships, however. To determine the direction and dynamics of the impacts we turn to a discussion of Moving Average Responses by the media and Congress to sharp increases in presidential attention.

Responses to Presidential Attention Increases

The Moving Average Response Rates for each of the issues are shown in Figures 5.1 through 5.8. The response rates represent simulations of the three time series in response to a sharp increase to the independent variable. The independent variable is artificially increased by one standard deviation, and the simulated responses are the changes, in standard deviations, by the dependent series. Each column represents responses by the media, president, and Congress to shocks to media attention, presidential attention, and congressional attention.

We are testing the hegemonic model, so we are interested in whether a shock to presidential attention causes a significant, positive response by media or congressional attention. Examining the middle column of each graph further verifies the minimal nature of presidential influence on the foreign policy agendas of Congress and the media using the continuous attention strategy. The media responses are in the first graph in the middle column. None of the graphs indicate a significant, positive response by the media to a shock in presidential attention. All of the responses are relatively flat and fluctuate around the mean of media attention. Even those issues where Table 5.1 indicated a significant F-test show only minimal responses by the media to the president.

The congressional responses to increases in presidential attention are shown in the third graph of the middle column in each figure. According to the response rates, the president has greater influence on the congressional agenda than the media's agenda, but

Figure 5.1: Moving Average Response for Arab-Israeli Issues



Figure 5.2: Moving Average Response for Bosnia Conflict Issues



Figure 5.3: Moving Average Response for Caribbean Issues



Figure 5.4: Moving Average Response for Central American Issues



Figure 5.5: Moving Average Response for China Issues



Figure 5.6: Moving Average Response for Japan Issues



Figure 5.8: Moving Average Response for Soviet Union Issues



the effect of increases in presidential attention are not great by any means. Figure 5.1 shows responses for the Arab-Israeli issue. Here, we see congressional attention shifting about .15 of a standard deviation after the shock to presidential attention, representing a very limited response once exogenous events are taken into account. The congressional response for the Soviet Union (Figure 5.8) issue is a little higher, about .20 of a standard deviation, with a sharp decrease after the first week. Of the three issues where the president was found to have a significant impact on the congressional agenda in Table 5.10, presidential attention to Bosnia (Figure 5.2) leads to a sharp, though delayed, response by Congress. The Congress appears to respond marginally to presidential increases in attention to Central American issues (Figure 5.4), with about a .15 of a standard deviation response, followed by several weeks of .10 of a standard deviation response. The graph for Caribbean (Figure 5.3) issues shows no significant response.

The moving average response rates indicate only marginal responses, if any response at all, by the media and Congress to increases in attention by the president. Independent of exogenous events, the president has little influence on when the media or Congress attend to this set of foreign policy issues.

Testing the Pluralist Presidency

The pluralist model hypothesizes that presidents are responsive to shifts in media attention to the foreign policy issues. Also, the model hypothesizes a reciprocal relationship between the president and Congress on some foreign policy issues. So far, the findings question the notion of presidential dominance of the foreign policy agenda

setting process. However, to gain a more complete picture of the process we must ask the question: what determines the president's foreign policy agenda?

Determinants of the President's Agenda

Is the president responsive to shifts in media attention to the various foreign policy issues as the pluralist model suggests? It appears so. The Granger F-tests for the determinants of presidential attention are displayed in Table 5.11. The independent variables are listed on the left-hand column, with the significance tests listed in the cells for each issue. In order to accept the pluralist model's expectation of a responsive president, the media must significantly influence presidential attention to the foreign policy issues. Of the eight issues examined, media attention significantly influences presidential attention in six issues: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bosnian conflict, the Caribbean, Central America, China, and the Soviet Union. The F-tests for the media on the six issues are all statistically significant. The results clearly suggest that the president is responsive to shifts in media attention.

For further evidence of the responsive nature of the presidency to the media in foreign policy agenda setting we can examine the Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance for presidential attention in Tables 5.2 through 5.9. For all of the issues, except Korea, innovations in media attention explain over 10 percent of the forecast error in presidential attention. The percentage of variance explained ranges from 10 percent (the

Table 5.11. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants Presidential Attention to Foreign Policy

Independent Variable	Arab-Israeli Conflict	Bosnian Conflict	Caribbean	Central America
Previous Presidential Attention	2.709 (**0.04**)	5.98 (**0.00**)	10.80 (**0.00**)	7.559 (**0.00**)
Media Attention	3.695 (**0.01**)	2.34 (**0.04**)	16.16 (**0.00**)	2.599 (**0.08**)
Congressional Attention	0.357 (0.78)	0.898 (0.48)	5.678 (**0.00**)	3.364 (**0.00**)
International Events	37.21 (**0.00**)	23.76 (**0.00**)	37.58 (**0.00**)	52.27 (**0.00**)

Independent Variable	China	Japan	Korea	Soviet Union
Previous Presidential Attention	33.89 (**0.00**)	1.068 (0.37)	1.689 (0.15)	4.177 (**0.01**)
Media Attention	5.763 (**0.00**)	0.174 (0.95)	0.135 (0.97)	2.99 (**0.03**)
Congressional Attention	18.334 (**0.00**)	0.148 (0.96)	0.542 (0.71)	1.673 (0.17)
International Events	8.24 (**0.00**)	55.20 (**0.00**)	38.69 (**0.00**)	129.05 (**0.00**)

Note: The numbers in the tables are F statistics; p values are in parentheses. Significant values are in bold. The lag values are reported in the Appendix. Events at lag 0 are included as an exogenous variable to control for the contemporaneous effects of events. The N is 514 in the Arab-Israeli and Soviet Union series The N is 219 in the Bosnian series. The N is 591 in the Caribbean, Central America, China, Japan, and Korea series.

Bosnian conflict) to 32 percent (Japan). This is strong evidence suggesting that shifts in media attention to the foreign policy issues are influential in explaining shifts in presidential attention.

The moving average responses graphed in Figures 5.1 through 5.8 provide further evidence of a responsive president. The first column in each figure shows responses by the media, the president, and Congress to shocks in media attention. A one standard deviation increase in media attention results in a positive response in presidential attention. The magnitudes of the responses range from .20 of a standard deviation (Bosina, Figure 5.2) to roughly half a standard deviation (the Soviet Union, Figure 5.8). The graphs represent substantial responses by the president when compared to the degree of unresponsiveness by the media to shifts in presidential attention discussed above.

Most of the presidential responses to shocks in media attention shown in Figures 5.1 through 5.8 show a sharp decay. Even so, in several cases the president's attention is still increased substantially two weeks after the initial response. The evidence clearly indicates that the president responds to shifts in media attention to the foreign policy issues, even when exogenous events are controlled.

Is the president responsive to shifts in congressional attention to the various issues? In most cases, the president is not responsive. Sometimes, however, the president is influenced by shifts in congressional attention. Congress influences presidential attention on three of the issues: China, the Caribbean, and Central America. According to the Granger F-Tests reported in Table 5.11, presidents shift their attention

to China, the Caribbean, and Central America in response to changes in congressional attention.

The Decomposition of Error Variances reported in Tables 5.2 through 5.9 indicate similar relationships as the F-Tests. The president responds sharply to shifts in congressional attention to China, and marginally to shifts in congressional attention to the Caribbean and Central America. Table 5.6 indicates that innovations in congressional attention to China explain about 13 percent of the forecast error in presidential attention to China after five weeks. The results for the Caribbean and Central America are much less clear. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate that the Congress explains about three percent of the forecast error for presidential attention in the Caribbean and Central America, a rather small portion of the total variance.

The moving average responses graphed in Figures 5.1 through 5.8 indicate the relative unresponsiveness of the president to shifts in congressional attention to the various issues. Only in the case of issues related to China (Figure 5.5) does the president respond sharply to an increase in congressional attention. The president's response is delayed, but substantively important (.30 of a standard deviation response after three weeks).

The findings indicate that the pluralist model is correct in claiming that presidents do not dominate the agenda setting process in relation to Congress. When we examined the impact of the president, we found Congress to be mostly unresponsive. Rather, presidents appear to share agenda setting responsibilities with Congress on some issues (the Caribbean and Central America), while on other issues the relationship is

Table 5.12. Summary of Granger Causality Results from the VARs

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Number of Issues Where Independent Variable is Significant	Issues Where Independent Variable is Significant
President	Congress	3	Bosnia, Caribbean, Central America
	Media	2	Caribbean, Central America
Media	Congress	6	Arab-Israel, Caribbean, Central America, China, Korea, Soviet Union
	President	6	Arab-Israel, Bosnia, Caribbean, Central America, China, Soviet Union
Congress	President	3	Caribbean, Central America, China
	Media	1	China
Events	Congress	5	All but China, Korea, and Japan
	Media	8	All issues
	President	8	All issues

exerts influence on the media and congressional agendas in only two of the eight issues examined, having no systematic effect on a majority of the issues. Presidential attention to the Caribbean and Central America influence both media and congressional attention; however, that influence is marginal when examining response rates and decomposition of error variance. Presidential attention to the Bosnian crisis influences congressional attention, but not media attention.

Between the three institutions, the media clearly have the most agenda setting influence among this set of foreign policy issues. Presidents respond to shifts in media attention on six of the eight issues. Congress is responsive to the media as well, responding to media attention on six of the eight issues. Congressional influence is marginal in comparison. While congressional attention influences presidential attention on three of the issues, the media responds to Congress on only one issue (China). Finally, as expected, the foreign policy context plays a primary role in determining institutional attention in foreign policy. Exogenous events Granger cause presidential and media attention on all eight issues. Events cause shifts in congressional attention on five of the eight issues.

The findings conclusively reject the hegemonic presidency model of foreign policy agenda setting. Presidents clearly do not dominate agenda setting in foreign policy issues related to exogenous events. Instead, presidents are responsive most of the time, in particular to the media and in some cases to Congress. If we are to label any of the three institutions as dominant, it surely would have to be the media.

CHAPTER VI

PRESIDENTIAL DRAMA AND THE FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

The analysis, to this point, has focused on the impact of continuous presidential attention on the media and congressional agendas. Continuous attention by the president, represented by his public statements, is a relatively inexpensive strategy for influencing the agenda. The results in Chapter V suggest continuous presidential attention has only marginal influence on media and congressional attention to foreign policy. What about a more focused presidential attempt to influence the agenda?

The theoretical discussion in Chapter III identified two broad strategies presidents employ to influence the policy agenda: continuous attention and presidential drama. The effects of continuous presidential attention are limited, mainly because the strategy involves relatively minor costs to the president. Also, public statements may only represent symbolic attention by the president rather than sincere policy efforts. Presidential drama involves more than just discussing an issue publicly and is far from symbolic. Presidential drama includes presidents practicing summitry, traveling abroad, ordering military strikes, and going public on national television. All eyes are on the president when presidents use dramatic methods to attract attention. Do dramatic presidential events influence media and congressional attention to foreign policy? Do media and congressional attention to the issue related to the event persist after the event?

Behr and Iyengar (1985) systematically analyzed the influence of presidential speeches on the public's policy agenda. The authors demonstrated that high profile, single issue speeches by the president increased media attention to the targeted issue, which in turn increased public concerns. Jeffrey Cohen (1995) examined the impact of the president's annual State of the Union address on what the American people felt to be the "most important problem" looking for subtle influences by the president. Cohen found that in most instances, presidential focus on an issue in the address increased the percentage of Americans concerned with the issue, as expressed in Gallup's famous "most important problem" question. Cohen concludes that presidents can influence the public's agenda, albeit subtly, by focusing on broad issues in an annual speech.

In Chapter V, I examined continuous presidential attention as the variable representing presidential efforts at setting the agenda. Presidential attention, measured as the amount of attention presidents give an issue in public statements, is a valid measure of the president's agenda. However, it is not the only way to measure what presidents are doing in foreign policy. Public statements by the president are not necessarily concrete efforts at influencing public policy. It is plausible that public statements represent symbolic efforts by the president. Jeffrey Cohen (1997) found that the president's statements in the State of the Union were only responsively symbolic to public concerns. What about presidential activities in foreign policy that clearly indicate the priorities of the administration?

Besides making public statements, presidents take trips abroad, hold summit meetings, and use American military force. Such events are much more dramatic than

presidential statements and show clear executive interest in the issues related to the event. While dramatic events are well represented in the presidential attention measure, they are not distinguished from one another or from other, less dramatic, presidential statements. Thus, to accurately gauge presidential influence on the media and congressional agenda, we must examine the impact of purely presidential events in addition to the president's attention to the various issues.

The results in Chapter V suggest that the president is unable, in most instances, to set the national foreign policy agenda. Rather than examining public statements, I now focus on concerted efforts by presidents to influence the foreign policy agenda. High profile presidential activities, especially the dramatic, should show an agenda setting effect if presidents are powerful agenda setters.

Theory

Presidents employ presidential drama to influence the agenda in foreign policy. Presidents are newsworthy actors in foreign policy and events orchestrated by the president may influence the agendas of the media and Congress. When presidents meet with their Soviet or Chinese counterparts, the media and Congress are watching. When the president chooses to invade a small Latin American nation, shifts in attention by Congress and the media can be dramatic. Presidential drama provides a useful, though costly, tool for presidents to influence the foreign policy agenda.

Presidential Drama

Presidents travel abroad, attend summit meetings, use American military force, and give nationally televised speeches, creating drama and spectacle (Miroff 1990) that may directly influence the foreign policy agenda of the media and Congress for at least a short period of time and possibly longer. In such events, the presidency is the center of attention. Presidential drama may serve to boost the president's agenda setting influence in foreign policy.

Presidential drama is probably more effective than the continuous attention strategy; however, the strategy involves greater costs. For example, in order to hold summit meetings, presidents must take several days out of their busy schedule to focus on one aspect of foreign policy. Presidential drama focuses presidential attention so sharply that inattention to another policy is likely due to the limited nature of the president's attention. This focused attention increases the overall costs of the strategy.

Dramatic presidential events may create shifts in media and congressional attention altering those institutions' agendas. Even seemingly less dramatic presidential events, such as a single-issue televised national speech, may attract media and congressional attention. If the president can create an event which substantially increases media and congressional attention to the related foreign policy issue, then the president is impacting the agenda.

Expectations

The more dramatic a presidential event, the more media attention it is likely to draw. Military invasions are the most dramatic, placing the president at the center of attention in the nightly news for lengthy periods of time. Soviet-U.S. summits, though commonplace in recent decades, are critically important presidential events and are likely to draw protracted media attention to issues related to the Soviet Union.

There are three possible responses by the media or Congress to a dramatic presidential event. The first possibility is no response. A presidential event occurs, media or congressional attention do not change significantly. The second possibility is a short term (one week) increase in media or congressional attention. The presidential event occurs, followed by a sharp increase in media or congressional attention. However, the increase is short-lived, with media and congressional attention returning to the pre-event mean the week following the event. The third possible response is a shift in media or congressional attention. The presidential event occurs, causing a sharp increase in media or congressional attention that persists after the event ends. The long term impact of the event indicates a clear agenda setting impact by the president.

Given the high costs of presidential drama and the fact that presidential drama is newsworthy, both models of agenda setting suggest that presidential events should lead to at least short-term increases in media and congressional attention. However, to have an agenda setting impact, presidential drama must cause a shift in attention by Congress or the media to an issue. A shift in attention denotes a long term change. For example, media attention continues to focus on issues related to the Soviet Union after a summit is

completed. Without a long term change, all that is occurring is the media covering presidential activities, not shifting their attentiveness to a policy issue.

If the president dominates the agenda setting process, we would expect long term (more than a week or two increases) shifts in media and congressional attention following dramatic presidential events. Presidents draw attention to an issue through diplomatic activity, and the media and Congress adjust their agendas in response. If, however, presidents compete with other institutions and are responsive in developing their own foreign policy agendas, we would expect long term shifts in media and congressional attention following a presidential event to be rare.

Research Design

The research design I employ is simple. I conduct Box-Jenkins impact assessment analysis, assessing the impact of all of the summits, trips abroad, major uses of force, and nationally televised speeches from 1984 to 1995 on weekly media and congressional attention to several foreign policy issues. I examine six different issues for media attention including the Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Japan, China, Central America, and the Caribbean. I examine only one issue (the SovietUnion) for congressional attention. I was unable to build a satisfactory noise model where the errors were white noise for congressional attention to the other issues. Without the proper noise model (a white noise error term) we cannot isolate the effects of the presidential event by controlling for other factors. Dramatic presidential events provide the

Methods

Using Box-Jenkins impact assessment, I can isolate the effects of each of the dramatic presidential events on the media and congressional agenda. I treat each event as a separate case and compare the findings for each case as part of the analysis. Chapter IV discusses impact assessment more fully. However, I will briefly describe the method here.

By modeling the error of a time series using Box-Jenkins methods, I can isolate the impact of a singular event on that time series. In the present analysis, media and congressional attention to each of the issues provide the dependent time series. Theory tells us that media and congressional attention constantly shift to the different foreign policy issues, usually dependent on exogenous international events. Impact assessment answers two questions concerning the influence of a discrete presidential event. First, does the event cause an increase in attention by the media or Congress? Second, does the increase in attention last for a significant length of time?

To answer the two questions for each of the events, I model their impacts as pulse functions. I expect there to be a dramatic increase in attention by the dependent series in response to the presidential event. Finding increases in attention does not mean significant agenda setting influence, however. A significant increase may only be a blip on the radar screen of media attention. In order to influence the agenda significantly, a presidential event must cause a shift in media or congressional attention to the related issue, something more than a blip.

Impact assessment measures the amount of the attention increase through the impact parameter. The impact parameter indicates the amount of initial change in the dependent series due to the intervention of the presidential event. Often, the media anticipate announced presidential events by increasing their attention the week prior to an event. Because this occurs with regularity, I examined the impact of the event both during the week of the event and the week prior to the event. If there is a significant impact parameter the week prior to the event, we can conclude that the increase is caused by the upcoming event. An impact the week prior is handled in similar fashion as an impact during the week of the event.

To assess the long term impact, we look at the decay parameter. The decay parameters range between -1 and 1. As the decay parameter approaches zero, the rate of decay is increased to the point where a zero indicates a true pulse function (or a blip), without lingering effect. Decay parameters further from zero indicate slower decay, thus the event has a greater long term effect. In order to attribute an agenda setting influence to the presidential event, both the impact and decay parameters must be positive and significant.

We can determine the estimated impact of the event by using the mathematical formulation: $Y_t = f(I_t) + \mu$, where Y_t represents the dependent series at time t, $f(I_t)$ is the differenced transfer function input, and μ represents the pre-event mean. Since all of the data are logged, the parameters provide percentage changes in the pre-event and post-event equilibria. Simple exponential mathematical calculations can then give us the

estimated impact on the dependent variable in terms of minutes for media coverage and columns for congressional attention. We can then plot the estimated values of media and congressional attention prior to, during, and after the event to give a visual representation of the estimated impact of the event. Plotting the estimated series gives us a visual distinction between lasting influence by the president and mere blips in attention.

Results

I ran thirty-six different interventions on the various media series and fourteen interventions on the congressional series for Soviet-U.S. relations. The more dramatic events tended to have greater long-term influence on media and congressional attention. Speeches, alone, had little impact on attention by the other institutions. The results indicate that the media and Congress increase their attention to foreign policy in response to dramatic presidential events. However, the responses are usually short-lived. Less than a third of the events examined led to a significant change in media or congressional attention beyond the week of the event.

In this section I present the findings by issue and by the type of presidential drama examined. I handle effects on the media's agenda and the congressional agenda separately.

Presidential Drama by Issue

The tables I present here summarize the results for each issue area. Full statistical results, including parameter values, appear in the Appendix. Examining the

Table 6.1. Summary of the Impact of Presidential Events Related to the Soviet Union on TV News Coverage

Type of Intervention	One Week Impact	Long Term Impact
Summits	11 of 12 (92%)	2 of 12 (17%)
TV Speeches	0 of 2 (0%)	0 of 2 (0%)
Exogenous Events	3 of 3 (100%)	3 of 3 (100%)

A.6). The most common events were summits, which in every case but one caused a significant increase in media attention. Eleven of the twelve Soviet-U.S. summits increased media attention for at least one week.

At first glance, presidential drama involving the Soviet Union seems to give the president clear agenda setting results. However, the case is not so clear when we look at the decay parameters to determine how long the presidential effect on media attention lasts. Only two of the twelve summits, or 17%, had a long-term impact past the week of the event. Therefore, we can conclude that summits rarely cause a shift in the equilibrium of media attention. Summits typically caused blips in media attention rather than lengthy shifts.

What is interesting here is that both of the summits that resulted in long term influences on the media were combined with nationally televised speeches. After the Iceland summit of October, 1986, President Reagan addressed the nation. The address

served to continue to focus attention on the Soviet Union. After President Bush met with Gorbachev in Malta in November, 1989, he addressed the nation live on television. The Iceland and Malta summits are arguably the most important summits during the end of the Cold War. Only one of the other summits, the December 1987 Washington summit included the president "going public."

The televised speeches independent of summits proved unsuccessful in significantly increasing media attention. Both of the speeches examined had insignificant impact parameters. One speech was followed by an increase in media attention; however, that increase cannot be attributed to the speech because of the lack of any impact prior to that point, and the fact that events occurring inside the Soviet Union in late 1991 determined much of the media focus.

Figure 6.1 plots the estimated logged values for four of the summit meetings. The pre-event mean for the series of logged media attention is 2.4, or about 11 minutes of TV news coverage on average. The plots show the estimated increases attributed to the summit meetings and the decay of media attention back to the pre-event mean once the event is completed. Both of the significant summits (Iceland in 1986 and Malta in 1989) are plotted on the top row. Two insignificant summits (significant impact parameters but insignificant decay parameters) are plotted in the bottom row.

Figure 6.1: Impact Assessment Plots for Presidential Summits on Weekly Media Attention to the Soviet Union



All four of the plots show a significant increase in media attention at the time of the event. The difference between the top row of plots and the bottom row of plots is the rate of decay after the event, the persistence of the media attention shift. The plots show that in the cases of Iceland and Malta the decay is much less sharp, and thus slower, than the blips shown in the Washington and Moscow summits. To illustrate in minutes, the Moscow summit led to an estimated increase in media attention to the Soviet Union to a point of 178 minutes. However, the following week estimated media coverage fell to 18 minutes and back to the pre-event mean (of 11 minutes) by the next week. The Washington summit led to an estimated 79 minutes of media coverage, but the coverage fell back to the pre-event mean the following week. In contrast, both Iceland and Malta led to more lasting increases. The week of the Iceland summit had an estimated 77 minutes of TV coverage of the Soviet Union, followed by 39 minutes, 25 minutes, and 19 minutes of coverage each week. Malta led to an estimated 78 minutes of coverage during the summit, followed by 34 minutes, 21 minutes, and 16 minutes each week.

Turning to events exogenous to the presidency, I examined the impact of three critical events that occurred within the Soviet Union in the time period: the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the failed Soviet coup attempt, and the announced dissolution of the Soviet Union. As expected, all three of these events increased media attention both at the time of the event and in the weeks following the event (see Appendix, Table 6A.3). The results illustrate the importance of these exogenous events in comparison to the limited impact of presidential events on media attention to the Soviet Union.

Despite the importance of the Soviet issue to American national security, presidents over the time period were unable to significantly impact media attention beyond the initial week through the presidential drama strategy. Only when presidents spoke directly to the American people following a summit, did the event have a significant long term impact, and this occurred only two out of three times. So far, the findings suggest that presidential drama is not a very successful strategy when looking at long term impacts on the media's agenda. However, the increased drama of adding a speech to explain the importance of a summit may increase the returns as far as media impact is concerned.

The Other Issues

The other issues did not provide as great a number of dramatic presidential events to examine. However presidents did take a variety of dramatic actions involving issues other than the Soviet Union. To complete the discussion of the results by issue, I have presented a summary of the results in Table 6.2. Complete tables of the results are available in the Appendix (Tables A.7 to A.11).

It is difficult to compare across issues because of the different types of events presidents used to try and influence the agenda in foreign policy. For example, presidents had a significant impact on media attention the week prior or the week during the event for 79% (11 of 14) of the Soviet events, 100% (7 of 7) of the China and Japan events, 71% (5 of 7) of the Central American and Caribbean events, and 67% (2 of 3) of the Arab-Israeli events. Clearly, across all issues, significant impacts on media attention

for the week of the presidential event are quite common. Dramatic presidential events cause increases in media attention for at least a week, no matter the issue.

Does presidential drama lead to long term shifts in media attention? Presidents had a significant long term impact on 14% (2 of 14) of the Soviet events, 43% (3 of 7) of the China and Japan events, 71% (5 of 7) of the Central American and Caribbean events, and none of the Arab-Israeli events. A significant long term shift in media attention caused by a presidential event is much less common and varies across the issues.

Table 6.2. Summary of the Impact of Dramatic Presidential Events on TV News Coverage

Issue	One Week Impact	Long Term Impact
Soviet-U.S. Rels.	11 of 14 (79%)	2 of 14 (14%)
Arab-Israel	2 of 3 (67%)	0 of 3 (0%)
Cent. America / Caribbean	5 of 7 (71%)	5 of 7 (71%)
China	3 of 3 (100%)	2 of 3 (67%)
Japan	4 of 4 (100%)	1 of 4 (25%)

Figure 6.2: Impact Assessment Plots for Various Dramatic Presidential Events on Weekly Media Attention



issues. The mean of weekly television news coverage to the Soviet Union is 16.7 minutes, and coverage to the Arab-Israeli conflict is 17.4 minutes.

In contrast, weekly media attention to Central America averages 8.5 minutes, 4.8 minutes for the Caribbean. Media attention to Japan and China both average about 7.3 minutes per week. The less salient issues are more influenced by presidential drama because media attention to Japan, China, the Caribbean, and Central America is sporadic. The media are unlikely to pay attention to less salient issues until the president (or an exogenous event) turns their attention to the issue. Media attention to the less salient issues hovers around zero until a presidential event or exogenous event attracts media coverage.

The more salient Soviet and Arab-Israeli issues are likely to maintain attention by the media and interested observers despite presidential activity. Levels of attention to the salient issues are already high, so presidential drama is less likely to have a significant long term impact. While examining continuous presidential attention in Chapter V, we found similar results based on the issues. Presidents were unsuccessful in influencing media attention to the highly salient issues, particularly the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Presidents had better results influencing the less salient issues, especially issues related to the Caribbean and Central America.

The most salient issues (the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict) are consistently on the agenda, so the president does not have to place them onto the policy agenda. However, because the issue is consistently on the agenda, the president's ability

to push attention by the media appears limited when compared to issues that rarely attract large amounts of media attention.

Presidential Drama by Type

Do the most dramatic presidential events have greater agenda setting influence? Table 6.3 summarizes the results by event type. Of the 31 dramatic presidential events examined, 26 (or 84%) of the events significantly increased media attention either the week prior or the week of the event. 92% (11 of 12) of the summits, 100% (2 of 2) of the major uses of force, and 100% (10 of 10) of the trips abroad had a significant impact. Both of the events coded "other" had an impact. Only 20% (1 of 5) of the independent nationally televised speeches had a significant impact. When speeches are subtracted from the total, 96% (25 of 26) of the dramatic events caused a spike in media attention. Clearly, presidential drama causes blips on the radar screen of media attention in foreign policy.

The results clearly show that televised speeches are ineffective at influencing the media's agenda. Only one speech, Reagan's last Nicaragua aid speech, had a significant impact on the media's attention. The speech was clearly a "going public" strategy by Reagan, as he appealed to the American public for support in an aid package before Congress, one that eventually failed. Television speeches are least dramatic of the presidential events and appear to have no real impact. Given the limited impact of presidential statements shown in Chapter V, it is no surprise that speeches have minimal influence on media attention.

40% (4 of 10) of the trips abroad, and none of the events coded "other" had an impact beyond a week.

The findings support the hypothesis that the more dramatic the event, the greater the returns in the form of influence on the media's agenda. Uses of force are clearly the most dramatic presidential events, and they clearly cause the media to pay attention to an issue. Presidential trips involve high drama, as well, and can result in an agenda setting effect. Neither of the "other" diplomatic events involved travel outside the United States, and neither of them had an effect beyond the initial week.

Summits do not seem to follow the high drama logic. Summits often involve travel abroad and are very dramatic, setting the president on center stage as a diplomat. However, the return is not often very great in terms of agenda setting. Of course, summits may have other important benefits for the president including reduced tensions, treaties, and policy changes. The fact that summits are Soviet Union events may explain why they have little agenda setting impact. The Soviet Union is a highly salient issue already, suggesting only marginal presidential influence.

Combining a televised speech with presidential drama may increase the impact of the event. As discussed earlier, both of the summits that proved significant beyond the initial week involved a televised national speech. Also, both of the uses of force involved at least one speech to the American public. Of the nine dramatic events that influenced media attention beyond a week, four of them combined drama with a speech. Speeches are not effective tools when used alone. However, speeches may increase the

level of drama surrounding a presidential event enough to make the long term impact on media attention significant.

Influencing the Congressional Agenda

I examined the effects of presidential drama on congressional attention to issues related to the Soviet Union. The results are summarized in Table 6.4, with complete statistical results available in the Appendix (Table A.12).

The influence of presidential drama is not as clear cut when examining the congressional agenda. However, patterns similar to that of presidential influence on the media's agenda appear. Of the 12 summits examined, 75% (or 9) of them caused a significant increase in congressional attention to the Soviet Union. Only 33% of the summits (4 of 12) had a significant impact past the week of the summit. Of those four, only one is among the nine that had an initial impact. Thus, only one of the summits, the Iceland summit of December, 1986, had a clear agenda setting impact.

Figure 6.3 plots the estimated logged values of congressional attention for several of the summits. The graphs include plots for the Iceland summit, the DC summit of 1990, the Moscow summit of 1991, and the Vancouver summit of 1993. The Iceland summit shows what appears to be the equivalent of a step function, where the summit changed the mean level of congressional attention. Calculating the estimated values shows that the mean level changed from a pre-event mean of 3 columns per week to 4.5 columns per week, an increase of 50 percent. The other summits involved greater

Table 6.4. Summary of the Impact of Dramatic Presidential Events Related to the Soviet Union on Congressional Attention to the Soviet Union

Type of Intervention	Significant Positive Impact	Significant Positive Decay Parameter
Summits	9 of 12 (75%)	4 of 12 (33%)
TV Speeches	0 of 2 (0%)	0 of 2 (0%)
Exogenous Events	1 of 3 (33%)	0 of 3 (0%)

impacts at the time of the summit, but were only blips in congressional attention. The increase in congressional attention did not last beyond the initial week.

What is likely occurring here is that congressional responses to presidential summits are delayed. It could be that members of Congress follow a wait and see strategy before discussing publicly presidential diplomacy in such a crucial issue as the Soviet Union. Many of the long term impacts are delayed, as shown by the insignificant impact parameter followed by a significant decay. Congress is a slow moving institution, delay is not surprising.

Neither of the speeches generated positive increases in congressional attention during the week of the speech. One speech (Bush's 1991 arms control speech) was followed by increases in congressional attention, but it is not clear whether the increases

Figure 6.3: Impact Assessment Plots for Presidential Summits on Weekly Congressional Attention to the Soviet Union



abroad, and summits followed by nationally televised speeches lead to long term increases in media and congressional attention.

When looking for long term agenda setting influence, less than a third of the presidential events influenced media attention beyond the time of the event. The results regarding congressional attention were less conclusive, but indicate only marginal influence for the president. The weak findings suggest dramatic presidential events only have marginal impacts on the foreign policy agendas of other institutions. Only the most dramatic events had any long term effect.

Additionally, the findings suggest that presidents are likely only to have a long term impact on the media's agenda for the least salient issues. More salient and important issues, such as the Soviet Union, have higher levels of continuous media attention and are less likely influenced by presidential activity.

Are presidents successful agenda setters in foreign policy? It depends. When presidents choose to use the continuous attention strategy, they are less likely successful than when they create a dramatic event. However, to cause shifts in media and congressional attention, it takes the most dramatic type of event, like an invasion or high profile trip. Presidential success also depends on the foreign policy issue. The less salient, sporadically attended to issues are more amenable to presidential influence of the agenda. American political attention to low salience issues, like Central America, is light by definition. Presidential attention and drama involving such an issue increase media and congressional attention so that the returns in agenda influence alone may exceed the costs presidents spend focusing their agenda.

CHAPTER VII

AGENDA SETTING IN FOREIGN AID AND TRADE POLICY

The findings to this point question the conventional wisdom of presidential influence in foreign policy agenda setting presented in the hegemonic presidency model. The analysis in Chapter V focused on event-related issues and found only marginal presidential influence on the agendas of the media and Congress. In Chapter VI, I examined the impacts of dramatic presidential events on the foreign policy agendas of Congress and the media and found limited presidential influence. That analysis dealt with event-related issues as well.

What about foreign policy issues that are not clearly linked with an ongoing set of international events? The analyses challenging presidential dominance to this point have focused only on issues that have a clear link with ongoing events, such as the Soviet Union or the Arab-Israeli conflict. I have yet to examine foreign policy issues unrelated to events. Events suggest the importance of crises in establishing the foreign policy agenda. The system is in reactive mode when events determine the agenda. The importance of events in the preceding analyses shows how the international environment is critical in determining how institutions shape their agendas. There are foreign policy issues, however, where the policy environment is not determined by international events.

In this chapter, I examine the agenda setting process for foreign policy issues unrelated to events, including foreign aid and foreign trade. Without an ongoing set of

events determining the agenda, do presidents have more influence on the agendas of Congress and the media than in the event-related issues?

Theory

Both the hegemonic and pluralist models take into account international events as the primary indicator of institutional agendas in foreign policy. However, in issues unrelated to events the relationships may change without events determining the policy environment. Theoretically, without events determining agendas in policies like foreign aid and trade, the president and Congress are likely to have more freedom in determining their agendas. Also, the media is likely to have less of a role in establishing the policy agenda in issues unrelated to events. The media's primary agenda setting role in foreign policy is reporting on events, raising issues related to the events onto the agenda. In issues where events are not primary indicators of the agenda, the media may be relegated to reporting on policy debates and changes in Washington. Rather than leading the agenda, the media may be responsive to presidential agenda setting in issues unrelated to events.

Foreign Aid

Congress's greatest power of control is through the appropriation power. James Madison (1961, 369) called the power of the purse "the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the representatives of the people." In that

vein, the authors of the Constitution reserved the appropriation power for Congress. Since then, Congress has delegated to presidents the authority to create a budget, part of which is the foreign aid budget for the upcoming fiscal year. Rarely, however, does the president's budget remain intact, especially in the hotly debated and unpopular foreign aid bill (Hinckley 1994). The president's budget is often announced DOA (dead on arrival), particularly when the government is divided, as it has been for all but six years since 1968.

Much of Congress's formal activities in foreign policy deal with the authorization of foreign aid appropriations. Barbara Hinckley (1994, 123) describes the development of the yearly foreign aid bill as a microcosm of congressional foreign policy. "By holding the purse string, it (Congress) had no problem designating friends or foes or policy priorities." In essence, foreign aid represents clear congressional participation in the foreign policy process. Therefore, when members of Congress want to hold parts of the foreign aid bill hostage, the president is likely to take notice. Given the controversy that results, the media is likely to take notice as well. Congressional intervention in foreign policy is often driven by hot issue areas, political concerns, and domestic influences, often in the form of adjustments to the foreign aid bill.

Rarely do foreign aid bills sail through the legislative process. Between 1981 and 1988, only two aid bills were passed separate from a continuing resolution at the end of the session (White 1993). Members of Congress like to accompany the president's foreign aid bill with veto bait. For instance, Republicans have attached several anti-

abortion amendments to foreign aid legislation during the 1990s, forcing President Clinton to veto the measures.

Historically, presidents have been important in shifting foreign aid priorities as well. President Carter began huge aid programs to both Israel and Egypt as part of the Camp David Accords. President Reagan pressured Congress tirelessly for continued military and humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. More recently, Presidents Bush and Clinton pressured Congress for aid to the former Soviet Union. It is quite plausible, that when presidents make specific foreign aid concerns a priority they can influence the agenda. Foreign aid reaches the agenda every year in Congress, so the broad issue of aid is continually on the agenda. The question remains: who is driving that agenda? If the president is successful in pushing media and congressional attention to foreign aid it follows that his priorities are likely to be the focus of the foreign aid discussion.

Clearly, Congress has a central role to play in developing foreign aid legislation. It is quite plausible that congressional activities in foreign aid are likely to cause responses by the president and the media. Presidents may respond to proposed changes in the aid bill by voicing their disapproval. Such a response is likely to cause conflict between the executive and legislature, attracting media attention to the specific issues under debate. Work on foreign aid legislation is ongoing throughout the year and is unlikely to be influenced by media coverage of issues related to foreign aid.

some area of commerce. However, presidents generally oppose protectionist trade bills, proposing and usually passing much more liberal legislation.

O'Halloran (1993) argues that Congress may have delegated its trade authority to the president, but that does not mean Congress is uninterested in trade, or unable to influence how presidents implement trade policy. From 1967 to 1984, trade bills made up four percent (or 480 bills per Congress) of the legislation introduced in the House of Representatives. Roughly six percent of those bills (325) were reported, with about 42 percent of the reported bills becoming law (O'Halloran 1993). The level of legislative activity clearly shows congressional interest in trade policy.

O'Halloran argues that the congressional role in foreign trade is one of monitoring presidential behavior. She claims that oversight of executive activity is not only passive, however. Oversight represents "police patrols" which are proactive, as well as reactive "fire alarm" oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). By constant oversight of the executive, Congress can bring forth important controversies in foreign trade. Even given "fast track" authority, where trade agreements are insulated from amendments while proceeding through the legislative process, Congress retains important influences in regulating foreign trade (O'Halloran 1993).

Nevertheless, oversight is inherently reactive. Oversight activity by Congress is more likely to be a response to some executive action than proactive in nature. "Fire-alarm" oversight is the preferred method of members of Congress for keeping watch over administrative agencies (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). West (1995) argues that comprehensive oversight has more costs than members of Congress are willing to bear.

Reactive oversight ("fire-alarms") is much more cost effective and provides avenues for members of Congress to provide benefits to their constituents (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).

Expectations

Congress has jealously retained control of their power of the purse, while delegating their power of regulating foreign commerce to the president. Given these two relatively undisputed observations, it follows that agenda setting relationships in foreign aid and foreign trade may be quite different from one another. Specifically, I expect that when Congress attends to foreign aid, the president and the media are likely going to take notice and adjust their foreign policy attention to include foreign aid. Therefore, I expect Congress to be the primary agenda setter in foreign aid.

Foreign trade is quite different from foreign aid, given the amount of delegation from Congress to the executive. Presidents, and their agents, are the primary negotiators for trade agreements, including tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Generally, presidents operate from a liberal, or free-trade, perspective, while forces in Congress operate from a protectionist stand point (Pastor 1980; White 1993). Therefore, presidents are less likely to respond to congressional demands for further protection, but members of Congress are likely to respond negatively to presidential actions resulting in less protection. Upset members of Congress may introduce protectionist trade legislation in response to the presidential easing of trade barriers. Given the negotiating authority that presidents retain in foreign trade, I expect presidents to dominate the agenda setting

process in trade. Presidents are the primary policymakers in foreign trade, therefore when they speak on foreign trade (often in the free trade direction) Congress and the media may respond.

Data and Methods

I use weekly measures of continuous presidential, media, and congressional attention to foreign aid and trade for the analysis in this chapter. I explain the techniques for obtaining the measures in Chapter IV and in the Methodological Appendix. I use the three agenda measures in two separate VAR analyses (explained in Chapter IV), similar to the analyses in Chapter V. However, the current analysis does not include an exogenous events variable because neither foreign trade or aid is linked to a continuous set of exogenous events like the issues examined in Chapter V.

Algebraically, the VAR models appear as:

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \upsilon + \Theta_1 \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \ldots + \Theta_P \mathbf{y}_{t-p} + \mathbf{v}_t \quad ,$$

where **y** is a vector of the endogenous variables, Θ is a vector of regression parameters associated with the lags of each variable in the VAR system, p is the number of lags in each variable, υ is a vector of constants for each equation, and $\mathbf{v}_t$ vector of disturbances for each equation.

With the specified models I ran simple three variable VAR models over the time period of 1984 to 1993 for foreign aid and 1984 to 1995 for foreign trade. I also analyzed the data separating the analyses by presidential administration (1984 - January

1989 for Reagan; 1989 - January 1993 for Bush; and 1993-1995 for Clinton on trade) to see if there are differences between administrations that may explain shifts in the importance of presidential focus on foreign aid or trade.

Results

I estimated two separate VAR systems, one each for foreign trade and foreign aid. The VAR systems included weekly measures of presidential, congressional, and media attention to foreign aid and foreign trade. The results generally follow the expectations discussed above. In foreign aid and trade the president has greater influence without the competition from events. In the forthcoming analysis, I find that the president systematically influences media attention and at times, congressional attention to aid and trade. I also find different levels of influence by the different presidents, generally in line with expectations given the presidents' policy priorities.

As in Chapter V, I present the results in terms of the dependent variable. I test the ability of presidents to influence media and congressional attention to aid and trade first. Next, I determine whether the president is responsive to media and congressional attention to aid and trade. Finally, I discuss the results for the analysis separated by administration.

Table 7.1. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Media Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade

	Issue	
Independent Variable	Foreign Aid	Foreign Trade
Presidential Attention	2.763*	45.94**
	(.064)	(.000)
	14.32%	36.66%
Previous Media Attention	11.48**	9.362**
	(.000)	(.000)
	83.45%	62.33%
Congressional Attention	0.724	1.382
	(.485)	(.252)
	2.87%	1.01%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Presidential Influence on the Media

Table 7.1 shows the Granger F-tests for the determinants of weekly media attention to foreign aid and trade. The percentage of forecast error variance of media attention explained is also shown in the table. Do shifts in presidential attention systematically influence media attention over the entire time period? Without events dominating the policy agenda, shifts in presidential attention have a great deal of

influence on media attention to aid and trade. In both issues, the F-test for presidential attention is highly significant. Also, innovations in presidential attention explain over 14% of the forecast error for media attention to aid and nearly 37% for trade.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the moving average responses for foreign aid and trade, respectively. According to the graphs, a shock (one standard deviation increase) to presidential attention has only a limited positive impact on media attention to aid. Increasing presidential attention to trade, however, shows a substantively significant impact on media attention to trade as shown in Figure 7.2. The response by the media appears delayed in the figure. Even so, a one standard deviation increase in presidential attention leads to about a .3 of a standard deviation response by the media.

Previous media attention influences current media attention as expected. Interestingly, congressional attention has no significant impact on media attention. In neither issue does the F-test for congressional attention reach statistical significance or explain over 3% of the error variance for media attention, as shown in Table 7.1. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the limited influence of congressional attention on media attention graphically. The response by the media is relatively flat.

Presidential Influence on Congress

It appears that the president has greater influence on the agenda in foreign aid and trade, at least when we examine presidential effects on media attention. Does greater presidential influence on the media carry over to influence on congressional attention to

Figure 7.1: Moving Average Response for Foreign Aid Issues



Figure 7.2: Moving Average Response for Foreign Trade Issues



Table 7.2. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Congressional Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade

	Issue	
Independent Variable	Foreign Aid	Foreign Trade
Presidential Attention	1.752 (.174) 0.13%	1.991 (.137) 1.91%
Media Attention	0.492 (.612) 0.68%	2.095 (.157) 0.62%
Previous Congressional Attention	32.77** (.000) 99.19%	22.91** (.000) 97.47%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable, 5 weeks after the increase.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

the issues? Table 7.2 shows the determinants of weekly congressional attention to foreign aid and trade. At first glance, it appears that presidents have only limited influence on congressional attention to aid and trade. The F-tests for presidential attention fail to reach statistical significance and the percent of forecast error explained is limited (under 2%). Apparently, the president is unable to influence systematically congressional attention to aid and trade.

Over the entire time period, media attention does not influence congressional attention either. It appears that congressional attention to foreign aid and trade is independent of media and presidential attention. This is an unsurprising result, as Congress has a great deal of formal control over these policies, in particular foreign aid.

Presidential Responsiveness in Aid and Trade

So far, the results indicate that the president may have greater influence on issues like aid and trade than in issues that are linked to international events, like the Soviet Union. The pluralist model of agenda setting suggests a responsive president, however. Are presidents responding to changes in media or congressional attention in foreign aid or trade?

Table 7.3 shows the Granger F-tests for the determinants of weekly presidential attention to foreign aid and trade. The results indicate that the president is responsive in foreign aid and unresponsive in foreign trade. Given the importance of Congress in appropriations legislation, a responsive president in foreign aid is expected. Also, with delegated powers in trade, presidents apparently have the greatest amount of influence, especially in attracting media attention to trade issues and insulating their own trade agenda from media effects.

In foreign aid, the president responds moderately to both the media and Congress. The F-tests for media and congressional attention are statistically significant, however the forecast error variance percentages are low (less than 3%). Figure 7.1 shows the president responding to increases in media attention, but not congressional attention. A

Table 7.3. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Presidential Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade

	Issue	
Independent Variable	Foreign Aid	Foreign Trade
Previous Presidential Attention	15.142**	48.42**
	(.000)	(.000)
	95.85%	99.26%
Media Attention	2.629*	1.856
	(.073)	(.157)
	1.25%	0.71%
Congressional Attention	3.404**	0.181
	(.034)	(.835)
	2.87%	0.04%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

one standard deviation increase in media attention leads to about a .4 of a standard deviation response by the president.

Presidents are unresponsive to Congress or the media in trade, as indicated by the insignificant F-tests in Table 7.3. Figure 7.2 suggests that sometimes presidents may respond sharply to increases in media attention, with a simulated increase in media

attention causing a response by the president of about .35 of a standard deviation in attention. In trade, the president in unresponsive to Congress.

Presidents are not as clearly responsive in foreign aid and trade as they are in the even-related issues we examined in Chapter V. Without events forcing issues onto the agenda in aid and trade, the president may be able to insulate his own public attention to the issues from outside influences like Congress or the media. Even with greater presidential influence in aid and trade, the president is not completely unresponsive, especially in foreign aid where presidential powers are not as substantial as they are in trade.

Analysis by Presidential Administration

The analyses of foreign aid and trade to this point indicate that presidents influence media attention and are less responsive to media attention for issues unrelated to events. Presidents apparently have more freedom to establish their own agendas, while presidential attention to issues often drives media attention. Events do not provide competition for presidential influence on the media's agenda.

Different presidents have focused their policy agendas on foreign aid or foreign trade at different times, however. If presidents make trade or aid a priority, they increase their chances of influencing the agenda on these issues. Without events providing the context for agenda setting in aid and trade, presidents have greater opportunity to act on their policy priorities. Presidents Bush and Clinton focused much of their policy attention on foreign trade in negotiating and then passing NAFTA, as well as dealing

with challenges to Most Favored Nation status of China and Eastern European nations. President Reagan dealt with an ever increasing trade deficit with Japan during the second half of his administration. In foreign aid, Reagan made aid to the Nicaraguan Contras a foreign policy priority. Reagan's aid requests moved toward security aid at the expense of humanitarian aid to U.S. allies. President Bush's aid policy focused mainly on emerging Eastern European democracies and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. President Clinton continued Bush's concern with facilitating democratization in former communist states early in his administration.

The three presidents covered by the analysis have had varied agendas in foreign trade and aid policy. Which of the presidents were most successful in establishing the agenda in aid and trade? Was President Reagan successful in shifting the aid agenda to the Nicaraguan Contras? Did clear priorities by the Bush and Clinton administration in foreign trade advantage those presidents in establishing the agenda? In the following analysis, I address these issues of presidential influence in agenda setting. I examine the agenda setting process for aid and trade by administration to determine if there were differences across administrations. If presidents have greater influence in aid and trade due to the absence of focusing events, then we should see differences across presidents depending on each administration's priorities.

Foreign Aid by Administration

The data for foreign aid end in 1993, so I only compare the Reagan and Bush administrations. Table 7.4 shows the Granger F-tests for the determinants of media attention to aid and trade separated by administration. The results indicate that President

Table 7.4. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Media Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade, by Administration

	Reagan		Bush		Clinton	
Independent Variable	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade
Presidential Attention	6.93** (.001) 18.54%	5.27** (.006) 8.81%	2.22 (.111) 12.85%	2.31* (.099) 15.41%	NA	33.91** (.000) 53.25%
Previous Media Attention	4.45** (.013) 77.74%	11.64** (.000) 90.61%	6.04** (.003) 85.71%	6.68** (.002) 81.27%	NA	6.80** (.001) 45.39%
Congressional Attention	0.849 (.429) 3.72%	0.063 (.939) 0.58%	0.960 (.385) 1.44%	2.45* (.089) 3.32%	NA -	1.93 (.149) 1.35%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable, 5 weeks after the increase.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Reagan had greater influence than President Bush on media attention to foreign aid. The F-test for presidential attention on media attention for Reagan is highly significant. The F-test is insignificant for Bush. Innovations in Reagan's public attention to foreign aid issues explain nearly 19% of the forecast error for media attention to aid. Bush's attention explains nearly 13%. Both presidents influenced media attention, however the results indicate that Reagan had greater influence.

Congressional influence on media attention to aid is minor in comparison to the president's influence. During both administrations, the F-test for congressional attention is insignificant in Table 7.4. As expected in a time series analysis, previous media attention explains most of the variance in media attention to aid.

Were there differences between Reagan and Bush in their influence on congressional attention to aid? Table 7.5 shows the Granger F-tests for weekly congressional attention to aid. Neither president significantly influenced congressional attention, however Reagan appears to have had a marginal effect at least. The F-test for Reagan's public attention approaches statistical significance, while Bush's is not even close. Shifts in Reagan's attention explain over 7% of the forecast error variance in congressional attention. The results suggest that Reagan had greater influence on the aid agenda of Congress than Bush.

So far, the results for foreign aid suggest that by making the aid issue a priority, Reagan was able to influence media attention to aid, and to a lesser extent, congressional attention to aid. Bush had less of an impact, which makes sense because aid issues were

Table 7.5. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Congressional Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade, by Administration

	Reagan		Bush		Clinton	
Independent Variable	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade
Presidential Attention	2.14 (.119) 7.41%	0.569 (.579) 0.38%	0.643 (.527) 0.73%	3.98** (.021) (3.46%	NA	2.13 (.122) 12.29%
Media Attention	0.924 (.398) 0.56%	4.13** (.017) 4.10%	0.092 (.912) 0.27%	0.035 (.966) 0.05%	NA	3.25** (.035) 4.42%
Previous Congressional Attention	8.81** (.000) 92.03%	7.35** (.001) 95.54%	16.24** (.000) 98.99%	7.82** (.000) 96.49%	NA	11.65** (.000) 85.48%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable, 5 weeks after the increase.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

not as important a priority for the Bush administration as they were for Reagan. What about the responsiveness of each president? Was Bush's aid agenda influenced greatly by outside forces, including the media or Congress? Was Reagan's aid agenda insulated from outside influence because aid was such a priority?

Table 7.6 shows the Granger F-tests for the determinants of weekly presidential attention to foreign aid separated by administration. The results suggest that Bush was more responsive to Congress than Reagan. Neither president responded to the media, however. The F-tests for congressional attention on presidential attention were significant for Bush and insignificant for Reagan. Innovations in congressional attention explain 6% of the forecast error variance in Bush's attention. The figure is less than a percentage point for Reagan's attention. Also, Reagan's previous attention was the primary determinant of his attention to aid, while Bush's previous attention fails to reach statistical significance. This finding suggests that Bush was not in control of his own agenda. Instead, external influences (Congress) had the greatest effect on Bush's attention to aid.

Examining presidential influence in foreign aid by administration proves fruitful in explaining why some presidents may be more successful than others in influencing the aid policy agenda. President Reagan stressed foreign aid as a major part of his foreign policy agenda, going public in support of Contra aid three times during his second term. President Bush did not go public over foreign aid. While foreign aid was an important part of Bush's foreign policy, it was more important for Reagan's policy agenda. Reagan stressed foreign aid and was able to insulate his own agenda from influence by the media and Congress. Bush was greatly influenced by congressional attention to aid, however. Both presidents influenced media attention, although Reagan was more effective with Congress because he made foreign aid such a critical priority.

Table 7.6. Granger F-Tests for the Determinants of Weekly Presidential Attention to Foreign Aid and Trade, by Administration

	Reagan		Bush		Clinton	
Independent Variable	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade
Previous Presidential Attention	20.67** (.000) 99.80%	4.79** (.009) 99.25%	0.231 (.794) 93.28%	2.53* (.082) 97.25%	NA	28.89** (.000) 95.42%
Media Attention	0.131 (.877) 0.11%	0.571 (.566) 0.38%	0.633 (.532) 0.59%	0.655 (.520) 0.70%	NA	3.42** (.035) 4.42%
Congressional Attention	0.167 (.846) 0.09%	0.449 (.638) 0.37%	6.18** (.002) 6.13%	1.74 (.178) 1.55%	NA	0.233 (.792) 0.15%

Note: The cell entries represent Granger F-tests. The p values are in parentheses. The third value in each cell is the percentage of forecast error variance in the dependent variable explained by an increase in the dependent variable, 5 weeks after the increase.

** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$

Foreign Trade by Administration

The data for foreign trade go all of the way through 1995, so we are able to compare presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. The VAR results for foreign trade are presented in Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. Granger F-tests and Decomposition of Error Variance statistics are presented in the tables for each administration. The results

indicate that presidents have met with varied success in influencing the foreign trade agenda.

How influential were the various presidents on media attention to trade? While all three presidents had a significant influence (according to the F-tests in Table 7.4) on media attention to trade, President Clinton appears to have had the greatest impact. Innovations in Clinton's attention to trade explain over 53% of the forecast error variance in media attention. Reagan's and Bush's attention explain 9% and 15% respectively. Although Bush influenced the media in trade, he had to compete with Congress for influence, whereas Congress was not influential during Reagan's and Clinton's tenure. The F-test for congressional attention on media attention to trade is significant during Bush's administration, but not for the other presidents.

Comparing the presidents' influences on Congress shows differences across administrations as well. The results in Table 7.5 indicate that Reagan had no where near the impact that Bush and Clinton had on congressional attention to trade. The F-test for Reagan on trade is insignificant, while Bush's attention is a significant factor and Clinton's nears statistical significance. The media influenced Congress during Reagan's and Clinton's tenure, but not during the Bush administration. The results coincide with our expectation that Reagan would be the least influential in trade policy given Bush and Clinton making foreign trade a priority of their administrations.

Were there differences in presidential responsiveness in foreign trade? Table 7.6 shows the Granger F-tests for the determinants of weekly presidential attention to trade separated by administration. Neither Reagan or Bush were responsive in their public

make the policy a priority. Presidents are better able to lead the media without events constraining them. Finally, when presidents make aid or trade a significant priority for their policy agenda, they can influence the congressional agenda.

Conclusion

The results presented in Chapter V indicate that the media are the most prominent agenda setting institution in foreign policy issues that are clearly linked to international events. The media's role in foreign policy agenda setting may be increased due to the importance of international events in defining the agenda. However, there are issues that do not relate well with a continuous stream of international events. Foreign aid and foreign trade are issues unrelated to events, and offer greater opportunities for presidential or congressional foreign policy leadership because events do not determine the policy environment. Presidents are not competing with events when trying to influence the agenda in aid and trade, therefore they have greater influence than in issues related to international events.

Presidents appear disadvantaged in relation to Congress when trying to influence institutional attention to foreign aid. Presidents tend to respond to changes in congressional attention in foreign aid, but they are unable to influence systematically congressional attention. However, when the presidents are examined separately, we find that President Reagan influenced congressional attention to foreign aid. This alternate finding suggests that while Congress may be the primary agenda setter in aid policy, presidents can influence Congress if they make aid a significant priority, as Reagan did.

Presidents are also responsive to changes in media attention to foreign aid, but this relationship is reciprocal with the media responding when presidents attend to foreign aid as well. Without events determining institutional attention to foreign aid, presidential and congressional influence in establishing the agenda increase.

Institutional relationships in foreign trade are less clear. The only clear, causal relationship involves presidents significantly influencing media attention to foreign trade. Presidential attention to foreign trade is quite heavy at times, and such focus by the president on foreign trade influence media attention to trade. When presidents make foreign trade a priority (as Bush and Clinton did), they can significantly influence congressional attention to trade.

Unlike issues that relate to international events, the media are not out front in determining issue attention in foreign aid and trade. Certainly, increased media attention to a foreign policy issue may provide cues influencing presidential and congressional attention. However, most of the media attention in trade and aid seems to be a result of increased political discussion between the legislative and executive branches of government. In foreign aid and trade, the traditional role of the media reporting on politics in Washington appears born out. Foreign aid and trade do not involve an event-driven "continually unfolding drama... a drama that depends on the media for production and interpretation" (Wood and Peake 1998, 182). Instead, our examination of aid and trade reflect more traditional views of policy agenda setting in Washington, where the media play a sideline role with politicians deciding when to address policy issues.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is time to draw conclusions from the findings of the research concerning presidential leadership. In this chapter I briefly summarize the findings of the dissertation. The general implications of the research are that presidents have limited opportunities to lead in foreign policy, suggesting that the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance in the foreign policymaking process is overstated. The marginal influence of presidents in the public agenda-setting process provides one explanation for presidential frustration in the latter stages of the policy process. Limited influence by the president in agenda setting is consistent with presidential scholarship that urges scholars to avoid "president-centered" explanations of policymaking and presidential-congressional relations (Edwards 1989). In foreign policy, as elsewhere, the president must play with the hand he is dealt, and often that hand is seriously limited by circumstances and an environment beyond the president's control.

The Responsiveness of the President

The findings of the dissertation indicate that presidents are mostly reactive in establishing their public agenda in foreign policy. The reactive nature of the presidency, reduces the president's capacity to affect media and Congress' public attention to a wide variety of foreign policy issues. Presidents do not dominate public attention by the

media or Congress to foreign policy issues. Instead, attention by Congress and the media to foreign policy is generally responsive to international events and the inertia of important issues in American politics. Presidents are hampered in their ability to focus their own attention as well as attention by other institutions on presidential priorities in foreign policy.

Presidential Responsiveness to Events

The clearest finding of this research is that the president is responsive to the foreign policy context when deciding where to focus his public attention. The president, like everyone else, responds to uncontrollable international events. Presidents usually cannot anticipate exogenous events and must respond. In every event-related issue that I examine, events prove the most important determinant of institutional attention. Events determine the policy environment that foreign policy is developed to address, and presidents clearly adjust their public statements in response to ongoing international events. The findings of presidential responsiveness are consistent with other recent empirical studies of presidential agenda setting (Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and Peake 1998).

The fact that presidents respond to exogenous events is certainly not a surprising finding. However, understanding the reactive nature of the presidency in foreign policy agenda setting is critical for understanding why presidential influence is not as great as the conventional wisdom suggests. Presidents typically take office with specific policy priorities in mind. However, those priorities often fall by the wayside because of

influences on the president's agenda that are beyond the control of the president. The president's agenda becomes full, limiting the president's ability to choose specific foreign policies on which to focus. Scholars give prescriptions to presidents regarding agenda setting, explaining that successful agenda-setters focus attention on one or two priorities in order not to flood the policymaking system with presidential proposals (Light 1991, Pfiffner 1996). The advice is sound. However, given the reactive nature of the president's public agenda in foreign policy, focusing attention on a small set of issues is certainly easier said than done. Instead, presidents are forced to take on issues they might prefer to ignore due to the trappings of the office and their important foreign policy responsibilities. Picking and choosing their foreign policy issues is generally not an option for presidents, particularly when issues are highly salient already and relate to an exogenous set of international events.

Attention by policymakers and the media alike is highly inertial, as evidenced by the findings that indicate previous institutional attention causes future attention in almost every case examined. Coupled with the influence of events, issue inertia makes the president's job of leading and focusing attention more difficult. With strong inertial forces and uncontrollable events determining attention, there is little room left on the agenda for manipulation by the president. Without much room for influence to begin with, the president's efforts to focus attention may bare less fruit.

Presidential Responsiveness to the Media

Media attention to foreign policy issues, in particular those issues related to events, influence the president's public attention in foreign policy. In seven of the ten issues studied, media attention is a primary indicator of public presidential attention to the issues. In important issues, like the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the president is highly responsive to media coverage. Congress responds to media attention in most instances as well. Presidential and congressional attention to foreign aid and trade (issues unrelated to events) is more independent of media attention (particularly in trade for the president). Interpreting events is a primary political role of the media and when events are not critical, the influence of the media in agenda setting decrease.

We should not overstate the influence of the media, however. The media are responding to events and issue inertia, just like the president. The media, however, serve to increase presidential concern for an issue brought onto the agenda by an exogenous event. Continuous media attention to an event leads to persistent public responses by the president. If an event does not attract heavy amounts of media attention, the president and other policymakers are less likely to take notice or display their concern publicly. In some sense, media coverage of foreign policy issues limits the president's choices in agenda setting. While not completely beholden to the media, the findings indicate that presidents often find it difficult to resist focusing on issues prominent in the media.

The president's options are often limited by the representation of foreign policy issues in the media, particularly in those issues that involve violence and high drama. Media coverage of such foreign policy issues as the Bosnian conflict and Somalia

prompted President Bush to respond and publicly pay attention to those issues (Baker 1995, 103; Powell 1995, 418, 507, 573). With the media continuously focusing on Somalia and Bosnia, it became more difficult for the president to focus his foreign policy agenda selectively. Bush's successor had similar difficulties regarding Bosnia. Clinton once complained that the media was "trying to force me to get into a war" (Morris 1997, 241).

Presidential Responsiveness to Congress

Congressional influence on the president's public attention to foreign policy is marginal compared to the effect of the media. However, the president responds in some instances to increased congressional concerns. Presidential attention increased in response to congressional concerns in several of the issues examined, including China, the Caribbean, Central America, and foreign aid. These issues include important legislative priorities of the president, including aid to the Contras and keeping Most Favored Nation trade status for China. When legislation is a necessary part of the foreign policy process, Congress plays an important role in defining the agenda. That role is less apparent when policy change does not require legislation, as is often the case in foreign policy. Examining a wide variety of foreign policy issues provides some insight into the congressional role in foreign policy agenda setting. Insight that is unavailable in studies that examine many fewer foreign policy issues. Edwards and Wood (1999) found no influence by Congress on media and presidential attention to U.S.-Soviet relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict, congruent with the findings presented

here. However, examining issues that are not consistently salient (like China, the Caribbean, and Central America) and traditional congressional issues, such as foreign aid, shows that Congress is sometimes important in foreign policy agenda setting. At times, congressional priorities find their way onto the president's public agenda.

In many instances, congressional priorities make up a significant proportion of foreign policy legislation before Congress. Of the 22 significant foreign policy bills before Congress from 1987 to 1992, 15 were opposed by the president, indicating that they were congressional initiatives (from data compiled from Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997 and Mayhew 1991). Divided government during this time period increased the viability of congressional initiatives in foreign policy and placed presidents Reagan and Bush on a reactive footing in their dealing with Congress and foreign policy.

Congressional influence on the agenda is clearest in the case of issues related to China. Congress influenced both media and presidential attention to issues related to China. Issues related to China were a high priority for many congressional activists during the 1980s and 1990s. However, much of their focus was on human rights, while presidential efforts focused on trade and engaging the Chinese government. Congressional Democrats took the lead beginning in 1989 in criticizing human rights violations in China following the Tianamen massacre. President Bush and Brent Scrowcroft reflect on how congressional activism made engagement with China frustrating:

> Our refusal to cast China completely into outer darkness had outraged many in the Congress. On November 16, the Senate passed a bill to impose further sanctions, including bans on arms sales, US satellite exports and police equipment, an end to nuclear cooperation, no further liberalization of export controls, and a suspension of OPIC insurance. After some last-minute negotiations, we managed to get language included that permitted the President to lift sanctions if he thought it was in the national interest, and with that proviso he signed it. There was a far less cooperative spirit, however, over a bill to allow Chinese students... to extend their visas until their government cleaned up its human rights behavior... We were certain that such confrontational legislation would result in China shutting down the student exchange program... Nevertheless, on November 19, the Pelosi bill passed the House 403-0 and the next day the Senate by unanimous voice vote—veto proof margins (Bush and Scrowcroft 1998, 158-159).

Both presidents Bush and Clinton were forced to respond to congressional criticisms of the Chinese government. Members of Congress have been vocal opponents of Chinese policies that discriminate against religious minorities, frustrating President Clinton's diplomatic efforts. Ultimately, the media responded to congressional activism on China issues, reporting on the inter-branch conflict. The China case illustrates the capacity of Congress to force important issues onto the public agenda that the president would rather ignore. By creating conflict, Congress expands discussion of the issue to

the media, in essence expanding the forum of debate. Conflict expansion is a common method of placing issues onto the domestic policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Schattschneider 1960) and apparently has a place in certain foreign policy issues as well. If Congress can influence the president to pay attention to an issue he might otherwise ignore, then it is influencing the president's foreign policy agenda. Legislation is not always required for Congress to be important. Congressional activists can keep public attention drawn to an issue by speaking out publicly against administration policies, making life difficult for the president.

Presidential Responsiveness in Perspective

We must be careful not to overstate the responsiveness of the president, however. Presidents are responsive in deciding which issues to decide about, but it is still the executive making the final policy decision and implementing the policy. By saying the president's agenda is often determined by forces beyond his control, we are not saying that presidents have no influence in the foreign policy process. Indeed, foreign policy is the bread and butter of presidential policymaking, with presidents often making decisions and implementing policies without requiring legislation from an often hostile Congress. Agenda setting is only the beginning stage of the public policy process, and whether influence on the agenda has important effects on later stages of the process is an empirical question we are unable to address with the present study.

The analysis presented in the dissertation is limited in that it only examines one aspect of agenda setting, the president's public foreign policy agenda. There is a private

agenda that we fail to examine, that is of particular importance in foreign policy. Efforts behind the scenes by executive policymakers often serve to influence the policy agenda and may come long before media coverage reaches a crescendo, forcing a presidential response. Interviews of policymakers and journalists have shown how policymakers may begin addressing a policy before the media report on an issue (Strobel 1998). For example, in February 1994, the "market massacre" in Sarajevo prompted the United States and NATO to broaden their role in Bosnia and declare the first "safe-zones" around Sarajevo. A simple cause and effect model would suggest that increased media coverage due to the focus event caused the policy response. In actuality, according to Strobel's (1998) interviews, policymakers, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, were already working on expanding NATO involvement in the Civil War. By increasing the salience of the issue, the increased media attention opened a window of opportunity for the intervention alternative and quickened the response by American policymakers. While the causal models and empirical analysis suggest simple cause-effect relationships, the relationships in reality are probably much more complicated.

Normative questions arise when we conclude that the media have a powerful influence on public policy. The media are not elected, and they are not responsible to elected officials. Yet, the media affect the policy process, as indicated by the findings presented in this research. The media shorten the time decisionmakers have to consider available options, increasing the likelihood that the best alternative is overlooked. Decisionmaking scientists explain how policymakers are "boundedly rational," meaning they are often unable to discuss all available alternatives due to the limits of time and

their environment (Simon 1947). The media increase stress placed on decisionmakers, shortening the already limited amount of time they have to make decisions. If policymakers are forced to react to an event because of increased media coverage, the ability of policymakers to determine which issues represent important foreign policy issues may be adversely affected.

Editors and media producers focus on making money with news, and their broadcast decisions are often determined by their drive for profits. This drive for profits may lead the media to pay attention to certain types of foreign policy problems over others, increasing the problem's relative status on the policy agenda, independent of the problem's relevance to American national security concerns (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1984). Such influence by the media may be dangerous, because it could prompt American policymakers to ignore important issues or even entangle American policy in dangerous situations abroad that may not represent serious national security concerns. The drive for profits may mean that consumers of the news influence what the media cover (Rogers and Dearing 1994). Media consumers include the American public and advertisers that provide the networks profits. In deciding what is news, media producers often base their decisions on what is entertaining to the public (Graber 1997). In a sense, then, public concerns may drive media attention to foreign policy issues indirectly.

If the media represent the systemic agenda, and they are attuned to public demands, as many media scholars argue (Rogers and Dearing 1994), then the president's responsiveness to the media could be an indirect response to the American public. Research has shown that media attention to issues influence public familiarity with

issues (Page and Shapiro 1992), the importance the public attach to issues (Dearing and Rogers 1996; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; McCombs and Estrada 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1993), and how the public evaluates the president on issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991). Presidents understand this connection between the media and public opinion and respond accordingly. Policy responsiveness by politicians to the public is a critical component of a republican government. If viewed from that angle, media effects on the agenda appear less threatening to the American political system.

Marginal Presidential Influence

The results concerning presidential influence on attention by the media and Congress are not as clear as the results regarding presidential responsiveness. However, the results are interesting in that they challenge the conventional wisdom that presidents generally get what they want in foreign policy. The results indicate that presidential success in focusing foreign policy attention of the media and Congress is less common than the conventional wisdom suggests.

Presidential Influence on the Media

Attention to an issue is both a precursor to policy agenda setting and an indicator of the importance of an issue in a very limited institutional agenda space. For the president to lead the public and influence which issues the public feel are important in foreign policy, he needs the media to get out his message. The findings indicate, in most

instances, that presidents find it difficult to focus and sustain media attention in foreign policy. I examine the degree to which the president's public agenda, represented by public presidential statements and dramatic foreign policy activities, affect continuous media attention (represented by television news coverage) to ten foreign policy issues over a ten year period. The findings indicate that media attention to foreign policy is generally independent of public presidential focus and dramatic presidential events. Of the ten foreign policy issues examined, presidential attention significantly influences media attention in only four (the Caribbean, Central America, foreign aid, and foreign trade).

There are indications that foreign policy provides some opportunities for the president to act entrepreneurially in terms of agenda setting, which runs counter to some recent findings presented in the literature that focuses on fewer foreign policy issues (Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and Peake 1998). In issues of low salience (in particular the Caribbean and Central America), the president appears to have greater influence on media attention. Examination of the president's public agenda and dramatic foreign policy activities show greater influence on media attention to the least salient issues. Presidents are least influential on highly salient issues, such as the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, greater presidential influence exists in issues that do not relate well to an ongoing stream of exogenous events, represented here by the issues of foreign aid and trade. Events are not predetermining the agenda, forcing the president's hand and providing competition for presidential influence on attention by the media. Without events forcing the president into a reactive mode in attention to foreign

is often considered a necessary, but insufficient, requirement for presidential success in Congress (Edwards 1989; Neustadt 1960). Without public support, the president loses support from his partisans and members of the opposing party alike, even in foreign policy (Edwards 1989, Chapter 5). In foreign policy, a president with the support of the public for a specific policy should be advantaged in sustaining congressional attention to his issues.

The presidency is often labeled the bully pulpit, expressing the ability of presidents to successfully appeal to the American public for support on policies. Presidential success in foreign policy is certainly not guaranteed given the results presented here. Despite being labeled the "Great Communicator", President Reagan attributed his failure to persuade the American people of the importance of the Nicaraguan issue for his inability to control the agenda on that issue.

> For eight years the press called me the "Great Communicator." Well, one of my greatest frustrations during those eight years was my inability to communicate to the American people and to Congress the seriousness of the threat we faced in Central America (Reagan 1990, 471).
>
> Time and again, I would speak on television, to a joint session of Congress, or to other audiences about the problems in Central America, and I would hope that the outcome would be an outpouring of support from Americans. But the polls usually found that large numbers of Americans cared little or not at all about what happened in Central America—in fact, a surprisingly large proportion didn't

> even know where Nicaragua or El Salvador were located—and, among those who did care, to few cared enough about a Communist penetration in the Americas to apply the kind of pressure I needed on Congress (Reagan 1990, 479).

Obviously, with the press presenting the public face of the president to the American people, the president's relationship with the media becomes very important. Nearly one-third of the White House staff works in some way with public relations (Edwards and Wayne 1997). What do the findings suggest regarding this critical relationship for the president? Certainly, presidents do not direct media coverage of foreign policy issues, so they have very little control over what the press cover in world affairs. The media go where the stories are, generally following a continuous stream of international events regardless of presidential activity or public statements. The media also clearly affect the public's agenda, with press coverage of foreign policy issues creating "a powerful imperative for prompt action. This pressure makes it more difficult for presidents to selectively engage in world affairs and may force them to state policies or send troops when they would prefer to let situations develop or encourage other nations to deal with a problem" (Edwards and Wayne 1997, 167). These findings clearly suggest that picking and choosing is difficult for presidents, particularly in issues tied to international events. By influencing what is important among the American public (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page and Shapiro 1992), the media limit the choices presidents have when deciding which issues to address, as shown by the responsiveness of the president's public attention to media attention.

Manipulation of the media is generally thought to be a critical part of the presidential-press relationship. The White House attempts to coordinate the news, manage the news, and provide services (including backgrounders, leaks, and other information) to the press in order to have some control over what issues the media cover and how they cover issues important to the president (Edwards 1983; Edwards and Wayne 1997; Grossman and Kumar 1981). The limited capacity of the president to set the media's agenda in foreign policy through activity and rhetoric in the public domain suggests that manipulation of media attention rarely bares fruit. Anecdotes aside, in general, efforts by the president to emphasize some issues to the exclusion of others rarely succeed, thus reducing the effects of the president on media attention to policy issues.

Marginal Presidential Influence of Congress

The president also wants to attract further attention to his proposals and policies in Congress. Presidents generally have limited resources within their control for dealing with Congress (Bond and Fleischer 1991; Edwards 1989). However, the president has some (although limited) control over his public agenda, providing the president with an avenue to influence Congress. Research has shown that presidential initiatives almost always find their way onto the congressional agenda by at least getting a congressional hearing (Edwards and Barrett 1998). However, persistent attention by Congress to the president's issues is a different threshold of presidential leadership of Congress. For a policy to have a chance to make it through the long, drawn-out path to policy

formulation in the legislature, it must receive persistent attention by legislators, and that attention generally comes at the expense of other issues. Also, if the president is not able to focus congressional attention on his priorities, his priorities may become lost in the overloaded legislative process. Finally, if the president does not have the support of Congress in foreign policy, he may appear weak when dealing with other foreign leaders.

One way to assess the president's capacity to influence further the congressional agenda is to examine the impact of the president's public agenda and activities on congressional attention to a broad set of issues. Congressional attention to the ten foreign policy issues provided one of the dependent variables of interest when I focused the analysis on presidential influence. The findings indicate that the president is limited in his ability to sustain and focus congressional attention to his issues in foreign policy. In the ten issues examined, presidential attention significantly influenced congressional attention in only three of the issues (the Bosnian conflict, the Caribbean, and Central America) across time. Congressional priorities in foreign policy often lie elsewhere. Without effectively sustaining attention in many instances, the president becomes less able to keep a busy Congress focused on his own policy priorities.

Leadership of Congress in Perspective

One of the greatest advantages the president has in relation to Congress is that presidents are unitary actors presenting a unified policy agenda, whereas Congress is made of 535 individuals, spread out over two political parties, two houses, and dozens of committees. The president's policy agenda is generally much more identifiable and

recognizable than an agenda of Congress. A unified agenda by a congressional party, represented by the Republican's "Contract with America," is a rarity. Given this advantage of the president in agenda setting, we might expect greater presidential leadership of Congress in foreign policy when examining agenda setting. After all, in the words of Nuestadt, "Congressmen need an agenda from outside, something with high status to respond to or react against. What provides it better than the program of the president" (1960, 7)? However, the findings indicate that the president has difficulty keeping congressional attention, both formal and informal, sustained on particular foreign policy issues. This finding flies in the face of our understanding that presidential proposals generally get at least a hearing before Congress (Edwards and Barrett 1999), and their foreign policy proposals generally do very well in Congress. What does that say regarding presidential leadership of Congress?

Getting a hearing on an issue may not be enough for the president to focus congressional attention that is typically wide-ranging and easily distracted. Much of what is on the congressional agenda from week to week involves issues Congress must address (because of inertia or events), regardless of presidential priorities. When presidents are unable to sustain congressional attention, even in foreign policy, their capacity to lead Congress decreases. This appears to be a problem when Congress becomes activist in foreign policy, even when opposed by the president. From 1987 to 1992, the foreign policy *legislative* agenda of the president could be labeled negative rather than positive in nature. Of the 22 significant, seriously considered bills related to foreign policy before Congress during those six years, 15 were opposed by the president,

while only seven were actually initiated or supported by the executive (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997, data drawn from their and Mayhew's (1991) lists of significant legislation). Even in foreign policy, the congressional agenda is not dominated by presidential priorities. Members of Congress have their own foreign policy priorities and are not afraid to further them even in the face of presidential opposition.

Foreign policy legislation can certainly be important for the president. Of the 501 important bills identified by Mayhew (1991) and Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) from 1969 to 1992, 75 (or 14%) dealt with foreign policy. That is a significant portion of significant legislation and certainly suggests that the relationship between the president and Congress in foreign policy is important legislatively.

Presidents realize the critical nature of this relationship to their success in foreign policy leadership, both at home and abroad. Brent Scrowcroft describes his concern with Congress in the following passage: "There was one area where I wished to make a significant change in my own manner of operating—congressional relations... The Congress is crucial in so many ways to the success of foreign policy... Therefore, as I put together my NSC staff, one of my first moves was to ask Virginia Lampley to assume congressional liaison responsibilities" (Bush and Scrowcroft 1998, 31).

Even in areas where congressional votes of support are unnecessary legally, they become a political necessity when the president is trying to present a unified front to foreign leaders. The closeness of the vote to authorize force prior to the Gulf War worried President Bush considerably. The independent nature of the Congress, even on

such a critical issue, made the president very concerned with influencing the debate before Congress. Brent Scrowcroft illustrates:

> This meeting [with congressional leaders] made graphically clear what we were up against. There were stalwarts in the leadership... but, by and large, there was no appetite for forceful action... Judging from the comments around the table, it seemed to me the balance was no better than 30 percent willing to support force... It was a chilling prospect... To go for a congressional resolution of support against such odds was daunting, to say the least... A negative vote would dishearten the coalition, encourage Saddam Hussein, and create a domestic firestorm if we were to ignore it. And, should we seek UN approval [which they did], we would certainly put ourselves in a position where it would be almost impossible politically not to go to Congress. We had an unpalatable set of alternatives (Bush and Scrowcroft 1998, 402).

Less Aspin, a prominent Democratic leader at the time reflects on the difficulties faced by the administration in controlling the agenda regarding Iraq. "'There's no question [the country has] moved away from a more hawkish position within the last month. The budget battle pushed Iraq off the front page. The crisis lacks freshness and outrage. The public is less confident that the government knows what it is doing.' People were focused on domestic issues" (Bush and Scrowcroft 1998, 391).

In their relations with Congress, presidents must "largely play with the hands that the public deals them through its electoral decisions and its evaluations of the chief executive's handling of his job. They are rarely in a position to augment substantially their resources. They operate at the margins as facilitators rather than directors of change" (Edwards 1989, 221). The limited ability presidents seem to have in focusing and sustaining both formal and informal congressional attention is probably a result of circumstances beyond the control of presidents. Members of Congress have their own agendas and are attuned to different goals than the president. They are generally more concerned with reelection (Mayhew 1974) and institutional power and prestige (Fenno 1973; Kingdon 1989) than supporting the president's foreign policy.

I have shown that the president's capacity to lead Congress is limited at a time when presidential leadership of Congress is certainly difficult. Scholars and presidents alike bemoan the difficulty presidents have in leading the modern, post-reform Congress. President Ford reflects:

> Today a President really does not have the kind of clout with Congress he had 30 years ago, even in matters that affect national security. There is not the kind of teamwork that existed in the '50s, even if the President and the majority of congress belong to the same party. The main reason for this change is the erosion of the leadership in the Congress. Party leaders have lost the power to tell their troops that something is really significant and to get them to respond accordingly. The days of Sam Rayburn, Lyndon Johnson, and Everett Dirksen are gone. That

> has adversely affected the Congress's ability to do things even in very difficult circumstances involving the national interest (Ford 1980. 30)

George C. Edwards (1989), in his work *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress*, identified several skills available to presidents in their efforts to lead Congress through facilitating. Several of these skills relate to policy agenda setting by the president, including setting priorities, moving fast, and structuring choices on proposals before Congress. In many cases, establishing priorities and structuring choice in foreign policy is unavailable to the president because his public attention is often determined for him and this limits the president's impact on sustaining congressional and media attention to issues. However, there are certain foreign policy issues where the president has greater opportunity for leadership, in particular issues that are low-salience and issues unrelated to events.

Marginal Presidential Influence in Perspective

Despite findings indicating limited presidential influence, foreign policy issues provide some opportunity for presidential leadership of media and congressional attention to foreign policy. I find greater presidential influence on congressional and media attention in two low-salience issues, the Caribbean and Central America. These issues are generally not on the congressional or media agenda, so attention by the president to the Caribbean and Central America is more likely to illicit a response in congressional and media attention. This limited finding should not be overstated,

however. The findings indicate that all three institutions (the president, the media, and Congress) were both influential and responsive to any attention to the Caribbean and Central America by the president, the media, or Congress. Because the system rarely pays much attention to these low-salience issues, any attention by a member of the system hightens the agenda status of the issue.

Examining the presidents in the aggregate shows only limited presidential influence on congressional and media attention to foreign aid and trade. However, when I examine the effects of presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton's public attention to aid and trade separately, I find that when presidents indicate distinct priorities by focusing a great deal of attention in aid or trade, they increase their influence on both congressional and media attention to the issues. President Reagan made aid to the Contras a foreign policy priority during his tenure in office, going public on national television in support of Contra aid three times during his last five years in office. President Bush did not go public in support of his aid agenda priorities. I find that President Reagan had greater influence on congressional and media attention to aid than President Bush. Aid to the Nicaraguan Contras was reduced sharply after Reagan left office, despite Bush's support for continued aid. President Bush did produce an aid proposal for Latin America, entitled "Enterprise for America's Initiative (HR 5855)," however the president failed to get the House to consider the legislation until very late in the session and the Senate never addressed the measure beyond holding hearings (Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997).

I find similar results in foreign trade. Presidents Bush and Clinton made trade a critical part of their policy agenda with NAFTA, often speaking in support of the treaty. Bush and Clinton's public attention to trade was much greater than Reagan's. Their public efforts were rewarded with greater presidential influence than Reagan in terms of sustaining media and congressional attention to trade. Bush and Clinton's public attention to trade influenced media and congressional attention more than Reagan's public attention.

The capacity for presidents to develop distinct priorities for aid and trade exist mainly because of the absence of uncontrollable international events determining systemic and institutional attention to the issues. Greater opportunity for presidential leadership exists when events are not driving the agenda. These results are similar to the findings of Edwards and Wood (1999), who examined three domestic issues in their study of institutional attention. The authors found greater opportunity for entrepreneurial leadership by the president in domestic issues where events did not put the president on a reactive footing. Without events determining the agenda, presidents are able to act in an entrepreneurial fashion regarding foreign aid and trade issues. In some cases presidents move issues onto the agenda space of the media and Congress by focusing attention. When the issue represents a presidential priority, and events are not predetermining institutional attention, the president may be able to create attention where none exists; in effect, placing his issues onto the public agendas of the media and Congress.

The problem remains that presidents find it difficult to greatly influence media and congressional attention to some crucial foreign policy issues, including the Soviet

Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict. We should not infer too much from this finding of limited presidential influence on highly salient issues. When is the Soviet Union or the Arab-Israeli conflict not on the policy agenda in American politics? I would argue, very rarely. The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union has concerned American policymakers and the public for decades, continuously reaching both the policy agenda as well as the public agenda. Over much of the time period, the Arab-Israeli conflict dominated our concerns with the Middle East, having proved an intractable problem for American presidents since Israel's formation as a state. Media attention to the two issues average seventeen minutes per week over the time period of study, a full ten minutes more than any of the other issues.

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet Union are on the agenda regardless of actions by the president. Congress was organized to handle issues related to the Cold War regardless of presidential direction. The media understand the importance of Israel and the Soviet relationship to Americans, and cover related issues independent of the president's public attention. A large factor in media coverage of these issues may be the placement of more American media correspondents in Moscow and Jerusalem than in other cities in places like Central America (Graber 1997). Also, as discussed above, issue inertia (of particular importance in highly salient issues) and uncontrollable events limit the degree to which presidents can influence attention by the media and Congress. The agenda is full, leaving little room for presidential leadership. Because of these realities, when the president tries to shift attention to other foreign policy issues in order

to exert presidential influence, the media and Congress continuously shift their attention back to the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli problem.

Also, without the ability to influence the media and Congress to increase their already high levels of attention to the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the president loses his capacity to focus attention on specific aspects of the issues, such as arms control or human rights. Although I provide no data indicating attention to specific areas of the relationship, we can infer that if the president is unable to sustain attention to the Soviet Union, his abilities to sustain attention to specific aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship suffer.

President Bush's agenda regarding the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 included priorities concerning arms control, furthering internal reforms in the Soviet Union through support of Soviet President Gorbachev, and keeping the Soviets within the allied coalition against Iraq (Beschloss and Talbot 1993; Bush and Scrowcroft 1998, 497). However, much of the world's attention, including the American media's, focused on the internal break-up of the Soviet Union, specifically attempts by separatists in early January 1991 in Lithuania and Latvia to break away from the Soviet Union and the violent Soviet response.

Despite wanting to focus on keeping Gorbachev strong, policymakers in the White House were forced to address the Soviet crackdown. In considering speaking out on the Soviet use of force, Bush reflects, "A rift with Moscow now would only encourage Saddam to dig in his heels. Worse yet, it might bolster the hard-liners around Gorbachev and cause him to stop cooperating with us. But we could not let the

intervention pass without comment" (Bush and Scrowcroft, 496). Bush wanted to couch any public statement in terms that would appear as not taking a "slap at Gorbachev" (Beschloss and Talbot 1993). Other administrative officials argued for a tough statement, despite the president's concerns. When "told of the news, Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice rushed into Scrowcroft's office to argue for a tough public statement from the White House. Scrowcroft demurred. Like the president, he knew that more than ever, Soviet support for the UN coalition in the Gulf was crucial to the credibility of the U.S. threat to use force against Saddam Hussein" (Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 299).

The president was unable to rise above the competing influence of events and media attention to events and focus his agenda on aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship he felt were most important. The policy consequences were serious. "Bush asked Baker to move toward postponement of his summit with Gorbachev in Moscow, now planned for February" (Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 300). The summit was delayed until July. Bush delivered provocative statements regarding the Soviet crackdown, despite his clear reluctance. The American media interpreted the statements as a tough warning to the Kremlin, as shown in a report on ABC's "Evening News." Brent Scrowcroft, the president's National Security Advisor, was clearly miffed at the reporting by ABC, obviously worried about Soviet reactions at a time where the need for Soviet support on Iraq was critical (Beschloss and Talbot 1993, 300).

President Bush lost control of the situation and was forced to focus publicly on aspects of the Soviet-U.S. relationship he would have rather handled privately. It was impossible for him to keep public focus on the reform process due to events and media

coverage of those events within the Baltics which resulted in public and congressional pressure to do something about the problem. The example illustrates the frustration presidents may experience in foreign policy agenda setting on a critically important and salient issue where the media and Congress pay close attention. The stakes were very high when dealing with the Soviet Union, and presidents had to compete with a variety of actors in order to influence the public agenda. In less critical issues, like the Caribbean, the president does not have to compete with continuous media attention and may have greater effects on attention by the media and Congress.

Reflections on Presidential Leadership

Foreign policy is generally considered the domain of the chief executive. Presidents have a freer hand in making foreign policy, and it is generally assumed that opportunities exist for presidential leadership in foreign policy that do not exist elsewhere. After all, presidents have greater constitutional and legal authority in foreign policy than in domestic policy, and they can often make policy irrespective of party coalitions in Congress. Our general understanding of presidential leadership is that foreign policy provides greater opportunities for presidential leadership than domestic or economic policy. Political scientists derive theories, such as the "Two Presidencies", to explain why presidents are so successful in foreign policy.

The findings of this dissertation fly in the face of our typical understanding of presidential leadership of the foreign policy process. We witness great successes of presidents in foreign policy (eg. Nixon and China, Carter and Camp David, Bush and the

Gulf War), and infer from those cases that presidents generally get what they want in foreign policy. Presidents base decisions to focus on foreign policy on their understanding that they have greater independence in that area. President Bush states how he preferred to focus on foreign policy over domestic policy because he felt that he had greater opportunities to influence policy. He believed he had a freer hand to deal with issues in foreign policy (Bush statements at the taping of the *Charlie Rose Show*, October 9th, 1998, Texas A&M University).

Despite these traditional understandings of presidential leadership in foreign policy, our examination of one aspect of presidential leadership in foreign policy, public agenda setting, has shown that presidents are lacking in their capacity to lead the policy process. The president's public agenda in foreign policy is typically not of the president's making and this limits the president's ability to sustain media and congressional attention to foreign policy issues.

This is a surprising finding. How do we reconcile the success presidents seem to have in foreign policy with the lack of presidential dominance portrayed in the findings? A large degree of reconciliation comes from understanding that the conventional wisdom probably overstates presidential dominance of the foreign policy process. The results become less surprising when couched in previous research on presidential leadership of the public, Congress, and the media. Presidential scholars understand that presidents are often handicapped by their environments when trying to lead in American politics. This is most eloquently stated in Nuestadt's (1960) seminal work, *Presidential Power*, where he argued that presidential power does not stem from the formal powers of the office, but

rather the ability of presidents to bargain with and persuade other important political actors. In studying the president and foreign policy, we often lose sight of presidential power as persuasion and become enamored with the obvious advantages presidents have in formal, legal, and informational powers. Neustadt's theory certainly has withstood the test of time, and now the theory's implications have been shown empirically in relation to foreign policy. Presidents cannot speak on a foreign policy issue and expect others to follow their lead. Presidents cannot take a trip and expect issues related to that trip to dominate political discussion in American politics. In the words of President Truman, presidents cannot say "do this, do that" and expect things to happen (Nuestadt 1960).

As one noted presidential scholar demonstrates (Edwards 1989), presidents are generally facilitators rather than directors of political change. Agenda setting is certainly critical to policy change. If the president's agenda reflects responsiveness by the president, this supports the view of the facilitator nature of the presidency. Presidents may try to direct in foreign policy agenda setting, and some certainly are successful in doing so. However, in most cases the systemic and institutional agenda is beyond the control of the president. To exercise agenda setting leadership, presidents must be willing to facilitate rather than direct. Recognizing the limited capacity of the office to directly effect the agenda increases the president's chances to successfully influence the agenda. President Clinton successfully kept NAFTA on the public agenda, despite efforts of his own partisans to kill the measure, by doggedly addressing the issue and keeping it the number one foreign trade priority early in his administration. Clinton

adopted a policy priority of his predecessor, thus placing his partisan rivals, the Republicans, firmly on his side on the NAFTA issue.

The facilitator/director dichotomy of presidential leadership (Edwards 1989; Edwards and Wayne 1997) fits well with the two theories presented in the dissertation. Director presidents dominate the agenda setting process and are hegemons in the foreign policy agenda setting system. Facilitator presidents, on the other hand, are responsive to the political system and the policy environment in deciding where to address their limited agenda setting resources. The findings clearly indicate that American presidents in foreign policy are more pluralists than hegemons, more facilitators than directors.

Understanding these limitations of the presidency in foreign policy is critical in assessing presidential leadership in foreign policy. In general, the American public have extremely high, unrealistic, and contradictory expectations of the president (Edwards 1983; Wayne 1982). I would argue that foreign policy scholars and presidential scholars alike (as represented by the conventional wisdom and theories like the "Two Presidencies") have similarly unrealistic expectations of presidential dominance in foreign policy. The conventional wisdom that presidents are somehow advantaged in foreign policy when dealing with the public, the media, and Congress lacks an understanding of how the realities of the American political system fit into a vibrant international system.

Certainly, the research presented in this dissertation does not completely explain why the conventional wisdom may overstate presidential influence in the foreign policy process. The research offers insight into only one aspect of presidential leadership, the

president's ability to influence what issues the media and other policymakers address in foreign policy. There are other aspects of the president's relationship with the public, the press, and Congress that are of importance in foreign policy.

The findings certainly question our traditional understanding of presidential power in foreign policy. However, rather than standing those expectations on their head, the findings indicate that our traditional understanding of presidential leadership in foreign policy lacks depth. Presidential influence is usually assumed, but not shown through systematic empirical analysis. Further work on presidential leadership in foreign policy is in order to reconcile the marginality of the president in agenda setting with the obvious strengths the president appears to have in other stages of the foreign policy process. Further analysis could take the shape of focusing examination on specific policy proposals of the president, such as SDI or foreign aid for Russia, rather than public presidential efforts to focus and sustain media and congressional attention to broad issues like the Soviet Union as was done in this analysis.

Normative Implications of Limited Presidential Influence

When we reach conclusions that disturb traditional explanations of presidential leadership, we should reflect on their normative implications. Essentially, is it good for American democracy to have a presidency that is handicapped by events and media coverage of events when trying to establish the policy agenda in foreign policy? Of course, on the reverse, we could ask similar questions about having a dominant executive in foreign policy (Rourke 1983; Sundquist 1981; Weissman 1995).

Some assume having an executive that dominates is especially important for national security concerns (Crowitz and Rabkin 1989; Mann 1990). Having a strong, unitary actor in American foreign policy enables our democracy to deal realistically with international threats (Abshire and Nurnberger 1981). Executive participants in foreign policy generally agree that a strong, unfettered president is a necessity in conducting foreign affairs. Proponents of strong presidents in foreign policy speak of the "good old days" when presidents dominated foreign policy, the days of bipartisanship, where politics stopped at the water's edge. Those days of bipartisanship also brought us foreign policy catastrophes including the Vietnam War and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion.

Perhaps if presidents did not benefit so much from bipartisanship in the 1950s and '60s (McCormick and Wittkopf 1990) and a media that relied on sometimes bogus and distorted official reports (Hallin 1984), tragedies like the Vietnam war may have been avoided. With a more independent media today, one that influences the policy agenda in foreign policy, we must take the good with the bad. Certainly, presidential leadership of foreign policy may be hampered because presidents spend more time responding than leading in foreign policy agenda setting. Presidential weakness in that respect is not necessarily a bad thing. Without successful executive control of information and manipulation of the media, issues find their way onto the foreign policy agenda through avenues other than the president. If, for example, the president would rather ignore issues like Apartheid despite popular will, as President Reagan attempted to do, media coverage of events in South Africa and activity by members of Congress can heighten the agenda status of the issue, forcing the president to act where he would rather

not (Weissman 1995). Such responsiveness by the presidency serves democracy because presidential priorities are not always reflections of the popular will.

Overall, dominance of a policy area by a particular branch of government is probably unhealthy for deliberative democracy. The American political system is not designed for any one branch to dominate in a system of separate institutions sharing power (Nuestadt 1960; C. Jones 1994). Certainly, power in relation to the president and Congress may fluctuate, but both institutions have their responsibilities in all areas of policy. The president and Congress share power in foreign policy, and in some cases the public can become quite concerned with foreign policy operations and their concerns should be reflected by actions of the president and Congress. In terms of agenda setting, those public concerns often are reflected by the public foreign policy agendas of the president and Congress.

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APPENDIX

Explanations of measurement, issue definitions, lag-lengths for the VAR analyses, and complete impact assessment results for Chapter VI are provided in this Appendix.

Keywords for Agenda Measures

The following keywords were used to search the index of the *Public Papers of the President*, the online version of the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*, the yearly indexes of the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, and the database *(Microsoft Access* software) version of the PANDA data set by issue for the years 1984 through 1995. The lists include the words and corresponding years in which they were used. Not all "hits" that came up using these keywords were counted. We read the entire selection from the *Papers* and counted only those paragraphs that related to the issue being measured. For the media measure, we read the abstracts and coded the variables so that only those stories that related to the issues were part of the measure. For congressional attention, only columns related to each of the issues were included in the measure.

The keywords for the *Public Papers* are shown in Table A.1. The keywords for the *Vanderbilt Archive* are in Table A.2. The table provides an exhaustive list of keywords in order to get as many relevant "hits" as possible using *Vanderbilt.* The

Table A.1. Key Words for the Presidential Attention Measure Using the *Public Papers of the President*

Issue Year	Public Papers Key Words
Arab-Israeli Conflict	
1984-1994	Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Middle East (having to do with conflict or terrorism), terrorism, PLO, Palestine
Bosnian Conflict	
1991-95	Bosnia, Macedonia, Coratia, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Montenegro
Caribbean	
1984-1995	Caribbean (all subheadings), Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica
Central America	
1984-1995	Central America, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Contras, Sandinistas
China	
1984-1995	People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong
Foreign Aid	
1984-1993	Aid and assistance using CD-ROM searchable *Papers*
Foreign Trade	
1984-1995	Business and Industry, Commerce-International, Economy-International, Maritime Affairs-country, Export, Import, Country name- U.S. trade.
Japan	
1984-1995	Japan.
Korea	
1984-1995	Republic of Korea, People's Republic of Korea.
Soviet Union	
1984-1990	United Soviet Socialist Republic, nuclear weapons, arms control, Afghanistan, any mention of Soviet Union.
1991-1994	Same as above, except no Afghanistan, and included: commonwealth of Independent States (all concurrent listings), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Belarus, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgzstan, Georgia, Kurdistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan

Table A.2. Key Words for the Media Attention Measure Using the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*

Issue Year	Vanderbilt Key Words
Arab-Israeli Conflict	
1984-1994	Israel, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Beruit, PLO, Arafat, Palestine, Palestinian, Arab-Israeli, terrorism, intifada, W. Bank, Gaza, Golan, occupied.
Bosnian Conflict	
1991-95	Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Sarajevo, civil war, embargo, ethnic cleansing, Moslem, Croat, Serb, Balkans, Montenegro
Caribbean	
1984-1995	Caribbean, Cuba, Havana, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Castro
Central America	
1984-1995	Central America, Guatemala, Belize, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Contra, Sandinista, Noriega
China	
1984-1995	China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing, Peking, Tianamen
Foreign Aid	
1984-1993	Foreign aid, Aid, foreign and aid, Famine, Military and Aid, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Africa (aid related), Afghanistan (aid related), Egypt (aid related), Israel (aid related), Nicaragua (aid related)
Foreign Trade	
1984-1995	Foreign Trade, Trade, International Commerce, Commerce, Economy, International Economy, NAFTA, GATT, Tariff, Quota
Japan	
1984-1995	Japan, Tokyo
Korea	
1984-1995	Korea, Seoul, Pyongyang
Soviet Union	
1984-1990	USSR, Soviet, Russia, Moscow, US-USSR rels., arms control, summit, nuclear weapons, Chernobyl
1991-94	As above, plus: Yeltsin and all former Soviet states listed in Table A.1.

Table A.3. Key Words for the Congressional Attention Measure Using *Congressional Weekly Reports*

Issue Year	Congressional Weekly Key Words
Arab-Israeli Conflict	
1984-1994	Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Middle East, terrorism
Bosnian Conflict	
1991-95	Bosnia, Macedonia, Coratia, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Montenegro
Caribbean	
1984-1995	Caribbean (all subheadings), Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica
Central America	
1984-1995	Central America (all subheadings), Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama
China	
1984-1995	People's Republic of China (all subheadings), Taiwan
Foreign Aid	
1984-1993	Foreign Aid (all see also), Afghanistan, Africa, Egypt, Food for Peace, Israel, Nicaragua
Foreign Trade	
1984-1995	Foreign Trade (all see also), Country name- foreign trade, Exports, Imports, NAFTA, GATT
Japan	
1984-1995	Japan (all subheadings)
Korea	
1984-1995	Republic of Korea (all subheadings), People's Republic of Korea (all subheadings)
Soviet Union	
1984-1990	Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Arms Control, Foreign Affairs (Soviet specific), SALT, START, SDI, Weapons—nuclear, INF
1991-1994	Same as above, plus, CIS (commonwealth), NIS (Newly Independent States), and all of the former Soviet States including: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Belarus, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgzstan, Georgia, Kurdistan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan

Table A.4. Key Words for the International Events Measure Using PANDA

Issue Year	PANDA Key Words
Arab-Israeli Conflict	
1984-1994	Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine
Bosnian Conflict	
1991-95	Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Coratia, Serbia, Montenegro
Caribbean	
1984-1995	Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Antigua, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica
Central America	
1984-1995	Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama
China	
1984-1995	People's Republic of China (all subheadings), Taiwan, Hong Kong
Foreign Aid	
1984-1993	Not measured.
Foreign Trade	
1984-1995	Not measured.
Japan	
1984-1995	Japan
Korea	
1984-1995	Republic of Korea, People's Republic of Korea
Soviet Union	
1984-1994	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kurdistan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Takjikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukrain, USSR, Uzbekistan

Table A.5. Listing of Dramatic Presidential Events Used for Analyses in Chapter VI[1]

Presidential Summits

Geneva (November 17, 1985)
Iceland (October 5, 1986)
Washington-87 (December 6, 1987)
Moscow-88 (May 29, 1988)
New York (December 4, 1988)
Malta (November 26, 1989)
Washington-90 (May 20, 1990)
Moscow-91 (July 28, 1991)
Washington-92 (June 14, 1992)
Moscow-93 (January 3, 1993)
Vancouver (March 28, 1993)
Moscow-94 (January 9, 1994)

National Televised Speeches, Independent of Summits or Uses of Force[2]

Reagan Arms Control Speech (June 14, 1987)
Bush Arms Control Speech (September 22, 1991)
Reagan on Central America (May 6, 1984)
Reagan on Nicaragua (March 16, 1986)
Reagan on Nicaragua (January 31, 1988)

Presidential Trips Abroad, Other than U.S.-Soviet Summits

Bush- Middle East Trip (November 18, 1990)
Bush- Madrid Mid East Peace Conference (October 27, 1991)
Bush- Costa Rica Trip (October 22, 1989)
Bush- Panama Trip (June 7, 1992)
Reagan- China Trip (April 22, 1984)

[1] All dates listed are the first Monday of the week the intervention ocurred.
[2] The speeches analyzed were not taken from Kernell's (1995; Table 4-1) list of "Reports to the Nation" on National Television, Jan. 1953-Dec. 1995. Three of the speeches made Kernell's list; two did not. The two that did not make Kernell's list include Reagan's Arms Control Speech (6/97) and Nicaragua speech of 1988. It is unclear why the Arms Control speech did not make Kernell's list, as it was a nationally televised speech. Reagan's 1988 Nicaraguan speech (not to be confused with several Iran-Contra speeches, which are a separate issue) did not make Kernell's list because several of the national networks refused to carry the speech live.

Table A.5, Continued.

Bush- China Trip (January 10, 1989)
Reagan- Japan Trip (April 27, 1986)
Bush- Japan Trip (February 19, 1989)
Bush- Japan Trip (January 5, 1992)
Clinton- Japan Trip (July 4, 1993)

Clear Presidential Uses of Force

Bush- Invasion of Panama (December 17, 1989)
Clinton- Invasion of Haiti (September 11 and 18, 1994)

Other Major Presidential Diplomatic Events

Clinton- Middle East Peace Signing in DC (September 12, 1993)
Chinese President State Visit to USA (July 21, 1985)

Events Exogenous to the Presidency

Chernobyl Meltdown (April 27, 1986)
Failed Soviet Coup (August 18, 1991)
Death of Soviet Union (December 15, 1991)
Tianamen Square Demonstrations (May 15, 1989)
Tianamen Square Massacre (June 4, 1989)

keywords for *Congressional Weekly* are in Table A.3. The keywords for PANDA are in Table A.4.

The dramatic presidential events used in Chapter VI are listed in Table A.5. Also included in the table are the exogenous events examined in Chapter VI.

Issue Definitions

The operational definitions of the issues examined in the study are as follows:

Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict issue includes all issues related to the conflict between Israel and her neighbors (Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt), as well as issues dealing with Zionism and the establishment of a Palestinian state. International terrorism related to the conflict is also included. The issue also includes American relations with Israel and the nations sharing borders with Israel.

Bosnian Conflict

The Bosnian Conflict issue includes all issues related to the civil war involving the former states of Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. The issue includes the time period beginning with the break-up of Yugoslavia to the direct involvement by NATO peacekeeping forces in 1995. Relations between the United States and all states of former Yugoslavia are included, as well as relations between those states and between those states and other nations.

Caribbean

The Caribbean issue involves all relations between the nations in the Caribbean (Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Grenada, Barbados, etc.), relations between the United States and the Caribbean states, and relations between the Caribbean

states and other nations. The issue also includes all political and natural events that occur within those Caribbean states.

Central America

The Central America issue includes relations between the states of Central America (all states south of Mexico and north of Columbia, including Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama), relations between those states and the United States, and relations between the Central American states and other nations. Political and natural events occurring within Central America are also included.

China

The China issue includes all relations between China and other nations, events (both political and natural) within China, and issues involving Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Foreign Aid

The Foreign Aid issue includes all topics related to the United States giving aid or assistance (humanitarian, economic, or military) to other nations. The issue includes international organizations, of which the United States is a member, that dispense aid to needy countries.

Foreign Trade

The Foreign Trade issues includes all topics related to trade between the United States and any other nation. The issue includes trade embargoes, trade barriers between states, trade treaties and agreements, trade imbalances, etc.

Japan

The Japan issue includes relations between Japan and any other nation including the United States, as well as political and natural events that occur within Japan.

Korea

The Korea issue involves relations between North and South Korea, relations between the Korean nations and other nations including the United States, and political and natural events that occur on the Korean peninsula.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union includes relations between the Soviet Union (or the former Soviet states after 1990) and other nations (particularly the United States). The issue includes arms control, treaties, and diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union (or former Soviet Union). The issue also includes all political and natural events that occurred within the Soviet Union (or former Soviet Union). Finally, issues related to United States spending and production of strategic weapons in relation to the Cold War are included.

VAR Diagnostics

All data series were logged in order to make the stationary. VAR includes a predetermined number of lags of each variable in each equation in the system in order to control for history. The number of lags are determined empirically using the methods explained in Simms (1980). I included the following lag lengths:

Arab-Israeli Conflict: 3 weeks of lags

Bosnian Conflict: 5 weeks of lags

Caribbean: 5 weeks of lags

Central America: 8 weeks of lags

China: 5 weeks of lags

Foreign Aid: 3 weeks of lags

Foreign Trade: 3 weeks of lags

Japan: 4 weeks of lags

Korea: 4 weeks of lags

Soviet Union: 3 weeks of lags

The Simms (1980) procedure entails sequentially adding lags to the VAR system and testing for the statistical significance of each additional lag using a modified F test. I tested lags from 1 through 10 for the VAR systems and arrived at the lag lengths reported above.

To facilitate interpretation of the moving average responses, and because the variables had no natural metric, we standardized all variables prior to the VAR analysis using the following formula: ((x-mean)/standard deviation). All initial shocks to simulate moving average responses are one standard deviation in magnitude. Because innovations are correlated between variables we plotted Choleski orthoganalized responses to one standard deviation simulated shocks.

Complete Tables of Results for Chapter VI

The following tables provide detailed results for the 48 intervention analyses run for Chapter VI. The results include the noise parameters for each of the dependent series, the impact and decay parameters, and the pre-intervention means. All data were logged (for stationarity concerns), but not standardized, prior to running the analyses. All series where pre-whitened, with the final noising models consisting of white noise (see McLeary and Hay 1981 for a complete discussion of this process).

Table A.6. Intervention Analyses of Summits and "Going Public" on Weekly TV News Coverage of the Soviet-U.S. Relationship, 1984-1994[3]

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
Geneva Summit	1.537	0.526	2.408	0.335	0.101
(851117)	(1.812)*	(1.22)	(36.09)**	(7.64)**	(2.31)**
week prior	1.281	0.713	2.405	0.335	0.100
	(1.54)	(2.19)**	(35.97)**	(7.63)**	(2.29)**
Iceland Summit	1.93	0.646	2.403	0.331	0.100
(861005)	(2.30)**	(2.45)**	(36.44)**	(7.49)**	(2.29)**
week prior	1.916	0.761	2.403	0.332	0.098
	(2.36)**	(4.34)**	(36.44)**	(7.57)**	(2.23)**
TV Speech	0.490	0.388	2.41	0.342	0.100
(870614)	(0.583)	(0.246)	(35.80)**	(7.80)**	(2.27)**
DC Summit-87	1.371	-.352	2.41	0.341	0.104
(871206)	(1.75)*	(-0.783)	(35.80)**	(7.45)**	(2.38)
week prior	1.804	0.43	2.41	0.339	0.107
	(2.13)**	(1.02)	(35.80)**	(7.75)**	(2.45)**
Moscow Summit	1.970	-0.176	2.41	0.339	0.100
(880529)	(2.42)**	(-0.460)	(35.80)**	(7.75)**	(2.29)**
week prior	0.231	0.991	2.34	0.341	0.097
	(0.950)	(110.47)**	(22.09)**	(7.76)**	(2.23)**
NY Summit	1.860	-0.230	2.41	0.346	0.099
(881204)	(2.32)**	(-0.602)	(35.82)**	(7.90)**	(2.27)**
week prior	0.333	0.994	2.33	0.338	0.096
	(1.28)	(113.38)**	(23.70)**	(7.70)**	(2.19)**
Malta Summit	1.951	0.575	2.41	0.339	0.101
(891126)	(2.32)**	(1.85)*	(35.87)**	(7.73)**	(2.31)**
week prior	-0.101	-0.977	2.41	0.343	0.098
	(-0.500)	(-15.68)**	(35.95)**	(7.83)**	(2.24)**

[3] Asterisks indicate statistically significant parameters. * p< .1, **p< .05. Also, in all of the interventions, the Q statistics were insignificant, indicating adequate noise models.

Table A.6, Continued

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
DC Summit	-0.001	1.00	2.45	0.338	0.094
(900520)	(-0.124)	(24.47)**	(32.06)**	(7.69)**	(2.14)*
week prior	1.371	0.774	2.40	0.336	0.091
	(1.69)*	(3.38)**	(36.30)**	(7.65)**	(2.08)**
Moscow	2.537	-0.103	2.41	0.346	0.102
Summit	(3.10)**	(-0.334)	(35.78)**	(7.90)**	(2.33)**
(910728)[4]					
week prior	1.139	0.956	2.36	0.324	0.085
	(2.16)**	(29.81)**	(34.19)**	(7.38)**	(1.95)*
TV Speech	0.541	0.957	2.39	0.339	0.094
(910922)[5]	(0.99)	(13.91)**	(32.99)**	(7.73)**	(2.14)**
DC Summit	1.964	0.011	2.41	0.342	0.107
(920614)	(2.35)**	(0.025)	(35.56)**	(7.81)**	(2.43)**
week prior	-0.238	1.00	2.41	0.341	0.105
	(0.89)	(59.38)**	(35.59)**	(7.79)**	(2.34)**
Moscow	0.692	-0.379	2.41	0.342	0.101
Summit	(0.89)	(-0.44)	(35.86)**	(7.78)**	(2.30)**
(930103)					
week prior	1.237	0.307	2.41	0.341	0.105
	(1.46)	(0.46)	(35.59)**	(7.79)**	(2.34)**
Vancouver	1.054	0.565	2.41	0.336	0.099
Sum. (930328)	(1.24)	(0.96)	(36.13)**	(7.64)**	(2.25)**
week prior	1.675	0.659	2.40	0.336	0.094
	(2.00)**	(2.24)**	(36.41)**	(7.65)**	(2.14)**
Moscow	2.749	0.179	2.41	0.353	0.096
Summit	(3.27)**	(0.58)	(35.71)**	(8.02)**	(2.19)**
(940109)					
week prior	-1.843	-0.456	2.41	0.354	0.096
	(-2.47)**	(-1.64)*	(35.67)**	(8.08)**	(2.18)**

[4] The Moscow-91 summit occurred a few weeks prior to the failed coup attempt. It is important to keep that in mind when discussing these results.

[5] Bush's speech on nuclear arms reduction came at a time of great turmoil in the Soviet Union. Much of the significance in the decay parameter could be explained by events exogenous to the president.

Table A.7. Selected Exogenous Events and the Impact on Weekly TV News Coverage of the Soviet-U.S. Relationship, 1984-1994

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
Chernobyl (860427)	2.00 (2.37)**	0.59 (2.00)**	2.40 (35.83)**	0.341 (7.78)**	0.100 (2.28)**
Coup Attempt (910818)	3.76 (4.59)**	0.68 (5.49)**	2.39 (36.38)**	0.330 (7.52)**	0.107 (2.45)**
Death of USSR (911215)	1.39 (2.03)**	0.904 (12.01)**	2.39 (36.52)**	0.321 (7.28)**	0.085 (1.94)*

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

Table A.8. Intervention Analysis of Presidential Diplomatic Events on Weekly TV News Coverage of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1984-1994

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
Mid East Trip	0.913	-0.41	2.42	0.365	0.162
(901118)	(1.15)	(-0.63)	(29.02)**	(8.36)**	(3.72)**
week prior	0.926	0.959	2.38	0.361	0.156
	(1.51)	(21.23)**	(26.43)**	(8.26)**	(3.58)**
ME Peace	1.859	-0.076	2.42	0.363	0.162
Conference	(2.17)**	(-0.17)	(29.22)**	(8.33)**	(3.71)**
(911027)					
week prior	1.589	0.817	2.41	0.354	0.162
	(1.88)*	(4.57)**	(29.01)**	(8.11)**	(3.72)**
ME Peace	1.302	-0.234	2.42	0.364	0.161
Signing	(1.56)	(-0.41)	(29.17)**	(8.34)**	(3.69)**
(930912)					
week prior	1.803	0.522	2.42	0.354	0.172
	(2.03)**	(1.30)	(29.04)**	(8.10)**	(3.94)**

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

Table A.9. Intervention Analyses of Presidents "Going Public" and Uses of Force on Weekly TV News Coverage of Central America and the Caribbean, 1984-1995[6]

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
TV Speech (840506)	0.765 (0.837)	-0.273 (-0.275)	2.10 (18.79)**	0.509 (10.78)**	NA
TV Speech (860316)	0.156 (0.398)	0.993 (30.56)**	2.048 (10.73)**	0.509 (10.79)**	NA
TV Speech (880131)	1.993 (2.30)**	0.901 (12.43)**	2.043 (18.58)**	0.476 (9.80)**	NA
Costa Rica Trip (891022)	1.807 (2.17)**	0.923 (15.36)**	2.037 (18.02)**	0.494 (10.34)**	NA
Panama Invasion (891217)	2.863 (2.95)**	0.790 (6.12)**	2.062 (19.07)**	0.488 (10.17)**	NA
Panama Trip (920607)[7]	2.99 (5.75)**	-0.039 (0.22)	0.273 (4.65)**	0.399 (6.50)**	NA
Haiti Invasion (940911)	2.849 (3.25)**	0.874 (12.93)**	0.807 (9.84)**	0.414 (9.99)**	0.101 (2.41)**

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

[6] For the interventions prior to 1991, the Central American series of 1984 to 1990 was used because a sufficient noise model for the entire series was unattainable. The entire Caribbean series (1984-1995) was used for the Haiti invasion intervention.

[7] Only media attention from 1/91 to 12/95 was used for Bush's Panama Trip. Insufficient noise models for the Central American series necessitated truncating the series to before and after 1991.

Table A.10. Intervention Analysis of Presidential Diplomatic Events and Exogenous Events on Weekly TV News Coverage of China, 1984-1995

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
China Trip (840422)	3.457 (3.97)**	0.486 (2.21)**	0.821 (10.13)**	0.405 (10.12)**	0.159 (3.99)**
PRC Premier Visit (850721)	1.871 (2.26)**	-0.167 (-0.41)	0.829 (10.19)**	0.414 (10.19)**	0.150 (3.76)**
China Trip (890110)	3.176 (3.65)**	0.593 (2.89)**	0.819 (10.03)**	0.410 (10.31)**	0.156 (3.92)**
Tianamen Startup (890514)	3.618 (5.94)**	0.940 (59.79)**	0.735 (11.68)**	0.344 (8.57)**	0.077 (1.91)*
Tianamen Massacre (890604)	2.132 (3.63)**	0.960 (54.94)**	0.747 (10.13)**	0.378 (9.42)**	0.103 (2.53)**

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

Table A.11. Intervention Analysis of Presidential Diplomatic Events on Weekly TV News Coverage of Japan, 1984-1995

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Inter. Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter	AR2 Noise Parameter
Japan Trip	1.884	0.409	1.186	0.221	0.109
(860427)	(1.92)*	(0.92)	(20.11)**	(5.50)**	(2.71)**
week prior	2.653	0.561	1.182	0.229	0.098
	(2.751)**	(2.25)**	(20.13)**	(5.72)**	(2.45)**
Japan Trip	3.608	0.135	1.185	0.221	0.115
(890219)	(3.71)**	(0.502)	(20.09)**	(5.51)**	(2.87)**
week prior	2.783	0.648	1.179	0.223	0.111
	(2.94)**	(3.37)**	(19.87)**	(5.58)**	(2.78)**
Japan Trip	2.357	-0.515	1.189	0.235	0.091
(920105)	(2.69)**	(-2.18)**	(20.41)**	(5.86)**	(2.28)**
week prior	2.319	0.875	1.161	0.207	0.082
	(3.02)**	(13.83)**	(20.60)**	(5.16)**	(2.04)**
Japan Trip	3.674	0.488	1.180	0.228	0.092
(930704)	(3.81)**	(2.40)**	(20.48)**	(5.68)**	(2.29)**
week prior	0.025	1.03	1.129	0.214	0.081
	(0.48)	(54.99)**	(18.42)**	(5.34)**	(2.01)**

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

Table A.12. Intervention Analysis of Major Presidential Diplomatic Events and "Going Public" on Weekly Congressional Attention to Soviet-U.S. Relations, 1984-1994

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Intervention Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter
Geneva Summit	0.137	-0.956	1.284	0.245
(851117)	(0.43)	(-6.76)**	(22.79)**	(5.74)**
week prior	0.260	0.998	1.136	0.240
	(1.29)	(301.51)**	(7.69)**	(5.62)**
Iceland Summit	0.469	0.996	1.106	0.234
(861005)	(2.37)**	(299.9)**	(9.80)**	(5.46)**
week prior	-1.497	-0.165	1.287	0.248
	(-1.56)	(-0.28)	(22.77)**	(5.82)**
TV Speech	1.169	-0.630	1.283	0.250
(870614)	(1.46)	(-1.90)*	(22.68)**	(5.68)**
DC Summit-87	1.231	-0.291	1.282	0.244
(871206)	(1.31)	(-0.45)	(22.81)**	(5.70)**
week prior	0.840	0.964	1.239	0.230
	(1.86)*	(32.70)**	(20.04)**	(5.37)**
Moscow Sum.-88	-0.001	1.024	1.343	0.229
(880529)	(-0.17)	(50.37)**	(20.18)**	(5.33)**
week prior	1.590	0.288	1.280	0.242
	(1.64)*	(0.50)	(22.80)**	(5.65)**
NY Summit	-1.387	0.775	1.296	0.234
(881204)	(-1.58)	(3.60)**	(23.06)**	(5.45)**
week prior	-1.451	0.806	1.298	0.232
	(-1.72)*	(4.73)**	(23.12)**	(5.40)**
Malta Summit	-0.024	-1.011	1.285	0.256
(891126)	(-0.59)	(-114.33)**	(22.61)**	(6.014)**
week prior	1.314	-0.717	1.283	0.250
	(1.81)*	(-3.42)	(22.73)**	(5.85)**
DC Summit-90	0.858	0.457	1.281	0.242
(900520)	(0.88)	(0.51)	(22.74)**	(5.65)**
week prior	1.694	0.534	1.277	0.246
	(1.76)*	(1.34)	(22.57)**	(5.76)**

Table A.12, Continued

Intervention	Impact Parameter	Decay Parameter	Pre-Intervention Mean	AR1 Noise Parameter
Moscow Sum.-91 (910728)	1.642 (1.69)*	0.135 (0.23)	1.281 (22.80)**	0.243 (5.68)**
week prior	0.678 (1.22)	0.943 (13.48)**	1.261 (21.14)**	0.237 (5.53)**
TV Speech (910922)	0.866 (1.07)	0.842 (3.79)**	1.274 (22.18)**	0.243 (5.69)**
Moscow Sum.-93 (930103)	-1.442 (-1.66)*	0.783 (3.94)**	1.297 (22.92)**	0.239 (5.59)**
week prior	0.280 (1.43)	-0.994 (-54.24)**	1.284 (22.61)**	0.255 (5.99)**
Vancouver Sum. (930328)	0.552 (0.57)	0.544 (0.45)	1.282 (22.69)**	0.242 (5.66)**
week prior	1.670 (1.73)**	0.530 (1.31)	1.277 (22.62)**	0.244 (5.72)**
Moscow Sum.-94 (940109)	1.262 (1.81)*	-0.743 (-3.87)**	1.283 (22.56)**	0.255 (6.00)**
week prior	-1.169 (-1.83)*	-0.795 (5.21)**	1.285 (22.76)**	0.251 (5.87)**

* p <= .1, ** p<= .05

VITA

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Publications

"The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting." *American Political Science Review* 92: No. 1 (March, 1998): 173-184, with B. Dan Wood.

"The Legislative Impact of Divided Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 545-563 (April, 1997), with George C. Edwards, III, and Andrew Barrett.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)













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